



OLIVES OF ENDLESS AGE

BEING A VIEW OF THIS DISTRACTED
WORLD AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL UNITY

BY

HENRY NOEL BRAILSFORD


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To Clifford Allen
with the warm regards
of the author
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BEING A STUDY OF THIS
DISTRACTED WORLD AND ITS NEED
OF UNITY

BY

HENRY NOEL BRAILSFORD

AUTHOR OF

"THE WAR OF STEEL AND GOLD," ETC.

*The mortal moon hath her eclipse endured,
And the sad augurs mock their own presage,
Uncertainties now crown themselves assured
And peace proclaims olives of endless age.*

SHAKESPEARE: Sonnet 107



HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

NEW YORK AND LONDON

MCMXXVIII

D443 B68

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PRINTED IN THE U. S. A.
FIRST EDITION
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· TO ·
· CLARE · LEIGHTON ·
· WHO · ENGRAVED · THIS · OLIVE ·
· THE · AUTHOR'S ·
· HOMAGE ·

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INTRODUCTION

Candide Returns to Earth

PIRANDELLO has put upon the stage his six characters in search of an author. I sometimes wonder whether a character in whose veins runs immortal life is wholly satisfied with one incarnation. Corporal Trim would gladly tell how he comported himself amid the barbed wire and the trenches of twentieth-century Flanders. I have caught glimpses of Pendennis, strolling through the Temple Courts on a rainy afternoon, and peering into the eyes of the passers-by, hoping to encounter a contemporary Thackeray among them. And once, when I gazed at the roof of the new Bush building in the Strand, I am certain that I saw Hilda Wangel on the opposite curbstone; she scrutinised me, and then with a gesture of rejection, vanished into the mist and the crowd. But none of these visions was ever quite so convincing as the visit which Candide paid to me in the train, as I was journeying from Moscow to Geneva. Candide, I had always supposed, goes satisfied among the immortals. He found Voltaire. Could he ever wish to tell his story again? Besides, he had attained rest at the end; I had not

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supposed that he would go travelling again. Armies have come and gone since he bought his farm in the outskirts of Constantinople. I am sure that he went on pruning his fruit-trees while King Ferdinand's men performed their Bulgarian exercises outside the lines of Chataldja. Frère Giroflée did not so much as look up from mending the garden-seat under the fig tree when the *Goeben* cast anchor off the shore of their estate. And though Candide might with ease have assembled, on any day since 1918, another half dozen fallen monarchs to pass the Carnival at Venice, I had supposed that his diamonds and his sequins were long since exhausted, and that he supped no more with kings. Once, in a little Turkish café, above the Sweet Waters of Europe, amid poplars and cypresses, I fancied, as I blew the smoke from my hookah, that I saw him selling his salads at the gate to the gossiping *cafedji*. "So Abdul Hamid is dead," said the *cafedji*. "Allah is compassionate and merciful." "And who," answered the gentle, white-bearded old man, as he offered a bouquet of stocks to the *cafedji*, to complete their bargain—"pray who was Abdul Hamid?" It may have been Candide. Certainly, if I may judge from the lettuces, his garden was well cultivated.

But on this last occasion I felt less doubt. I

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may have fallen asleep in the train. One is never aware in a Russian train of the passage of time. One seems to waken with a start, but when one looks out, the landscape is unchanged, and one doubts whether the train can have moved. The same snow covers the same flat land; the same fir-woods alternate with the same birch-woods; the same peasant, in the same sheepskin coat, is driving his sledge towards the same monastery on the horizon. So same, so still, so eternal he seems, as he glides imperceptibly over the snow, that one feels of him as Keats felt about the lovers on his Grecian urn; he will never reach the monastery. There is only one relief from the monotony of these landscapes—the Russians whom one meets in these trains. For they are always surprising. Indeed, as an anonymous writer has put it, who may have made this same journey from Moscow to Geneva:

When God had made the Alps, his weary brain
Flagged, and he flattened out the Russian plain.
“Cover it up,” the pitying angels cried,
And made the snow his handiwork to hide.
Whereat the Lord was piqued, and straightway sent
The Slavs to show that he could still invent.

We were alone in the carriage, and the stranger was sitting opposite me. I did not recollect seeing him enter. He looked much as Voltaire described

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him: "a young man to whom Nature had given the most agreeable manners. His face proclaimed his soul. He had an honest understanding, and a mind of great simplicity; it was, I suppose, for this reason that he was called Candide." The train had stopped at a wayside station. Beyond it, on the side of the road, I could see a dilapidated wooden cross; the inscription was barely decipherable, but I could just read the words "Tomb of Refugees." I enquired from my companion whether he knew anything of the circumstances. "Yes," he answered; "it happened during the Great War. In Berlin the pastors were praising God for Hindenburg's masterly advance, while in Petrograd the priests were thanking Him for the no less masterly retreat of the Grand Duke Nicholas. Because the Grand Duke dare not leave one Christian population to the mercies of another, his Cossacks with whips and compassion drove the orthodox inhabitants before them, while they left the Jews to expiate the crime of their race. It happened that typhus visited the trains in which the fortunate Christians were packed, and many thousands quitted this best of all possible worlds before they could reach their destination. They were flung out and buried here." And then his countenance clouded, and he wept ingenuous tears. "Oh, my master," he cried, "the greatest of all

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philosophers in the province of Minsk and consequently in the whole world, shall I never see you again, or sit at your feet while you explain to me, that all is for the best, though you were driven from your home by Cossack whips, packed with ten thousand other recipients of the bounties of creation in a Russian train, left without doctor or nurse to moisten your lips, while typhus was the sufficient reason of your miserable end, and then flung with a hundred other Christians into this wayside pit? Dear Pangloss, is your wisdom, which reasoned so bravely of the cause and the effect, for ever silent? But all this happened"—he paused, musing as he spoke—"before the Allies had brought to its fortunate conclusion the war which ended war."

I was delighted by the old-fashioned turn of his phrases, and amused by the serenity of his optimism, but had I heard him correctly when he uttered the familiar name of Pangloss? The stranger was now expounding for me, the metaphysico-theologico-cosmological system of this ornament of his species. He was at pains to report with especial accuracy the argument by which the esteemed Doctor had accounted for the survival of war in the best of all possible worlds. But it was, I gathered, a transient accident which humanity would presently surmount. Kings and

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autocrats were its cause, if I understood him correctly, and the spread of democratic institutions must bring it to an end. He had reached this point, when, the train stopped again at the next little wayside station. Some of its buildings had just been completed, and others still bore the marks of fire. Beyond it lay the relics of a once prosperous village. Its plan was outlined with admirable distinctness by the remains of its blackened walls. A group of ancient Jews with long coats and sweeping grey beards gossiped dismally on the platform, as we strolled up and down. We fell into talk with them and they told us how, some years earlier, a Polish army, bent on creating a new world on a foundation of democracy, while retreating from a Russian army, which professed a like ambition, had burned their village, in which it saw an offence to its ideals of Republican fraternity. The younger women were violated as much as it is possible to be so, while their elders, before their throats were cut, were stripped of the ornaments which might have obstructed their entry into the Kingdom of Heaven. A young Jew enquired of us whether it were yet possible to take ship to New York, but an older man argued that it was preferable to assist in building the New Jerusalem on the consecrated soil of Zion, where deposits of petrol were recently discovered. "All

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is for the best," mused the stranger, "none the less, these Jews conceive that it is better beyond the seas."

He was beginning to demonstrate their error to them, when one of them chanced to mention the name of the village. It affected him so deeply that it was with difficulty that I carried him back to the train. "This, then," he continued, when he came to himself, "was the village of Kumanovo, in which my beloved lady, Mademoiselle Cunégonde, suffered the most disastrous adventures of her career, and here it was that she met M. de Marmontel, who for the love that he bore to humanity carried her as his mistress to China, and there abandoned her. Oh! my dear master, how wisely did you reason of the effect and the cause, and how surely did you perceive that all is for the best! For it is certain that unless Mademoiselle Cunégonde had first been driven by the Cossacks of the Grand Duke from the home of her childhood in the province of Minsk, she would not have taken refuge in the other estate which her distinguished family possessed in the village of Bogomolova in the province of Vladimir. Again, had she not taken refuge in Bogomolova, she could not have escaped its flames, when, amid the convulsions which attended the revolution throughout Russia, the revolted peas-

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ants burned the mansion of her family with all that it contained, divided her ancestral lands, and cut the throat of her father, Prince Minsky-Djerjinsky, as he was endeavoring to rescue her from the embraces of a class-conscious but drunken peasant. Nor unless this peasant had carried her off to his own bed, could he have wearied of her, and transferred her for a consideration to the rich Jew Rosenthal, who took her with him to the village which we have just left behind us. And again, had she not spent two years as the darling of this Jew in this very village, she would not have been present when the liberating army of the Polish Republic burned it to the ground, and slew her Jew before her eyes. For this accident was it due that she had the good fortune to encounter M. de Marmontel. He is by profession a writer whose talents have brought him deserved celebrity, for he accompanies the armies of France and her Allies, doubtless with the laudable intention of explaining how their exploits fit into the happy framework of this best of all possible worlds. The sufferings of the chosen people moved him to deep pity, and perceiving that my dear Cunégonde was young, fair, penniless, and unattended, he determined to satisfy his boundless instincts of compassion by succouring the stricken population of the village in

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her person. Had he not taken her with him to China on his next journalistic expedition, to wash his linen and satisfy his natural cravings, he could not have abandoned her, when he transferred his affections to an attractive missionary. And, finally, had he not left her, without a penny to pay their score in the Chinese inn where they lay, she would not have been cast as a debtor into the filthiest cell of a Chinese prison. There she fell under the protection of a colonel of "White" Russian mercenaries in the Chinese service, whose favourite she still was when I met her after our ten years' separation. Oh, my dear master, how wisely did you reason of the inevitable connection of events, and how convincingly would you have proved that all is for the best, since it was only by reason of this series of exiles, burnings, violations, murders, desertions, and imprisonments that I met my dear Cunégonde at last, and snatched her from her Russian colonel, by running him through the body!"

From the rich stores of wisdom which the stranger had derived from his master, Pangloss, he was beginning to congratulate humanity on its fortunate delivery, through the glorious victory of the Allies, from the ancient institution of war, when I, perceiving that he was indeed Candide, begged him to recount his history to me.

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It was as I expected. He was the natural son of a lady of the illustrious house of Minsky-Djerjinsky; he had the good fortune to be instructed in the sciences by his tutor, Dr. Pangloss, and on the threshold of manhood, as he chanced to kiss the fair Cunégonde behind a screen, his ecstasy was interrupted by the boot of Prince Minsky-Djerjinsky, who drove him with curses from his door. He arrived in the town of Minsk to find that mobilisation was in progress, for the Autocrat by right divine of all the Russias, together with Poland, Finland, Georgia, and a part of Armenia, moved by the sublime intention of vindicating with fire and sword the outraged rights of little nationalities and the institutions of democracy, was about to invade the territories of the Emperor by right divine of Germany, together with Alsace, Lorraine, Schleswig, and a part of Poland. Candide had been trained by his master Pangloss in a deep devotion to the inseparable ideals of peace and democracy; conceive, then, with what natural enthusiasm he shouldered his rifle for the Autocrat of all the Russias. The regiment in which he soon found himself a lieutenant prepared itself for the holiest of all crusades, by practising with great piety the manipulation of the rifle and bomb, and by attending on Sunday the various churches, Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant,

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and Hebrew, which are the ornaments of the town of Minsk. In each of these the priest explained that the conscripts who attended the neighbouring churches must infallibly be damned by an all-merciful God, but all agreed to predict that through His favour, victory must crown the cause of peace, democracy, and the Autocrat of all the Russias. Moved by these exhortations, which had also been addressed with equal fervour to the various confessions and battalions of the opposing side, the Russian army marched with unwavering faith into the marshes and lakes round Tannenberg, in which some hundreds of thousands of its Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, and Jews were pounded by the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish artillery of the Emperor of Germany, while they drowned in the waters or sank in the bogs. Candide was among those who had the honour of surrendering their swords to the victorious army.

In the fortress to which he was consigned, Candide, who had been brought up by his venerated tutor to entertain a deep respect for theology and philosophy, attended with becoming zeal the ministrations of the chaplain. After this holy man had delivered a moving address on Christian charity and our duty to our neighbour, Candide with that simplicity which never left him, ad-

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dressed to him the request that he would open the doors of the fortress and restore him to liberty. "Liberty," answered the good man with a frown, "is the most precious of all God's gifts to mankind; it must therefore be strictly rationed." As the years went on, Candide, who was passionately devoted to music, applied his mind to two problems—how he might console himself with his favourite distraction, and how he might be reunited with his beloved Cunégonde. He collected from his fellow-prisoners during many months the matches which they had used to light their cigarettes, and succeeded, with a pot of glue, in making a violoncello which sufficiently resembled the instrument which he was wont to play at home, when his dear Cunégonde with her violin, and Dr. Pangloss at the piano, performed with him the trios of Mozart. As he scrambled over the wall of the prison courtyard on a dark night, with his 'cello under his arm, he chanced to drop it upon the doctor of the fortress, a man of free-thinking opinions and of Polish origin, who at this late hour was returning from a concert, humming, as he walked, the strains of the "Ode to Joy" from the Choral Symphony. The doctor, whose duty it was to arrest him on the spot, was so touched by the sight of his 'cello made from matches, that he was betrayed by his sympathy

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into conducting Candide to his home. There he spent many agreeable weeks over the Trios of Mozart, while his former comrades furthered the inseparable causes of democracy and peace by drowning themselves in the marshes of the Pripet to the accompaniment of the German guns. It chanced, one evening as Candide was playing the Trio of E Major with the doctor and his daughter, that his sleeve brushed against the arm of that young woman, who was young and fair like Cunégonde, and forgetting himself for a moment, he kissed her shoulder. "Mademoiselle Cunégonde," he murmured, "will forgive me this infidelity, when at length we meet." The doctor, chancing to turn round from the piano, saw the incident, and hearing Candide's exclamation, determined to help him further on his way to rejoin his mistress. Disguising him as his own son, he took him with him to Sweden. It was with a natural astonishment that Candide witnessed the singular behaviour of the inhabitants of this country, for though they professed the same devotion to democracy and peace as the rest of mankind, they had not mobilised their army, nor did they drown themselves in marshes.

From Sweden, Candide travelled to Russia in the company of a Belgian Minister, an English feminist, and a French Socialist deputy, who were

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all bent on convincing the Russian people of the immense advantage of universal war, and of certain Russian Socialists who advocated the superior claims of civil war. He learned that without loss to the cause of democracy and peace, the Autocrat of all the Russias had been deposed. Finding that his fellow-countrymen were about to engage in civil war, he was at a loss to decide which side he should take. "Oh, my dear master," he cried, "you were always an advocate alike of democracy and of peace! I find myself between two bodies of men each bent on exterminating the other. One side maintains that eternal peace can come only from prosecuting the present war to the bitter end, and it holds that true democracy requires that men should vote, each in his district, for a Parliament, while the other side maintains that peace will come by ceasing to wage war, and for them true democracy is attainable only if men vote, each in his factory, for a Soviet. All is for the best, and it is highly reasonable that men who hold these diverse opinions should cut one another's throats; but ponder as I may upon the causes and the effects and on the sufficient reason, I am at a loss to know whose throat is the apter to be cut." As he spoke these words aloud in the street, his doubts were providentially resolved, for a man of the latter party, at the head of a group of armed work-

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men, addressed him with injurious words as a *bourgeois* and a hireling of the Imperialists, and would have felled him to the ground, had he not drawn his sword and run him through the body. Thus the law of self-preservation decided that Candide should take the side of the *bourgeoisie* in the Russian civil war.

For two years Candide served with distinction in the army of Admiral Kolchak. Fired by the example of his more experienced elders, he became an adept in the art of burning villages, breaking bridges, destroying the machinery of factories, massacring Jews, and other martial exercises prescribed by the rules of war. None the less, the proficiency of the White Army in these arts failed to win the regard of the local populations, and it was compelled to retreat through Siberia to the confines of China. The greater part of it perished on the way, and the survivors, as they meditated on peace and democracy, maintained themselves by following the profession of banditry. Arrived in China, Candide looked about him for a means of earning his bread. From the estimable Dr. Pangloss he had learned many arts both useful and agreeable. He wrote a fair hand, he knew the Calculus, and read the ancient philosophers in the original tongues; he could demonstrate with much cogency that all is for the best,

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and he played skilfully on the 'cello. He found, however, that none of these accomplishments would provide him with bread. He was like to perish of hunger, when he observed from the familiar signs that here also men were devoted to the cause of democracy and of peace. The railways fulfilled their function by carrying troops; the villages were burning briskly as they do in the West, and the prisons were well filled. Falling in with a fellow-officer, who assured him that a man who measured five foot ten inches and knew the management of a rifle, need never starve, Candide engaged himself with other Russians of the White Army in the service of Marshal Chang Tso-Lin.

It happened that this army, more fortunate than others in which Candide had served, had occupied the city of Peking. Busied, one Sunday, with his military duties until far into the evening—for he had supervised the sack of the richest quarter of the native town and commanded a platoon which shot eighty-nine Chinese democrats and fifty-seven trade union leaders—Candide returned, hungry and belated, to the mess room of his regiment. He found that his companions were feasting to celebrate their victory. Flushed with wine, the colonel, who had brought his mistress with him, had ordered her to undress and

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stand upon the supper table, that the officers might see the perfection of her form. As Candide entered the room he saw her step down from the table, pick up the colonel's riding whip, and strike him deliberately with it in the face. Something in the proud grace of the young woman seemed to him familiar, and with a cry of joy he rushed to the side of his beloved Cunégonde. He was always quick with his hands, and it was with him the work of a moment to draw his sword and challenge the colonel to mortal combat. The duel took place in due form at dawn outside the city walls, and ended, almost as soon as it had begun, in the death of the colonel.

Candide was now a fugitive in a country where retribution is swift, but the fair Cunégonde was with him, and reunited at last, after so many trials, they fled at their best pace into the open country. The headless trunks of a score of trade union leaders dangled from the walls, and reminded them that in this climate it is dangerous to delay. They made their way to Tientsin, which at that time was governed by the illustrious war lord Wu Chang-Shi. Unhappily for Candide, that potentate chanced to see Mademoiselle Cunégonde in the street, and sent to invite her to take up her residence in his palace. The messenger, who had a sufficient escort, intimated that Candide was not

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included in the invitation and that his master was not accustomed, in affairs of this nature, to pardon delay. As Candide was about to dispute the urgency of the case, a second party of armed men drew near and enquired of the messenger whether he had seen the murderer of the Russian colonel. "Fly," whispered the fair Cunégonde. "Remember the consolations of our venerated master, and be sure that we shall meet again."

"Tell me," I asked, for I had not forgotten the familiar sequence of events, "did you find your way to the Kingdom of Eldorado?"

"That also befell me," Candide answered, "but it is not known to geographers under that name."

To shorten a long story, after many wanderings and the most surprising adventures, Candide found himself shooting the rapids of the Yangtse in the company of a wealthy but kindly Englishman who was bound for Shanghai. He interested himself in Candide's case, assured him that a supply of money was all that he required for the recovery of his lost Cunégonde, and promised to show him at their journey's end how he might come by it. Candide at first was dazed by the magnificence of all that he saw around him in the International Settlement. It was not at first apparent to him from what source its white inhabitants drew the wealth which enabled them to summon from all

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over the world the giant ships that lay along its quays, to construct the machines which spun their cotton and their silk, and to build the palaces and the clubs in which they enjoyed their abundant leisure. A dim memory stirred in him of the land where each road is paved with diamonds, and the soil as full of gold as a common field of flints. He put his difficulty to his English guide. "Come with me," said the other, and beckoning to two yellow men who stood with bowed heads panting by the roadside, the pair were presently rolling along in chariots drawn by human steeds. They passed at a rapid pace teams of men and women who dragged heavy drays behind them, straining at the ropes as the sun beat upon their naked backs. The road swept through a quarter of the city where the ground was cumbered by a vast disarray of shelters which barely concealed the inhabitants from the eyes of the passers-by; children waded up to their knees in the slough of filth which surrounded what apparently were habitations. "And these, I conceive," said Candide, "are the stables."

They paused to glance through the open door of a vast and ugly building. Amid deafening noise, in a stifling cloud of dust, row upon row of little yellow children were standing in front of machines which moved with an admirable regu-

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larity under their fingers. From time to time a child's head would drop upon its breast, but in Eldorado one does not capitulate readily to nature. To cope with the infirmities which survive even in that paradise, there were at regular intervals among the rows of machinery men who walked about with wands of cane in their hands. That plant has the property of dispelling drowsiness.

They continued on their way until they reached a building of an imposing dignity. Entering its doors, they observed a big soldier of the same yellow race, who was depositing on the counter a great horde of silver and gold. At last, thought Candide, in his simplicity, I have seen wealth. But what was his surprise when the big man, bristling though he was with a sword and revolver and an even more terrible pair of mustachios, accepted in exchange a bundle of scraps of paper, and went out with every appearance of content. Following his guide, Candide then saw in an inner room a press by which these scraps of paper were multiplied. "And of what conceivable use," asked Candide in amazement, "is your paper?" "Come with me," said his guide, and stepping once more into their chariot, they were whirled along until they reached the market place. Holding one of these scraps of paper in his hand, his guide enquired from the yellow men who

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thronged around him, what each would do in return for it. "I would carry you over the mountains for thirty days in my ricksha," said one. "And we," shouted a great chorus, "would stand for twelve hours a day for a month at your spinning machines." "And I," cried a young woman more comely than the rest, "I will give you joy in my arms." "And I," said a sturdy young man, "I will stand in the ranks for you, and kill whom it is your will to kill."

Candide was a youth of good natural parts. He soon learned the mystery of printing and utilising paper, and his guide put him in the way of turning his knowledge to advantage. Even in his 'prentice hands, the spell worked infallibly, and he found that for him also the children would spin, the coolies would run, and the young men were willing to kill and to be killed. He applied himself with much assiduity to his new tasks, for he never lost sight of his purpose of rescuing Cunégonde from her captivity in Tientsin. With the proceeds of one year's stay in Eldorado he was enabled to seduce from their allegiance one war lord, three generals of division and five brigadiers, and these, issuing a manifesto, proclaimed in the name of democracy and of peace their unshakeable resolve to drive from Tientsin the war lord Wu Chang-Shi, and to exterminate all

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who adhered to his detestable principles. Their expedition prospered; a hundred blazing villages lit their advance by night, while by day the fleeing peasants spread the terror of their name. An adroit application of paper served to open the gates of Tientsin, and its garrison rushed to enlist among the victors. Arrived at his goal, Candide spent his days and nights in searching for his beloved. By assiduous enquiries he learned that Cunégonde, who by this time had lost the freshness of her youth, had long since ceased to please the fancy of her war lord. Tracing her from one refuge to another, he learned, at length, that she had quitted Tientsin for Europe, in the company of a ship's captain. "All is for the best," mused Candide, "and if I have not yet recovered my darling, I have at least established the reign of peace and democracy in the city of Tientsin."

Our train, as we conversed, had by now reached Berlin. Candide was uncertain what route to follow in his search for Mademoiselle Cunégonde. Unwilling to lose so agreeable a companion, I pointed out to him that he might begin his search as hopefully in Switzerland as elsewhere. While he hesitated, I noticed that he was gazing fixedly at a portly and evidently prosperous gentleman who was taking his place in the carriage for Geneva. With a simultaneous impulse of recog-

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nition, they fell upon each other's necks. "Oh, my master," cried Candide, "is it possible that I see you again and alive, you who were flung out of the train for dead, and buried with a hundred other recipients of the solicitude of the Grand Duke Nicholas, in the common grave of refugees? All is, indeed, for the best. I await but your word to confirm it."

Dr. Pangloss, for it was indeed that celebrated philosopher, was soon entertaining us with an account of his adventures. Water and air were all that he required on the occasion of his misfortune in the train. The rain descended violently before his burial was completed; the grave-diggers retired to drink in the nearest inn, and, as he lay on the top of the heap of corpses, he was enabled to imbibe both elements in great profusion. Coming to himself, he discovered much, in what had befallen him, to fortify his view of the universe. Proceeding on his way to the capital, he found that his talents were soon in great request with successive governments, for as retreat followed retreat and hunger began to prey upon the minds of the people, it became more than ever necessary to convince them that all is for the best. His demonstrations of the necessity of each defeat were welcomed by every lover of democracy and peace. It happened, none the less, on the very

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day when his *magnum opus* appeared, that the Reds overthrew the established order of society. Pangloss adjusted himself to the change with his usual composure. He was seated on an ever-memorable morning in one of those communal soup kitchens in which every citizen satisfied himself that his own hunger was exactly equal to his neighbour's. Over a bowl of thin soup made from apple skins and potato parings flavoured with herrings' heads, he maintained with his usual conviction that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Chancing to overhear him, an officer of the Tcheka¹ beckoned to the guard and had him conveyed to the nearest prison. His neighbour, as he turned to go, appropriated his half-finished bowl of soup. The revolutionary tribunal condemned him to death without hesitation, for uttering counter-revolutionary opinions to the imminent danger of the Soviet Power. For it was evident to the meanest understanding that where all is for the best, no motive can exist for intensifying the class war. The gaol became overcrowded as the morning went on, and with a minimum of ceremony its occupants were ushered into the courtyard. As they were ranged against the wall, Pangloss found himself next to the citizen

¹ The Bolshevik Secret Service.

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who had appropriated his half-finished bowl in the soup kitchen. They recounted their experiences to each other, as the comrade-commander examined the rifles of the firing party. "And why, neighbour, are you here?" asked Pangloss. "I," said the man, "maintained after you had gone, that this is the worst of all possible worlds, and Petrograd the worst corner in it. And that, it seems, is also a counter-revolutionary opinion." They argued so hotly on this theme that the firing party paused to listen. "Petrograd," Pangloss insisted, "is Paradise, for here men eat apples and go naked."

"Stay," said the comrade-commander as he searched his pockets in vain for a handkerchief with which to give the signal to fire. "We may yet have a use for this man. There was a mutiny this morning on board our cruiser which lies anchored in the Neva. The men were tired of apple skins and herrings' heads and demanded beef. Let us see whether this fellow can convince them that all is for the best." His inspiration was instantly approved. Pangloss, with his eyes still bandaged, and handcuffs on his wrists, stood on the bridge of the cruiser, while the guard covered him with their rifles. In this posture he gave the most triumphant demonstration of his whole career, that all is for the best. The muti-

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néers returned to their duty, and in the comrade-commander's cabin Pangloss was allowed to finish a bowl of soup which contained exactly the quantity which he had failed to imbibe in the morning. His execution, like that of the surviving hundred million citizens of the Soviet Republic, was postponed to a more fitting occasion; he was decorated with the Order of the Red Flag, and appointed comrade-chaplain of the cruiser.

Throughout the rest of our journey Pangloss entertained us with his adventures at sea. He was shipwrecked; he was captured by a British warship of the blockading fleet; he travelled before the mast in merchant ships of every nationality. Stoutly maintaining that all is for the best and that the victory of the Allies, by establishing the principles of democracy and the right of self-determination, had made an end of wars forever, he witnessed the burning of the city of Smyrna, saw from an empty coaling ship the victorious occupation of the Ruhr, heard the bombardment of Damascus, and counted from the coast the air fleets which rained their mercies upon the inhabitants of the Riff. As his vessel entered an Italian port his enthusiasm for democracy prompted him to visit Rome. Hardly had he left the railway station, when he came upon a concourse of black-shirted citizens zealously performing their civic

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duties. They were beating one of the most renowned Senators of Italy¹ within an inch of his life, while in an adjoining street they were burning with the same untiring devotion the library of a world-renowned philosopher.² "All is for the best," remonstrated Pangloss, "but ——" Hearing this rash syllable, the crowd perceived that its work was but half finished, and promptly administered a dose of castor-oil.

At that Pangloss resolved to quit the soil of Italy forever and betook himself to Switzerland, where, as he had been given to understand, the devotion of the citizens to peace and democracy was of long standing. Here, too, as he left the station, he encountered a crowd of citizens bent, as it seemed, on celebrating some crowning glory of their republic. When he questioned them on the meaning of their demonstration, they invited him to join them in rejoicing over the acquittal of a young man who had murdered a Russian ambassador.³ "But did not he murder him?" asked Pangloss. "Of course he did," answered the citizens, and they lifted the young man in triumph on their shoulders. "All is for the best ——" Pangloss began with his accustomed

¹ Amendola.

² Croce.

³ Vorowski.

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intrepidity; but for the first time in his career he was for a moment at a loss as to how he should complete the argument. Seeing him hesitate, a justly-indignant citizen knocked him down; his blood flowed profusely and he lay in a dead swoon. But at that moment a doctor chanced to pass, who brushed the by-standers aside and restored the unfortunate philosopher to life. "I have it," Pangloss exclaimed, and proceeded to complete the argument which the attentions of the citizens of Geneva had interrupted. "All is certainly for the best, for had not the Ambassador Vorowski been foully murdered, I should not have been knocked senseless in the street, and consequently should have missed the felicity of encountering this excellent doctor."

Something in this train of reasoning seemed familiar to the doctor, and he enquired whether Pangloss had at one time imparted his system to an ingenuous young man named Candide. It was, in fact, the free-thinking doctor of Polish origin into whose hands he had had the good fortune to fall. They spent that evening over a Trio of Mozart, and in the morning the doctor, as was his wont, completed one good action by another. He was himself in the service of the League of Nations. Devoted, with an ardour scarcely inferior to that of the philosopher, to the inseparable

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causes of peace and democracy, he at once perceived how invaluable the services of his patient would be to the institution which he adorned. Pangloss was welcomed with enthusiasm on its staff, and from that day to this, though wars have raged and shells, notes, bombs, poison gas, and ultimata have descended in great profusion upon various members and *protégés* of the League, never did he fail to demonstrate that all is for the best.

As he completed his story, the train drew up at its platform in Geneva. As Pangloss and Candide descended from their carriage, whom should they see before them but the good doctor himself. A lady in early middle age stood beside him, carrying in one hand a violin case, and in the other a portfolio of papers. She seemed mature and collected, and in her somewhat rotund but imposing person one could still discern traces of her former beauty. I witnessed with some concern the conflicting emotions mirrored in the still youthful countenance of Candide, for this was the Mademoiselle Cunégonde whom he had followed round the earth and for whose dear sake he had broken prison, run the Russian colonel through the body, and corrupted the loyalty of a Chinese war lord, three generals of division, and five brigadiers. If

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it was with less than the rapture which he felt when first he kissed her behind a screen in the Château of Minsky-Djerjinsky, he did not fail to embrace her. The pair received the congratulations of their friends, and Mademoiselle Cunégonde, who had learned prudence in many formative adventures, made her consent to their marriage conditional on his obtaining an appointment under the League. She was herself employed in its offices, in investigating the white-slave traffic, a duty for which her wide experience admirably fitted her. That evening, fully assured that all is for the best, the three old friends, reunited in the doctor's house, drew tears from the eyes of his family as they played the Trio of Mozart in E Major. Mademoiselle Cunégonde may have lacked something of her former grace in the lighter passages, but her time was impeccable. "I have it," she exclaimed, as Candide, overcome with emotion after playing the dark passages for the 'cello in the second movement, kissed her hand with chivalrous fervour—"I have it; the League is about to disarm the world; it will require a soldier of experience to inspect the tanks, machine guns, artillery, aëroplanes and flame-throwers which will survive the advent of democracy and of peace. That post would suit Candide." He

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listened with rather less than the attention to which his lady had a right. Alternately he stroked the spine of the doctor's cat and drew his bow across the rosin. "But above all," he summed up, "one must play Mozart."

CHAPTER ONE

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DEEP in the nerve centres even of the most civilised men, there lurks an expectation which makes fatalists of us. What has once happened will happen again. This dim, half-formulated belief pursues us alike in our personal lives and in our reading of history. It is a fear which ensures the fulfilment of its own predictions. The man who has failed once in love, or in friendship, moves to a new chapter in his record with a haunting dread that the old blot will stain the yet unwritten pages. Sometimes a dream of warning will repeat itself twice or thrice in those nocturnal musings of our subconscious self, which uncover the pattern on which our experience is woven. There are the same dreams in the life of peoples. To the least reflective of us, as we pause to survey the intricate panorama of our civilisation, the question will occur: Is it, with all its achievements and its bewildering elaboration, more secure than the earlier attainments of our race? Time and again a civilisation has flowered, and before the stalk has withered, the sickle of an invading force has cut it down. History, in our generation, has

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taught us to stand with regretful wonder amid ruins which seem to us more intimate and familiar than the contemporary growths which have covered them. We are at home in Minoan Crete. We adjust ourselves to the ordered life of Babylon. Our studious hours would run smoothly in the great reading room of Alexandria. But the refrain returns in the ballad that we know too well. Through their allotted span, men laboured in hope and security until there came the knocking at the gate, and in a night of terror the labours and refinements of ten centuries went up in smoke. Is there always a barbarian at the gate? Shall we, in our turn, stand shuddering at the news that the dikes are down, and the barbarian flood in motion which is destined to bury our learning with its teachers? Must what has happened happen again?

The habit is more than a literary exercise; it can move crowds and the leaders of crowds to action. It is not only a Volney who returns from his sojourn among the sculptured memories of Syria, to moralise, on the eve of the French Revolution, upon the inevitable ruin of empires. It is not only a Spengler, whose pen, amid the shadows of universal war, traces *the Decline of the West*. Twice, at least, in our own time the dread of the barbarian at the gate has become a motive of

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action. The last Emperor of Germany, whose unbalanced and romantic mind was readily swayed by these emotional promptings, summoned the whole white race to the defence of its culture against the "yellow peril." His fears took shape in the international expedition which forced its way into the forbidden city of Peking. The cartoon which he drew with his own imperial pencil remains as a curious record of this antiquarian fear. But the haunting alarm would not quit us. The nerves of a curious world were ready to answer, when writers warned us of the Pan-Islamic danger, and there are even explorers in this land of shadows who have come back to warn us that the negro race may prove to be the destroyer. But the most energetic of these fears found its stimulus in the Russian revolution. It organised itself. It moved armies and ships. It took shape in the blockade and the sanitary cordon which British and French statesmen, not without some American help, drew round a Russia in birth throes. It invaded her impoverished territory. It squandered on the incompetent leaders of her reaction, for purposes of devastation, the sums which the war-worn West required so urgently for reconstruction. Nor was it a fear which exhausted itself in a single outbreak of folly. It revealed itself again in the extravagance of the

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professedly defensive precautions which the British Government took in China. For, plainly, it was fighting Moscow over the body of Canton. In 1927 as in 1919, it was in haste to destroy an alien but still-struggling force which might one day fling itself upon Western civilisation.

In all these panics and precautions it is a single fear which betrays itself. Whether or not it arises consciously from a backward glance upon the glory and the doom of Rome, it formulates itself in the belief that the danger which besets us is external. We tend to assume that our own civilisation is stable and healthy; the force which may overthrow it is something outside it. One might pause, if it were worth while, to dispute this popular but mistaken reading of history. What the barbarians overthrew, was an empire which had dissipated its own heritage by its social errors and economic follies, and shattered its own title to survive. Immeasurably superior though it was, in its legal organisation and its intellectual tradition, to the primitive invaders who broke in upon it, it had no such overwhelming advantage in its mechanical achievement and its economic structures as our own civilisation can boast. Nor had the Roman Empire ever dreamed, though we think of it as a universal sovereign, of consolidating its sway over the whole earth. Its province was little more than

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the old area of the Mediterranean culture. With the dim worlds that lay beyond, it had no contact, and about them it had no curiosity. Its deficiency in mechanical invention was an obstacle to the effective unification even of the territories which it did know and control. We talk across oceans; it had no swifter means of communication than the legs of a horse. Above all, it lacked the art of printing, without which it is barely possible to attain any intimate unity of thought over wide spaces. To all this there is nothing comparable in our own case. We have forgotten what distance means. The very forces which our civilisation dreads are masters of the last refinements of our science. While our statesmen fulminate against the Russian peril, a man in the heart of the green English provinces may sit in his study and listen to an oration by Trotsky, if he does but possess a sufficiently powerful wireless set. We injure ourselves by indulgence in these historical parallels, for they blind us to the singularity of our case. The Romans, save in an occasional verse of their poets, never conceived it to be their task to unify the earth. We resemble them only in so far as we shrink from that destiny. They lacked the means for success. We fail only in the poverty of our ambitions. It is not the resemblance to what has happened before, which should arrest

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our attention, but the startling and stimulating difference.

IT HAPPENED to me during the worst period of post-war deflation and depression in England, that I travelled alone one night in the train with a Cornish sailor. He talked of the creeks and river estuaries in which great ships lay at anchor, and nothing stirred but the tides. He talked of the numbers of the unemployed in his own union. He talked of his own case, no better than that of his fellows. He knew nothing of the cause. I should have bewildered him if I had suggested that the engines of his last ship ceased to revolve, because a group of directors met round a green table and raised the bank rate. But something he, too, understood of the complicated world in which he lived. He talked of his home to which he was returning. He could recall his Cornish village thriving, while its tin-mine worked busily. It met a peculiar want. The tin which it produced was specially suitable for one particular purpose. It was used to make the tin foil in which packets of Indian tea were wrapped. The plantations which dealt with that particular mine specialised in one branch of the export trade. They

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sold their tea to Russia. And, now, outside the ports through which that tea might have entered, our cruisers were stationed to bar the road. That fear of the barbarian at the gate had worked. It sent the Indian tea-gatherer back to his overpopulated village. It caused the Russian peasant, unable to buy his wonted comforts, to plough two acres for wheat, where he had been accustomed to plough three. It gathered barnacles on the hull of the tramp steamers which would have carried the tea from the Hoogly to the Neva. And in the Cornish village it stopped the wheel which used to revolve above the shaft of the tin-mine, and the miners sat at home drawing their dole for unemployment. As we talked through the night I saw that Cornish village framed in one picture with the Indian plantation and the fields of Russian wheat.

But to say that all the quarters of the world have become economically interdependent, is a commonplace which every child absorbs in his lessons of geography. Yet the same child, without any sense of incongruity or contradiction, will imbibe at the same time another lesson. One large-scale map may show him the world's trade routes, the charted tracks across the ocean, the transcontinental railroads, and even the international air routes which pioneers are exploring; it

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will mark the ports, the coaling stations, and the cable lines. He may continue his survey and turn the page of his atlas, to discover that the world's deposits of coal and oil and iron ore have also been plotted out, its cotton-fields and its wheat plains. So far he is a citizen of the world, and thinks of mankind as a vast coöperative organisation which copes with nature and turns the earth's riches to its common purposes. And then, suddenly, his maps will blush with many colours and he must learn the frontiers traced in blood, the capitals that have endured historic sieges, the towns which are *places d'armes*, and all the complexities of their history which have divided state from state and Power from Power. He learns to regard as natural what is monstrous, as modern what is obsolete—the anarchy in the political structure. There is enough in him of the traditional savage to respond to the conception of the national sovereign state, which will bow to nothing greater than itself. His sense of honour will thrill at the symbol of the flag and all the romantic mythology of nationalism. With that infinite capacity for self-contradiction which it is his human right to indulge from his earliest years, he will respond to the epic of Switzerland's separate existence amid the armed giants of Europe; the phrase about the rights of little nationalities will ring with the note of a

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trumpet, and he will bow his head to the millions who gave their lives in defence of violated Belgium. The infant Aristides within him will feel elevated by the doctrine, at once Wilsonian and Muscovite, at once Liberal and Communist, of each people's "right of self-determination." He will grasp the rule of good manners and political ethics by which one sovereign state refrains from intervening in the affairs of others. And then, if he is an Englishman, or an American, his imagination will expand to revel in the vast extent of the territory to which he is heir, and as he traces the way of his island fathers in distant seas and the paths of the pioneers from Atlantic to Pacific, he will understand that the race from which he sprang took assiduous pains to avoid the blessings which fall in this world to a little nationality.

If that child has an intelligent teacher to guide him through the mazes of modern history, a remarkable superstructure will rear itself upon the light foundations of his notions of nationality and the independent sovereign state. He will learn that the transition from the agricultural to the industrial age began, even in the eighteenth century, to break down the natural limits of the sovereign national state. Its energies were absorbed in acquiring territories beyond the seas in which it saw first plantations from which it might derive

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its raw materials, then markets which it might monopolise as outlets for the products of its weaving-sheds and its foundries, and lastly, fields of investment in which it might employ the capital which accumulated so rapidly, as the surplus of its profitable enterprise. He will understand why the French Revolution, proclaiming to all mankind its doctrines of nationality and democracy, must, none the less, send its General Buonaparte to Egypt; and why in wars which seemed to turn on the right of a nation to shorten a king by a head, or, if you will, upon the ownership of Flanders and mouth of the Scheldt, it happened that Malta and the Cape of Good Hope changed their allegiance, and sundry West Indian islands with them.

The phase of primitive Liberalism and its Manchester doctrine may next engage the attention of our ingenuous child. He will understand the ambition which seized Victorian England, at the heights of its manufacturing supremacy, to divorce politics from economics. The triumphant middle class had used politics, as it conceived its own purpose, to abolish politics at home. It had won power: it would use it to unfasten the fetters which the feudal class had placed upon industry and trade. It believed that free trade and *laissez-faire* must mean at home a free course for its own energies and its own natural ability to organise

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and command. And if it preached free trade to Europe, it believed, with good reason, that the open door would swing wide to admit, certainly the produce of all nations, but, above all, the wares which its own early adoption of the industrial system had enabled its factories and foundries to produce with unrivalled cheapness. It conceived that trade would flow across frontiers, obedient only to the laws of the markets. It did not value colonies, and would have been content to see them go. In theory, at least, it believed that its trade gained nothing from the support of diplomacy and the fleet—a theory which broke down, none the less, with an occasional crash, when it fought its opium wars to open the Chinese market to the poisons of its Indian plantations, the piece goods of Lancashire, and the more spiritual exports of its missionary societies.

The adventure of nineteenth century Liberalism failed for two or three main reasons. In the first place, the Continent, more backward than the pioneering island, in the exploitation of its coal-fields and the adoption of the industrial system, was not content to compete with it on equal terms. Germany, in particular, could raise herself out of her poverty and cope with what looked like overpopulation, only by developing her manufactures. These could grow rapidly only behind a

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tariff wall which would protect her "infant industries." The opposition of the second Napoleonic Empire to her national unification taught her that she dared not undervalue military considerations. Alike to secure her food supplies in war-time and to maintain the fertility of the population from which she drew her conscript armies, she had to aim at a due balance between industry and agriculture, and therefore to "protect," to foster, and to regulate both.

Parallel with this tendency on the Continent, which rejected Cobdenism and brought politics and the state into the closest relation with economics, a change was taking place in the balance of British trading interests. Cotton cloth was no longer the typical export. Iron and steel, as the world called for railways, were taking its place as the substance which dictated policy. Cotton is a singularly unpolitical commodity. One can sell it without concerning oneself excessively with the nature of the government under which one's customers live. Massacres, civil wars, and the more noisy types of tyranny may be objectionable, but trade can survive these accidents. If one sells less cotton in one direction, because there are fewer Armenians in the world, one may profit elsewhere by the growing capacity of China or Africa to absorb one's wares. It is otherwise when one lays

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down a railway. One's capital is anchored in a particular spot. The capacity of the native government to ensure order, and the punctual payment of interest or of kilometric guaranties, forbid the financiers who have sunk capital in these ventures to imitate the naïve indifference of the Manchester school to the politics of distant peoples. The growing export of capital goods to backward parts of the earth, but above all of railways, which was characteristic of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ushered in the epoch of Imperialism. The national state assumed charge of the economic interests of its citizens. Scrip acquired nationality; investments were now as much the concern of the sovereign state as the ears of Captain Jenkins had been in an earlier century. A regular technique of intervention and expansion was worked out by the ingenuity of Foreign Offices. Occasionally women and children were in danger; sometimes (as at Tangiers) a local potentate would box a consul's ears; on occasion, a missionary was murdered for his faith. In the end it was found that nothing less than the control of the finances of the state in question, or its recognition as a sphere of interest, would sufficiently safeguard the chastity of white women and the inviolability of official ears, or protect our missionaries from a martyr's crown.

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The end of the whole matter, in such cases as Egypt and Morocco, was commonly that the Imperial Power took charge of the weak state's "independence," and thereafter the building of railways and bridges, the sinking of petroleum wells and the irrigation of cotton-fields, proceeded with the requisite smoothness. Two things were happening during this process. The industrial Powers were bringing within their own orbit, as colonies, spheres of interest, protectorates, or (latterly) as mandated areas, undeveloped territories which, as sources of raw material and as markets for their own manufactures, would serve to complement the economic structure of the home country. In the second place, they were assuring to the investing class, which is also in every industrial Power the ruling class, a secure and even privileged field in which its surplus wealth might fructify.

One need hardly pause to point out that when capital, still organised in national units, called in the State to safeguard it abroad, to push its claims to concessions and contracts, and to protect it in its often usurious operations of money-lending, it fatally intensified the competition, not merely of rival national industries, but of the whole mechanism which entitles certain states to the name of great Powers. In plain words, when ambassadors

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began to compete one with another for loans and railway concessions, the sanction behind their demands and remonstrances came to be of the first importance. One learned, in measuring the weight of an ambassador's words, to count the tonnage of the dreadnaughts behind him. The epoch of Imperialism was also the epoch of the Armed Peace, which had its inevitable consequence in universal war. The economic motives which, on both sides, inspired that war, were disguised by common consent in wartime propaganda, but they were painfully legible in the terms of peace.

Like the lesser wars of the later nineteenth century, the Great War was caused by the working of economic forces; it was fought to the bitter end for economic gains. The decisive factor which brought victory to the Allies was their command of the economic arm—the blockade. They could deny to the enemy not merely food, but essential raw materials, including, above all, the petrol and the lubricating oil on which the mobility of his armies depended. The all-importance of the economic factor played its inevitable part, while the war lasted, in sweeping aside the proud self-sufficiency of the sovereign national state. The Allies soon learned that they must pool their buying of foods and raw materials in the external market. They bought under the direction of a common

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board. Another interallied authority controlled their supplies of coal. They rationed the tonnage of their shipping, alike for their common and for their individual needs. And finally, in the last phase of the war, they made victory possible by placing all their armies under a single command. That meant the surrender of the sovereign state to the necessities of common action. It involved the abandonment of the most jealous of all historical traditions, and, as M. Delaisi has pointed out, it must have had upon the rank and file of every national army, trained to risk life and limb only for the sake of flag and country, a disastrous emotional effect, had not President Wilson supplied at the critical moment a new myth and a new rallying cry. The myth was a naïve interpretation of the war as an effort to establish world-wide democracy, motivated by the legend that monarchy, or, at any rate, the somewhat autocratic monarchical institution of the Central Powers, was the root cause of the survival of war in our time. But based on this myth was the stimulating vision of a League of Nations which should abolish war.¹

¹ The brief analysis of the war in this paragraph was suggested by the shrewd dissection of it in that most stimulating book by M. Francis Delaisi, *Les Contradictions du Monde Moderne* (Payot. Paris. 1926).

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In the chapters which follow, we shall attempt to study both the promise and the shortcomings of the Wilsonian League as a means of unifying the world. If it is inadequate, the root causes of its comparative failure may be, as our argument will suggest, its ignoring of the economic factor and its acceptance of the myth of the sovereign national state. The abandonment by the belligerent Powers during the war of their full sovereignty was but a recognition, in a sudden flash rather of practical than of theoretical insight, of the fact that in the modern world the sovereign state, as history has known it, has itself become obsolete.

What is left of the old conception of sovereignty? Its association with the national idea has become increasingly slender. Britain and France are not nations; they are empires. Italy would fain imitate them. Japan has her subject alien territories of Korea and Formosa, and her virtual protectorate over Manchuria; even Belgium and Holland have their little overseas empires. And Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Roumania, reconstituted and aggrandised by the war, are military Powers of the second rank, which must constrain large alien populations to an unwilling loyalty.

The fiction survives that all sovereign states are

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equal, and in the League's Assembly they enjoy equal voting rights. In fact, they are graded in a species of social hierarchy. The Great Powers alone are fully independent in the sense that they are active forces in the world. To them, and in the full sense to them alone, belongs the luxury of framing and executing a world policy. They propose; they consent; they, in effect, decide. The Powers of the second rank gain consequence only as the satellites and allies of the greater Powers. The tie is not merely one of paper and sentiment; the Great Power is the furnisher of their munitions and the dispenser of credit. As for the little national states of the third rank—the Baltic republics, for example—they are merely the outworks of the European system, and little can happen within them without the consent of the Great Powers, which, in effect, dowered them with independence, and control their economic life by their ability to give or withhold credit. In this dangerous world, a state of the second or third rank can count on maintaining its independence, especially if it possesses territory to which a stronger Power has a claim, only if it adheres to some armed group or to some overshadowing Great Power strong enough to protect it. To speak of any state which is in this case, as fully independent or sovereign, is to misuse words.

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It must conform its policy to that of its protector. There are severe limits to its autonomy, even in its domestic concerns.

It follows that the tradition of non-interference in the concerns of a sovereign state is observed rather as a rule of good manners than as a guide to action. The interference should be discreet and, as far as possible, secret. For, from the moment that the safety and the major interests of one state depend upon internal happenings in another, it is nonsense to pretend that it can refrain from interference. Not even a Great Power is wholly immune from such "meddling." No one, for example, could read the reports of Ambassador Isvolsky from Paris to Petersburg during the years which immediately preceded the war, and still hold that Russia refrained from any interference in the domestic concerns of France. For it mattered intensely and legitimately to the Tsar's Government whether the Left or the Right, whether a Caillaux or a Poincaré, held power in the Republic. It mattered, above all, because Russia as the ally of France had an interest in her military preparedness. But the restoration of the three-year term of military service on the eve of the Great War could be brought about only by the victory of the Nationalist and Militarist Right over the relatively Pacifist Left. It would have

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been folly on Russia's part to refrain from using any influence to guide the course of French internal politics, which the peculiar social institutions of France allowed her to use. Her influence was brought to bear in several ways, none of them public, but, above all, it was exerted through the habitual subsidising of the French press. M. Isvolsky had his fund from which he regularly dispensed financial aid virtually to the whole French press (with the exception of the Socialist organs) and also to individual journalists. One need not pause to assert, or to guess, that what happened in a great and wealthy country like France, happened also, in far cruder ways, in countries which have a lower standard of morals and self-respect. In the Balkans even a king might be murdered or kidnapped. An examination of the accounts of some Italian newspapers in the early months of the war, when the Allies and the Central Powers were competing to influence the moral judgment of Italy on the justice of their respective causes, might reveal some interesting financial transactions. A Great Power in such an emergency values a prompt conscience.

The war is over, but does anyone suppose that Paris and London, dreading above all things the coming to office of a Nationalist Ministry in Germany, have omitted to use the means which might

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spare the peace of Europe from this menace? A hint may suffice in such a case of the consequences, financial and diplomatic, which must follow an unfortunate choice of Ministers. Austria, in the early months of the peace, was warned by the Allies that any inclination to communism would mean the stoppage of her food supplies. An American administrator of relief has boasted (probably with reason) that he was responsible for fastening the present régime of reaction on Hungary. We are accustomed (long after the epoch of avowed intervention in Russia has ceased) to plain language from Lord Birkenhead and other British Ministers about the present rulers of Russia. Their language may be crude and provocative, and their judgment of the characters of these men as erroneous as it is summary. The interesting fact is, however, that the convention of non-interference by word and deed breaks down in the modern world, because politics are today inextricably linked with the interests of every class which engages in them. A capitalist class must desire the overthrow of the present rulers of Russia; a working class must view their survival with a certain self-congratulation. And so it happens that while Mr. Churchill lavishes public encomiums on Mussolini and the Fascist régime, he denounces the Soviet leaders as murderers. Nei-

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ther utterance was the expression of a disinterested moral judgment. Both meant that it matters to the British propertied class who rules in Moscow and in Rome. With almost equal candour the same British statesmen have in public utterances made plain their disapproval of the Cantonese brand of Nationalism in China, and behind their disapproval there was a formidable array of tanks and cruisers. Nor are these new manners confined to the Old World. American troops have assisted the Conservative party in Nicaragua to demonstrate that it possesses the confidence of the Nicaraguan people.

It would be futile to censure these acts and words of interference. They are inevitable and natural. The moral is rather that frontiers have ceased to limit our actions and sympathies in the political field. The world is today so inextricably one, that it is nonsense for a British or a French statesman to pretend that it is a matter of indifference to him what sort of government rules in Warsaw or Sofia, in Moscow or Hankow. But the pretence has almost ceased to fetter even their public language. It certainly does not fetter their acts. Finance works, even when politicians are silent.

“The right of self-determination” fares no better in the modern world. Let us be clear what

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this principle means. One cannot call it a new idea. It was latent in the claim which the Whigs put forward as the justification for the Revolution of 1688—the right of a people “to choose its governors.” Their statement of it lived and was active in this form for over a century. It forms the refrain of that eloquent sermon by Dr. Price in defence of the French Revolution, which Burke assailed with such unmeasured violence. Even in that form it would work havoc in all our modern empires—even in those which boast a republican constitution. The modern statements of it are coloured by the Mazzinian doctrine of nationality. Every nationality has the right freely to choose its governors, which plainly means that any stock which by the individuality of its culture, the possession of a language of its own, or, one may add, by its consciousness of separate interests, or the heritage of history, feels itself to be a nation, may decide the form of its government and give or withhold its allegiance to any other political unit. This principle, so stated, goes far beyond the Liberal-Imperialist expedient of home rule. It was not fully satisfied, for example, by the creation of the Irish Free State; for Ireland was not free to choose absolute independence.

In its extreme and logical form, the doctrine was advanced in the later phases of the war both

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by Allied propagandists and by the Russian Socialists. Each was using it as a means of disintegrating the forces of its enemies. The Allies meant to apply it as a charge of dynamite which would break up the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, and provide a sound moral reason for depriving Germany of the population (and, one may add, the minerals) of Alsace-Lorraine and Upper Silesia. The doctrine is actually latent in the peace treaties. Its perfect expression is the *plébiscite*, by which a population (one assumes, freely) declares by a majority of votes its preference for one destiny or another. And the *plébiscite* was actually applied, honestly in Schleswig, a part of Holstein, and in the Masurian regions of East Prussia, dishonestly in Eupen and Malmédy, and with disingenuous caprice in Upper Silesia. The doctrine, in short, was applied wherever it might tell against the vanquished. It was not applied when Italy took the German South Tyrol, nor in Macedonia, Bessarabia, and the Ukrainian regions which the Poles annexed. But perhaps the most flagrant denial of the principle is contained in the clause of the settlement which expressly forbids German Austria to unite with the German Reich without the consent of the victors.

It found, once more, partial recognition in the arrangements for the mandated areas contained in

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the Covenant. The preference of the inhabitants of the more advanced of these regions was to be "a principal consideration" in allotting them to the Power which was to act as trustee during their period of tutelage. It was discovered, when the Allies allotted these mandates, that by a sort of preëstablished harmony, the preferences of the inhabitants accorded exactly with the ambitions of the victors: the allocation of mandates carried out the bargains which the Allies had made some years earlier in the secret treaties. There was subsequently reason to doubt whether the Allies had correctly divined the will of the inhabitants. They proceeded, failing a *plébiscite*, to indicate their preferences in the usual manner. In plain words, they rebelled. Clearly the right of self-determination is an obscure doctrine which stands in need of authoritative exposition. In Mesopotamia, the British aëroplanes expounded it to rebellious Arabs from the skies. In Syria, the guns of the French mandatory rained commentaries on the city of Damascus.

Once more let us neither censure nor criticise. It is enough to face the fact. The post-war world is not based upon the right of self-determination. The doctrine is a revolutionary principle, suitable for temporary propagandist use against the other side in a universal war. If Moscow may use it

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without a time limit, that is only because Moscow is morally always at war with the *bourgeois* world. Its honest appreciation would rend the map of the world to tatters. Plainly it could be applied with safety only in a world which had abolished wars and blockades, and worked out a rational system for the apportionment of the raw materials of the earth. For gladly as we may suppose that Liberal statesmen would accord the right of self-determination to their fellow-men, be they white, or yellow, or brown, there is at least one inconvenience to be faced. These men of various colours, whom Heaven has endowed with the faculty of free choice, have only too often the bad taste to inhabit portions of the earth which contain valuable mineral deposits. There is gold in the Transvaal; there is oil in Mesopotamia; and rubber may be grown in the Philippine Islands. One may be willing that the men should choose their governors, but dare one allow the gold, the oil, and the rubber to choose their markets? Even that might be conceded in peace-time, but if these raw materials of victory were to find their way in the next universal war to the enemy, what prudent War Office would guarantee the safety of British Empire or American Republic? One may be destroyed for lack of petrol for one's bombing 'planes and of rubber for the tyres of one's mili-

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tary cars. The right of self-determination implies universal and everlasting peace, and that, as we shall argue, requires a form of universal government vastly more authoritative than the Wilsonian League. Whether, even then, the right of self-determination flows (as the post-war world has stated it) from the dictates of a self-evident morality, we shall discuss in the sequel. To me, at least, it seems a lever of revolutionary disintegration and a relic of anarchist and individualist thinking.

It seems, then, that our post-war political world is riddled with contradictions. It professes principles which it does not and dare not apply. Its equal, sovereign, national states are neither national nor sovereign nor equal. They enjoy the most varied degrees of effective independence. It is hardly too much to say that only the Great Powers possess that actual ability to move and act of their free choice, which truly constitutes independence. They possess, as we have seen, too much good sense to respect in deeds the doctrine of non-interference, which they profess in words. And very wisely they apply the anarchic doctrine of self-determination only when it suits their interests. The world has outgrown these individualistic principles.

Unfortunately, this view of the political world

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is much too summary. The absolute right of a sovereign state to injure both itself and its neighbours does in fact survive. Let Hungary decide of her own free choice (as she once did for a few months) to set up a Soviet system, and she will learn at the bayonet's point that there are limits to the tolerance of her neighbours. But let her play havoc (as she has since done) by means of her tariffs and railway arrangements with the once orderly economic life of Central Europe, and no one will say her nay. The post-war period has witnessed throughout Europe, and indeed throughout the world, a riot of economic nationalism. By its wild ballet of fluctuating currencies, by its prohibitive short-term tariffs, by a dozen new devices of discrimination against foreign trade, Europe in the last decade has seemed to aim in each of the now numerous states into which the Continent has been split, at economic self-sufficiency. One unquestioned right the sovereign national state possesses: it may seek poverty at its own sweet will. America, one may add, is no exception to this rule of nationalist reaction, but America can indulge in high protection without serious injury to herself. She has her own gigantic market of internal free trade. It is otherwise in Europe. Here the constitution of innumerable small economic units, each aiming at self-suffi-

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ciency, frustrates the redeeming advantages of the industrial system. Men are still dragged from the village to labour in the bowels of the earth. They are still herded in overcrowded dwellings which rob human life of every pretension to beauty. All the smoke and the noise and the ugliness of the system are here in triumphant unrestraint. But it fails to make general wealth. The European wage-earner must be content with a half (as in England) or a third (as in Germany) of the real wages which an American worker draws. And the main reason is obvious. The advantages of mass production cannot be enjoyed to the full by industries which must serve the limited markets to which the fiscal nationalism of Europe has condemned them. In other words, the centrifugal politics of this continent condemn it to a fatal poverty. The political form of the world is a contradiction of economic good sense. The titanic power of our machines is fettered and lamed by our political folly.

But the present phase in Europe is full of interest. For while politicians pursue their economic nationalism, the world of industry, obedient to the inner logic of its own machines, is finding out the way to circumvent and override the obstacles of frontiers. The epoch of international combination has begun. The formation of the Euro-

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pean iron and steel cartel, with its power to control the entire production and marketing of these metals and their chief products throughout the Continent, may turn out to be the most significant event of our time. Suppose that coal and textiles and electricity should follow this example. There will then reside, in a few cosmopolitan capitalist groupings, a power over the real basis of our daily lives incomparably greater than any government possesses. If the banks should go the same way, national politics must retire to an insignificant corner of our lives. None of these cartels would be subject to any national government. Our economic life would be ordered on an international plan. Within a generation, when men spoke of the Great Powers, they would mean no longer those governments which sit as a matter of right on the Council of the League of Nations. They would mean the trusts which govern iron and cotton, electricity and money.

It seems, then, that the economic interests of mankind demand a far higher degree of unity than the Versailles Settlement has provided. The political form of the world has ceased to correspond to its economic needs. The problem of our generation is to find this form. Will it come first of all by continent groupings? Will it come through the triumphant dictation of internation-

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ally-organised capital? Will it be imposed by a Muscovite revolution? Or will it steal upon us gradually through the development of the League of Nations? However it comes, it must impose modesty on the sovereign state, and erect above it a supra-national government which will dare to limit its freedom to injure its neighbours, whether by economic or by political unwisdom. The penalty of failure we all know in our hearts. It would not come, as it came to the Romans, by the irruption of barbarians from without. It would come by the fratricidal strife of peoples equal in their murderous proficiency in all the arts of chemical and aërial warfare. But of failure we will not and dare not think. The most powerful of all our instincts seconds the impetus which is driving us, sometimes consciously and often without our knowledge, toward international government. Our instinct of self-preservation will not let us rest until we have solved this central problem of our age. It calls for all our powers. Only by hard struggle and critical thinking shall we crown ourselves with olives of endless age.

CHAPTER TWO

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AN OBSERVER who would study the tendencies which further or frustrate the world's organisation as a unity, must realise today that he no longer has before him a sheet of white paper. Thirteen years ago one might guess and construct at will. In the interval the Great Powers have demolished and rebuilt with a speed and a sweep of arm which recall the impetus of a revolutionary movement. One may think that their work does not deserve to endure the assaults and attrition of time. But it is cast in the moulds which statesmen use when they would build a monument more lasting than brass. The Peace Treaties have legislated for the world: they engage the faith of most of its governments: and if faith cannot ensure their permanence, they have behind them the vested interests of the Powers which concentrate in their own hands the vast mass of the Old World's military forces. Of these treaties one would gladly think that they are hasty essays in reconstruction which await a not too leisurely revision, but in form they seem as rigid as the American Constitution. On the foun-

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dation of this Peace Settlement, as its custodian and interpreter, the victors erected their League of Nations. It watches the map which they drew, like some towering fortress on a disturbed frontier. It too has all time before it: it aims at permanence, and it is nothing less than the first model of an engine designed to control the world. And finally, because the creators were neither satisfied with their work, nor weary of the effort of constructing, they have given to Europe a second charter, and built an alternative foundation—as it were a false bottom—in the system of the Locarno Treaties. They are no less ambitious but more realistic. They do not mistake the world for their parish, as the statesmen of Versailles seemed to do. The Locarno Treaties are an attempt on the part of the masters of Europe to cultivate their garden. They show a limited but practical ambition. Leaving the rest of the earth's surface to enjoy such weather as fate may send it, these Treaties fence in a little oasis of peace between the Vistula and the Atlantic coast.

A first glance at this record might suggest that in eight years the victors had suffered some shrinkage in their constructive ambitions. The League of Nations started with notable exclusions, some punitive and deliberate, and some involuntary, but it aimed at exercising its sway over every con-

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continent. It has since filled some of the gaps, but while its complement of European members is nearer completion, it is further than ever from including the leading Powers of other continents. For while the United States remains benevolent, critical, and resolutely aloof, and Russia stands outside it, half-censor, half-outlaw, Spain and Brazil have withdrawn their support, but Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria have entered. The consolidation which has taken place, whether from accident or from design, has been confined to one continent. That continent, however, remains, paradoxically, what it has always been in history, the centre of the world's politics.

It is a commonplace to say what every alert mind has recognized, that in some measure and for some purposes the leadership of the world has passed from Europe. The contrast between European poverty and American wealth has become since the war incomparably sharper. Whole areas of Central Europe were inhabited for a time by pauper populations. If France has all but completed the restoration of her devastated area, there are still districts on the Russo-Polish border which for years to come will bear in field and woodland and deserted village the scars of the years of war. The riot of the currencies is only now nearing its end. In almost every country the standard

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of living is a little lower, the expenditure on cultural purposes a little more niggardly. Stabilisation has everywhere brought as its accompaniment a restriction of enterprise, and above all in England a part of the population has sunk into a mere reserve to the active army of labour, and the misery of hopeless unemployment afflicts a million men and women capable of useful labour. Debts, domestic or foreign, or both, are the preoccupation of every Ministry of Finance. This burdened continent looks across the Atlantic at a spectacle of unparalleled prosperity. It knows that the level of real wages in America is double the highest average which the most fortunate country of Europe attains. It pictures the American horde of gold as the Elizabethan navigators pictured El Dorado. It tries to visualise the incredibly rapid accumulation of capital in the continent which won the war, and dimly realises what this fertilising wealth might mean to its own penury. Its mood swings from irritable envy, through a moment of servility, to a febrile impulse of defiance. But as yet, this gigantic economic power confers a potential, rather than an active dictatorship. The ambition to assume economic leadership grows very slowly in the fortunate continent; of the lust of political power it appears to be unconscious.

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Europe accordingly remains the focus of power and the conscious leader in the post-war world. Her cultural life is stirred by no potent creative impulse. She originates little that is great in literature or arts, but Einstein stands to her credit in the interpretation of the physical world: she long ago released Bertrand Russell from prison, and Croce survives the destruction of his library. Restless and poor, she still reflects, and a Spengler or a Rivers has illuminated the meaning and origin of a civilisation which may have outlived its period of originality. But this continent is still the arbiter of taste and the school of tomorrow. Its intellectual supremacy is not yet in danger. Its poverty finds its compensation, and in some degree its cause, in the possession and exercise of military power. It draws from its mortgaged soil the bread that nourishes armies numerous enough to dominate the earth. It is questionable for how long, with its second-rate economic structure, it could sustain its military machine in active use. But it is, for immediate application, by far the most efficient and formidable engine of power which any continent can boast. It bestows upon this collective entity of Europe the unchallenged mastery of Africa. It holds in fee a great part of Asia, and only when the affairs of China demand discussion, must it step outside the bound-

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aries of its parish to consult with America and Japan. It retains within its political orbit, though by a slender thread of sentiment intertwined with finance, the British Dominions. And within this vast territory over which its military power gives it command, it reckons great stores of raw materials in some of which it holds a virtual monopoly. It has all the rubber, the jute, and the vegetable oils of the tropics, and it ceaselessly commissions its science and its capital to develop other possibilities.

If Europe is still the political focus of the post-war world by reason of her culture, her military power, and her command over other continents and their resources, she is likely, for another reason, to enjoy the initiative in the international history of the near future. She contains within herself reserves of emotional energy which may seek outlet and activity beyond the frontiers that confine them. Two "armed doctrines" have their base within this continent, Italian Fascism and Russian Bolshevism. The vast mass of the German race has sought and found in hard, constructive work relief from its resentments and regrets, but it has its militarist minority which dreams of reconquering with arms the greatness of its past. The map of this continent is littered with injustices, which have erected on every frontier their fingerposts to the next "inevitable" war.

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The Versailles Settlement brought with it neither contentment nor emotional stability: a continent which is at once so restless within its own confines, and so closely linked with the fate of other continents, cannot fail to provide starting-points for many a chapter in world-history.

IN THREE successive but contradictory shapes the Great Powers have given system and unity to this dynamic continent. Versailles, Geneva, and Locarno stand out as the decisive names in post-war history. A brief summary must suffice to recall the outlines of the peace settlement. It was dominated, as most men now realise, by the sinister genius of M. Clemenceau, a man who atoned for the malice which masked his dealings with his fellow-men, by the love which he bore to his mistress, France. His European system was conceived in terms of relentless and logical realism. He started with the assumption that a race so prolific and formidable as the Germans must seek to repair by arms the defeat which it had sustained. His arrangements divulge a single purpose—to weaken this strong race and surround it with a confederation of allies, for each of whom he provided, in the satisfactions which he furnished for their inordinate appetites,

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a perpetual motive which would forbid them to unite with Germany and compel them to seek the shelter and support of France. The injustices which disfigure the new map of Europe are not accidental. There is no cement so enduring as injustice, if many allies must be united to maintain a complicated and vulnerable territorial settlement. Germany was ruthlessly disarmed, while the victors themselves surpassed the highest pre-war level in their armaments, and knit their forces together in a complex which made of Belgium, Poland, and the Little Entente (Tchecho-Slovakia, Yougo-Slavia, and Roumania) a single military system with France as its nucleus and the furnisher of its armaments.

The war was prolonged to the "knock-out blow" primarily in order that Austria-Hungary, the chief buttress outside Germany of Prussia's military power, might be dismembered and abolished. That was an object which might have been justified by arguments based on the claims of nationality and the general good of Europe. The details of the settlement are evidence that neither of these considerations was the decisive motive. No map could have been drawn, which would have avoided some sacrifice of racial minorities, but at Versailles the ruling principle seemed to be to lessen the man-power of the former enemy

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states, wherever any faintly plausible plea could be discovered, which would excuse the transference of Germans or Magyars to the territories of the Allies. The annexation by Italy on strategical grounds of a solidly German population in the Tyrol, was the most wanton, but by no means the most extensive of these wrongs. Bulgaria suffered in the same way to the profit of Greece, Roumania and Yougo-Slavia. The military motive shouts aloud in the clause which forbids German Austria to exercise her "right of self-determination" by adding her population to the German Reich. To the mischief of these racial injustices there was added a needless aggravation, in the lack of forethought which failed to provide a substitute for the economic unity which had been the chief justification for the existence of the Dual Monarchy. In conferring here the boon of independence and there an immense accession of territory, the Allies might well have imposed conditions which would have preserved the advantages which Hapsburg rule secured. But this great area, which had enjoyed internal free trade and a well-knit system of communications, was broken up among a welter of second-class states, which could look no higher than the pursuit of a narrow nationalism, economic and political, qualified only by the need which they felt to unite their military forces for the repres-

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sion of the injured enemies of yesterday. In this policy of dispersion, which made for every purpose of trade and finance a fragmentary and barbaric Europe, the Allies showed themselves reactionary in their economic outlook where their enemies had been progressive. The war-aims of the Central Powers had gradually crystallised, as the struggle went on, round the conception of "Mittel-Europa." The Germans dreamed of consolidating into one vast economic unit the territories of the allies who formed their confederacy, with as great a stretch of Polish and Ukrainian and Baltic land as they could add to the original nucleus. The plan may have threatened national liberties, for it was clearly meant to ensure Germany's hegemony, but unquestionably it would have advanced the wealth and the material culture of all the peoples within "Mid-Europe" as surely as the ultra-nationalism and decentralisation of the Allies depressed them. It would, indeed, have begun to confer on European industry the advantage which North American industry enjoys, in having at its doors a vast market within which internal free trade prevails. The Allied system which triumphed over this German conception ignored economics entirely; it reflected the ambitions only of the French General Staff.

Such economic thinking as influenced the Settle-

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ment was crude and negative. The amputations which Germany suffered were dictated by the reckonings partly of the soldiers and partly of the industrialists of France. The recovery of Lorraine and Alsace was of course a satisfaction to the cherished traditions of the great mass of their population. But the master-thought of French policy was to win the Rhine Frontier, for military and also for economic ends. These two ends, indeed, are rarely separable in the modern world. The powerful industrial-political organisation of the French metallurgists, which has its direct methods of influencing policy through its hold over the press and its provision of campaign funds to the parties of the Right, desired for its own commercial purposes to control the coal-fields of the Saar, and afterward of the Ruhr and Upper Silesia, together with the iron-ore deposits of Lorraine. Both these industrial ambitions were reinforced by the calculations of the General Staff. The Rhine is a useful military obstacle, and it makes its appeal to Napoleonic sentiment, but no less did it seem a military gain to deprive Germany of these coal-fields and of the chemical and metallurgical industries which depend upon them. Krupp's foundry and the Baden Aniline Works are, to a strategist, points of much greater value than any fortress or railway terminus. This

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Rhineland motive coloured the history of Europe for many years before and after the drafting of the Versailles Treaty. It made its first official appearance in the secret treaty concluded between the French Republic and Tsardom, on the eve of the first Russian revolution, which promised to France, among the richest fruits of victory, the separation of the Rhineland from Germany, and its erection into a satellite state under French control. Mr. Wilson, with the aid of Mr. Lloyd George, gave to this project the less mischievous form of a mixed Allied occupation, which left the political affiliation of this region to the German Reich theoretically intact, and had its time-limit, which, if all went well, was not to exceed fifteen years.

With this arrangement the French parties of the Right and the General Staff were never satisfied. They sought to attain their end by promoting within the Rhineland an artificial separatist movement. They financed it; they supplied it with weapons; and when they judged the moment ripe, they favoured the operations of the handful of adventurers and criminals who attempted to seize the administration by an armed conspiracy. Their policy throughout the earlier years of the occupation seemed to be to drive the loyal German population of the Rhineland to despair, in the

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expectation that it would eventually consent to save itself by cutting its connection with the Fatherland. The occupation of the Ruhr was inspired by the same mixed yet consistent calculations. It had been preceded by persistent attempts on the part of the French metallurgical interests to form some kind of cartel or trust with the Heavy Industries of the Ruhr. German coke was necessary for the working of the iron-ore of Lorraine, while any combination of the iron and steel interests of France and Germany could readily dominate the entire European markets. In these early approaches, the French had been too exacting and had imposed a constitution, which would have given them a controlling vote. That was intolerable to the more advanced and powerful German industry, and here patriotism may have reinforced self-interest. The Occupation of the Ruhr, as it was conceived by M. Poincaré (who had been, as a lawyer, very closely associated with these metallurgical organisations), may have been designed to serve three purposes. In the first place, if it did not actually yield a rich harvest of reparations, it would at least serve as a bargaining counter to extort this desirable object in some other form; and this was, indeed, what happened, for the Occupation of the Ruhr opened a sore so intolerable in Europe that the rest of

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the world was morally driven to intervene with the Dawes scheme. In the second place the Occupation of the Ruhr, if it could be prolonged indefinitely, as M. Poincaré repeatedly threatened, even in a mild and "invisible" form, would in effect add this invaluable territory to the Rhineland, and bring it eventually within the separatist satellite state. Thirdly, the pressure of the Occupation, which fell most heavily on the coal-owners, might have the effect of driving them to make their peace with France by entering the French industrial organisation. The economic separation of the Ruhr from the body of the German nation, which was in fact complete during M. Poincaré's conduct of the Occupation, would have realised the Clemencist conception of a satisfactory peace in an almost ideal form. For while it strengthened the reserves of the French system, it would have reduced Germany to the level of a second-rate industrial Power; it would have lessened her capacity to produce munitions, compelled her to rely on her agricultural resources, and driven a large part of her population to emigrate if it could have found any outlet in a world which was sedulously closing its doors against her children.

The Ruhr adventure failed to achieve its more crudely conceived purposes, but it helped the world to realise the monstrous possibilities of the

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Rhineland Occupation. When the revolt of the French electorate against M. Poincaré led, after considerable delays and much hard bargaining, to the evacuation of the Ruhr and the restoration of Cologne to Germany, it became morally almost impossible to conceive of the continuance of the Rhineland Occupation for its prescribed term. In a settlement so heavily charged with all the poisons and explosives of illiberal statecraft as that of Versailles, it is hard to fix upon its worst element. But this Occupation has done more than anything else to weaken the mood of regret and self-examination which prevailed very widely in Germany immediately after the Armistice, and to check the growth of an international consciousness in her population. It saw itself perpetually humiliated and threatened; it dreaded the loss of this legendary German land; it was assailed in its self-respect, and injured in its pocket by the daily details of a costly and inconvenient intrusion; French propaganda insulted and stimulated its patriotism; its nerves were exasperated by the pettiness of military regulations; above all, its racial pride was outraged by the employment of coloured troops. Nor were these effects confined to the inhabitants of the Rhineland. Every German newspaper must report the periodical incidents, the violent outrages and the unjust dealings

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of the French courts martial. The spirit of revenge was nurtured on this spectacle, and it grew rapidly amid the social and economic disorganisation which followed from the financial consequences of the Peace. The great reduction in the numbers of the professional military caste, and still more the destruction of savings and family fortunes which resulted from the mad inflation of the currency, created a restless, impoverished, and desperate class of young men. They felt themselves disinherited, and directed their hatreds partly against the French and partly against the more liberal of their own countrymen; they expected the restoration of their fortunes first from a return to Monarchy and militarism at home, and then from a war of revenge. Their temper, in its recklessness and violence, was that of a revolutionary proletariat, though their aim was reaction. To the passions of these young men the Occupation supplied inexhaustible fuel.

Worse still, because it was more permanent and more widespread, was the effect of the Occupation in fostering the belief in the all-importance of military power. Of what avail was it to struggle to forget the barbaric past when the horizon blue of the French uniform coloured the German landscape? It was not the poppy of oblivion that the invaders cultivated on their parade

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grounds and aviation parks. Nor did this lesson in the effectiveness of military power end, when M. Herriot and M. Briand followed M. Poincaré. For neither of them, in their most liberal moment, even dreamed of evacuating Ruhr or Rhineland without bartering. They were willing to abandon such satisfaction as French national pride might derive from the Occupation, but for each withdrawal, each softening of the rigours of military administration, each diminution of the garrison, they demanded a price. The chief difference, indeed, between the Nationalist Right and the Radical Left in France is that while the former stores up military power, the latter cashes its gains. The relationship is rather one of the division of labour than of opposition. So long as this Occupation lasts, it must be the key to all the relations of France with Germany. Its basis is a use of force as continuous as it is oppressive.

ONE cannot pass from this theme of the use of military power in the west, without recalling the question of Germany's eastern frontier. There was here no question of rewarding an ally for faithful service. Poland had been rather anvil than hammer during the war, and the greater part of the Polish population had

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fought faithfully on the side of the Central Empires, some of it in their conscript ranks, but some of it also among the enthusiastic volunteers of Marshal Piludski's Legion, who readily forgot their negligible grievances against Austria for the satisfaction of fighting their Russian oppressors. If Poland was aggrandised beyond measure in the peace treaties, and thereafter permitted to aggrandise herself, the reckoning of French soldiers and politicians was that this romantic people, with its boyish love of arms, would serve as a barrier between Germany and Russia. The wrongs which the Allies helped or permitted the Poles to inflict, first on Germany and then on Russia, seemed an insurance against any undue familiarity on her part, in the future, with either of her neighbours. It was an imposing and dangerous part to assign to this nation. No people even inherited a territory less suited to be a barrier than these flat and featureless plains, nor have the Poles developed in themselves that Spartan discipline which makes walls and fortresses superfluous.

In redistributing territory when Poland was created, it was of course inevitable that all Posen, some part of Upper Silesia, and probably also a few districts of West Prussia should pass from the German to the Polish flag. The most scrupulous partition would inevitably sacrifice big German

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minorities, who would come under the far from efficient administration of a race whose amiable qualities are not those which appeal most readily to Germans. But the post-treaty partition of Upper Silesia, which, in defiance of the *plébiscite*, assigned to Poland such a decidedly German region as Kattowitz, with its wealth of coal and its highly organised industries, was a wanton wrong inflicted on the German race, which one can explain only as one explains the fifteen years' occupation of the Saar and the temporary occupation of the Ruhr—it was necessary for the complete success of the Settlement as MM. Clemenceau and Poincaré conceived it, that Germany should be weakened by the loss of a great part of her mineral wealth. The problem of providing Poland with a port had also to be settled. A landlocked state which must be provided with a port outside its territories, must usually be content with some such arrangements as Greece gave to the Yougo-Slavs at Salonica—the lease of a part of the port, with its docks, sheds, and railway sidings, together with the free use of the railway which must carry their goods to their own frontier. That model might have been followed with modifications favourable to Poland. But she must have her own ships of the coast; she wished to create a navy of her own, and therefore her ambitions were

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satisfied by cutting the ancient Hansa town of Danzig from its German allegiance and from the body of German territory (though it was granted political autonomy). And then a broad corridor (which happens to be largely populated by Poles) was carved out along the lower course of the Vistula, in order that Polish munitions might, in time of war, as in time of peace, run from Danzig to Warsaw over rails and soil which belong to Poland. The mischief of this arrangement is not merely the inconvenience (to use no stronger word) which it inflicts on the German population of Danzig and the German minority of the corridor, as that it separates from the body of the German nation, like a limb severed from its trunk, the intensely German province of East Prussia.¹ There is no possibility of a cordial reconciliation between Poles and Germans while this arrangement lasts, which means that Paris may rely on Poland as a permanent part of the French military circle round Germany.

THE French authors of the Peace had thought out their aims with their customary logic; their settlement did unquestionably create a

¹ German railway traffic does, of course, enjoy a right of passage across the Polish corridor.

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European system which boasted a certain symmetry. The plans of the French Staff gave to Europe a certain order and unity. The peculiarly British contribution to the settlement must be studied in remote continents. One simple master-idea runs through it—to uproot every trace of Germany's power, and to obliterate every foothold of German commerce outside Europe. Her colonies disappeared from Africa and from Asia. Not only must she surrender her war fleet, but with it she must hand over the greater part of her merchant marine. The charters and concessions and investments which she possessed, notably in Russia, Turkey, and China, were all of them forfeited. Neutral China was brought into the war, before its end, in order that every trace of German work and influence might be uprooted in her soil. Her merchants were interned and forcibly shipped home, while the rights and privileges which they enjoyed in common with other Europeans, were abolished. On every African river, the factories and wharves of the German merchants and shippers were confiscated and put up to auction. The etiquette of Old World diplomacy was accustomed to open a treaty which ended a war, with an appeal to Almighty God and a declaration of the will of the contracting parties to live henceforward in "peace and amity." No

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phrase of that kind softened the harshness of the Versailles document. The conventional model would then go on to revive, at least as a provisional arrangement, the various treaties of commerce which linked the belligerents before the war. There is no such clause in the Versailles Treaty. What treaties omit is often as important as what they include. The salient fact about this treaty was that it revived none of the rights of reciprocity which habitually govern the relations of civilised states, and many years were destined to pass before they were in fact restored. In clause after clause Germany renounced her former rights; in no clause did she recover any of these rights which in the modern world are indispensable for the conduct of trade. Elaborate provisions insured the right of Allied subjects to trade with Germany, to reside in Germany, to pass their goods through her customs without suffering discrimination, to fly over her territory, to use her rivers, with the guarantee of international control, to enjoy on her railways the same rates and facilities as her own subjects, and even to require of her that she should build new railways for the better transmission of their goods. The Germans on their side were disarmed, and deprived of the customary resource of retaliation, if they should struggle to regain their former rights.

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By a peculiarly cruel aggravation of their sufferings, the Germans had to endure the prolongation of the war-time blockade (mitigated during part of the period by the admission of certain food-stuffs) for a full seven months after the conclusion of the Armistice. When, at last, the legal state of peace returned, the Germans as traders, after the long delay of five years, were compelled to start work afresh almost without ships and without resident agents, premises or covenanted rights in Allied countries and colonies. These injuries were not always, as it turned out, skilfully devised. The delay in reopening the markets of Central Europe had its effect, like the blockade of Russia, in limiting and shortening the expansion of trade which followed the Armistice during the period of inflation. From the Rhine to the Urals, and from the Urals over the Siberian plains a vast and populous area was blotted out from the world's economic map as though a deluge had submerged it. The transfer of Germany's shipping to British ownership ruined the ship-building yards of the Clyde and the Tyne. Before many years were over, while in China British traders were boycotted because they clung to their unpopular privileges, German merchants proclaimed their nationality by sewing an armband on their sleeves, and went on trading without the

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aid of gunboats or treaty rights. The motive, however, of these chapters of the settlement is legible to all who read them. Their purpose was to use victory, and the lasting naval superiority which it conferred, in order to handicap the Germans in the race for world trade.

THESE economic provisions of the Treaty served the immediate purpose of the Allies by delaying the recovery of Germany, and they reveal the spirit in which the Settlement was conceived. In their bearing on China and Africa they were the peculiar British contribution to the Peace. But two further aspects of the Settlement disclose even more clearly the crudity of the economic thinking which prevailed during these months at the world's headquarters. During the war the pressure of necessity drove all the belligerents and many of the neutrals into that deliberate regulation of their economic life which has been called "War-time Socialism." Not only was each government compelled by scarcity to ration shipping and to supervise or undertake the importation of the chief foodstuffs and raw materials; it soon became necessary that each group of allies should coördinate these activities. Throughout the latter years of the war, the time-honoured

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faith in *laissez-faire* and competitive supply ceased to influence the belligerents, and two powerful international organisations rationed and regulated their buying. It was, of course, a hastily improvised system, but it might have served as a nucleus for the development of a permanent international organisation, which by eliminating conflicts over the distribution of raw materials, would have neutralised the most potent poison of Imperialism. These commissions were hastily disbanded, under the pressure of the interests which desired, in this period of scarcity and high prices, to reap their inflated profits from the world's needs. The disbanding of the organisation which controlled the export of coal was peculiarly disastrous, for it was followed by a riot of profiteering and a chaos in production and distribution, which cursed the miners and eventually the whole industrial system of Great Britain and the Continent for years to come. But the Allied statesmen were in no mood to think out the world's problem of the orderly production and distribution of wealth. They felt the sword in their grasp, and they believed that they could get wealth by grabbing it. They preferred to lame the production of Central Europe by prolonging the blockade and shutting out the supply of raw materials, when bigger men would have set the

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despairing peoples of the defeated countries at work, to manufacture on a vast scale the ploughs and locomotives that war had destroyed. Their decision to end the international economic controls was consistent with all their unconstructive economic thinking.

THE other chapter of the settlement in which the Allies decisively revealed their economic thinking was that which provided for reparations. For five years it made the history of the Continent, kept its most productive nation in penury and unrest, deflected the healthy and normal operation of thought and work in France, and absorbed the concern of the world's public opinion which should have been busier with more constructive themes. It has been so constantly in our minds, and has engaged the pens of so many able writers of whom Mr. Keynes is the most brilliant, that it may suffice in this brief review of tendencies to recall only so much of the controversies which turn around it as will suffice to indicate its place in the Allied scheme of world-reconstruction. Three conceptions of reparations seem to have influenced the statesmen and the mass-thinking of the victor nations. There was, first of all, the legitimate purpose of requiring the Ger-

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mans to make good the wanton devastation which they had wrought in northern France. Because it was as visible as it was pitiable, it made its instant appeal to men's imaginations. They forgot, perhaps, how much of it was inevitable and how much of it had been caused by the Allied artillery. They forgot, moreover, that while Germany had (save in East Prussia) escaped this visible devastation, she had suffered, largely as a consequence of the Allied blockade, a subtle kind of devastation, which all over her territory had weakened the physique, depressed the vitality, and injured the very nerves and bones of her population, reduced her flocks and herds, and lessened the fertility of her starved soil. That diffused loss over her entire area may well have balanced the intensive destruction in one region of France, big and wealthy though that region was. But, on the other hand, it was justly pointed out that much of the devastation in France had been deliberately organised by the German General Staff in order to delay the economic recovery of a rival. In particular, the French coal-mines had been systematically ruined.

For such injuries as this, it was just to demand compensation. But no attempt was ever made to call in neutral arbitrators to assess this damage, and notoriously the bill was swollen by the in-

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flated estimates of the sufferers, and the exacting charges of the contractors who carried out the restoration. These interests were strong enough to secure the rejection of the German offers to carry through the work of rebuilding with their own materials and their own labour. Moreover, the Armistice terms were stretched by a dishonourable legal subtlety, and the obligation on the Germans to repair such damage as this, was interpreted to include the expenditure of the Allies in maintaining the dependent families of the soldiers called to the colours. By this extension alone of the reasonable claim for the repair of the damage they had caused, the Germans became liable for impossible sums.

But appeal was openly made to other motives in assessing the liability of Germany. It was argued, even while a part of her population was visibly starving before the eyes of our soldiers and our relief agents, that it was necessary to subject her to some handicap, lest her insolent prosperity should contrast too flagrantly with the penury of the victorious nations. And finally, an indemnity was justified as a punishment for the war-guilt, which a notorious clause in the treaty attributed to her alone.

Few historians would justify today the confession which the Allies imposed on their defeated

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enemies by a threat of the prolongation of the hunger-blockade. No apologies by German statesmen, no self-accusations by honest critics in Allied countries, can lessen the heavy guilt which does belong to the rulers of Imperial Germany, not merely for the invasion of Belgium, but for their conduct on the eve of the war and during the generation which preceded it. But these men had been thrust aside by the revolution. And can any candid mind maintain, whether one takes the long view or the short view of the causation of the war, that all the Allies were innocent? One knows enough of the history of the pre-war years to realise that on several occasions it was not the self-restraint of the Allies which saved them from the guilt of starting a world war. Once at least the British navy had its decks cleared for action, to back the French in their imperialist claims to Morocco. In the Russian documents which have been given to the world, we find M. Poincaré assuring M. Isvolsky of the readiness of France to back Russia, if war should follow from the stand to which her conceptions of prestige moved her throughout the complications in the Balkans. Once the curtain rises to disclose the rulers of Russia sitting under the Tsar's presidency to discuss a Russian expedition to seize the Turkish straits, and coldly facing the certainty

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that a general war would follow. It was these tensions and these ambitions, of which all were guilty, which made the Great War. And even when we study its immediate causation, we have now to adjust ourselves to the fact that the murders of Serajevo were arranged, not merely as we had supposed, by a group of boys who were Austrian subjects, but by the Serbian military secret society of the "Black Hand," which had at its head the chief of the Intelligence Service of the Serbian army. Worse still, a Serbian Cabinet Minister has placed it on record that the Prime Minister disclosed to his colleagues, some weeks before the murder, his acquaintance with the plot. The steps which he took to frustrate it were half-hearted, nor did he warn the Austrian police.

Again, it is impossible to acquit Russia of a prime share in war-guilt, for she was the first to order a general mobilisation, knowing that this step meant war. On the other hand, one cannot question the sincerity of the steps, belated and inadequate though they were, which the Kaiser and the German Chancellor took in Vienna and Petersburg, in the last days, to avert war. The truth is, as Mr. Lloyd George has put it, that these statesmen "staggered and stumbled" into the war. But innocence should mean more than the absence of guilt. Were those Allied statesmen

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wholly innocent who drafted the secret treaties and compiled the Treaty of Versailles? The motives and appetites which these documents disclosed, had influenced them for a decade before the catastrophe. If they made no war, they had sedulously avoided the making of an unbreakable peace.

But to debate in further detail the justifications which Allied statesmen advanced for their extravagant demands upon Germany, would be to show a lack of realism. Each of the Allied governments felt a mountain of debt upon its shoulders; each of them in one measure or another had inflated its currency; it was inevitable and, within limits, justifiable that they should look around them for sources of revenue that would spare them the unpopularity of adding to the burden of taxation. Mr. Lloyd George, when he decided to hold a general election before the Peace Conference met, let loose upon the Settlement the meanest and most irresponsible passion of the mob; while even at this early stage M. Poincaré was teaching the French taxpayer to expect that "the Boche" would pay for everything. The result was that sober economic thinking on this subject was suspended for some five years after the cessation of warfare. Sobriety returned, as was only natural, much earlier to insular England than to devastated

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France, and a demonstration was required in the Ruhr of the failure of coercion to impose unreason, before Europe was delivered from the worst consequences of this collective folly. In the interval, the Rhineland Occupation was used upon the prostrate body of Germany, very much as mediæval taxgatherers would use the rack. Conferences met incessantly to weigh and apportion the crock of gold at the rainbow's end; their extortions and their ultimata hurried the ruin of the German fiscal system by measureless inflation; but while economists were steadily teaching the more intelligent strata of public opinion the difficulty of transferring vast quantities of wealth from one country to another, the politicians must needs continue their crude efforts to perform that operation by force. The fantastic totals, which the Allies expected to receive, stand on record in history for the amazement of posterity. This episode concerns us only because it was the maddest consequence of the attempt made at Versailles to govern and unify the world on the basis of force. Military power was the ruling principle in Europe, until its empire over men's minds was sapped by its failure in the Ruhr.

CHAPTER THREE

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HISTORY is rarely so simple that it can be rendered intelligible as the working out of a single principle. Military power dictated the territorial Settlement of Versailles and the attempt to extort a measureless indemnity. But the forces of reflection which had been busy upon our international problems, even amid the fever of the war, were strong enough to add their own chapter to the settlement. The Covenant of the League of Nations was embodied as an integral part of the Peace Treaty, but the root fact about it is that, largely as it bulked in the minds of some of the responsible statesmen, it was never, even for them, the organic principle out of which the whole Settlement grew. Two principles wrote each its chapter, and the strong right hand which drew its maps and speculated with the astronomical figures of the indemnity, seemed neither to know nor to care what the liberal left hand inscribed in the Covenant. There was, indeed, a division of labour and interests among the Allied statesmen, which turned this metaphor into literal fact. M. Clemenceau was the realist who embodied his neo-

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Napoleonic military system in the new map of Europe, and watched the efforts of Mr. Wilson to construct a new war-proof world with cynical indifference. If the League had any meaning for M. Clemenceau and his school, it was as an institution which might serve to stereotype their territorial settlement by lending it the majesty of morals and law. The soldiers drew the map, and called in Mr. Wilson to sprinkle it with holy water. To these uses he lent himself with the simplicity of inexperience. While he was compelled to accept defeat after defeat in those chapters of the Settlement which made the framework of Europe for the next generation, it seemed to him and to those British statesmen who worked with him, notably Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, that in the creation of the League they had an adequate compensation for these failures. They saw in it the instrument which would gradually modify the rigours and cruelties of the treaties; they had inserted a principle in the Settlement which would eventually shape it to liberal lines.

This was a perilous reckoning. The only sure hope for peace lay in taking the principle of the League as the starting-point and the test of the Settlement. Given this ambitious conception of a new structure for the world, which would render

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war improbable if not impossible, the only wise course, while the Allies enjoyed their temporary spell of omnipotence, was to reshape this world on lines which would allow the minimum of incentives to strife. It was, indeed, a part of the purpose of the Allies to bring this about, but unluckily they fixed their attention only on those causes of war which irked the members of their own confederation. These they removed with a will, but in removing them they made for the defeated peoples as many new occasions for restlessness and strife. A wise victor will desire a contented enemy. That may sound like a violent paradox, but on no other basis could a world-League hope to work smoothly. So little did the Allies accept this basis, that they failed even to realise that Germany, despoiled not merely of some territory and much wealth, but, in effect, of her former standing in the world, must rank in the future as a focus of discontent and unrest. Her exclusion from the original membership of the League was the first symbol of this lower status. The drastic disarmament to which she had to submit, while the Allies, on the whole, increased their armaments, carried even graver implications. For with what show of sincerity can Powers profess to desire a war-proof world, if they must continue to carry even heavier weapons than of old, while

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no honest telescope can discern an aggressor on the horizon? The scale of these armaments kept alive the old fatalism which never wholly abandons the obsession of an inevitable war. From the heavy charges of this insurance against war, men will not fail to infer the magnitude of the peril. The belief which we keep alive by our inordinate precautions will one day realise itself in action. But, unhappily, no realistic mind could assert that the fears which inspired these armaments were baseless. Clause after clause in the Settlement gave eloquent warning that Tchechs and Poles, Serbs and Roumanians, would be wise to arm. The League started on its race for peace handicapped by all this heavy armour. Nor could it, during the years while Germany was still outside its ranks, assume, even in European affairs, the majesty of a full representative assembly. How could it legislate for Europe, while the gap of this vast unrepresented territory stared it in the face? Two consequences of the Versailles Settlement cursed it from the start. A great part of the Settlement was of such a nature that it could only be administered by force. A League in which neutrals sat, neither could, nor would have applied the clauses which dealt with reparations. These, with all the action which they involved, were naturally left to Allied councils or confer-

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ences to impose. The result was that for many a year the League seemed to be little more than a well-meaning irrelevance in Europe. The real organ of international government for Europe sat, not in Geneva, but in Paris. The League's councils and assemblies met and dissolved, but no item on their agenda so much as recalled the events which in reality were shaping the daily history of Europe. It could take no notice even of the invasion of the Ruhr. The result was that men began to speak of the League as an infant body, which must not be burdened with responsibilities too heavy for it. That it seemed to be an impotent bystander, while the Allied Great Powers dictated in these first years of peace to Europe, was a misfortune of which the prime cause lay, not in the conception of the League and still less in its admirable staff: the cause lay in the deep inconsistency between the Covenant and the treaties.

To this inconsistency one may in part trace the disaster which excluded from the League both the United States and Russia. The reasons for American abstention were complex. They reflected first of all the resentment of the Senate at President Wilson's failure to consult it before the treaties and the Covenant assumed their final shape. But whatever tact and skill he might have used, un-

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questionably he would have encountered the resistance of conservative public opinion to those commitments in the Covenant which seem to involve some surrender of absolute sovereignty, however slight, by the member states. But the progressive elements which might in the end have reconciled a nation, reared in a proud tradition of aloofness, to the prospect of playing its part in the coöperative enterprise of maintaining the world's peace, were chilled and disillusioned by the character of the Settlement and the conduct of the chief Allies. They had made a peace too precarious for American reinsurance. Russia had very different reasons for standing aloof. Her government was not recognized by the dominant powers of the League, and at the moment of its formation they were blockading her coasts, and fostering civil war within her borders. That section of the Russian Communist party which actively believes in the possibility of rallying the working class of Europe, and the struggling peoples of Asia, under its own militant leadership for the purposes of world revolution, was bound in any event to regard the League as the representative of a hostile principle and the international expression of capitalist civilisation. But these were never the views of the whole party, which always included an able and influential min-

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ority which would have collaborated with the League. It is a fact that when the Labour Government took office in England, the encouraging message was conveyed to it that Soviet Russia had no reason of principle for refusing to join the League, though some modification in its structure and in the obligations of the Covenant would be a necessary condition. But here also the character of the Settlement with which the League was associated helped to discredit it, and weakened the influence of this moderate section.

One can hardly exaggerate the effect of American abstention in weakening the League and limiting its range of action. It became impossible for the League to take the initiative in any movement which aimed at world-wide effects. It wisely left to American leadership the summoning of the Conference on the reduction of naval armaments. That precedent was repeated in the less fruitful Washington Conference on the affairs of the Far East. While there were other reasons which may have restrained the League from offering its mediation in Chinese affairs, the absence of the United States from its councils was reason enough for its inaction. The limitation of the League's scope during its early years, first by the rival organisation of the Allies which prolonged their war-time dictatorship, and then by the abstention

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of America, had the most unfortunate effect on its prestige. It missed the psychological moment for imposing itself on the imagination of mankind. Nations which might have looked to it with hope and gratitude, were tempted to think that they had gained nothing by its foundation.

These misfortunes which attended the creation of the League cannot detract from the greatness of the idea which inspired it. Neither familiarity, nor the disappointments of these difficult years, can obscure the immense achievement with which the spirit of history, amid all the illusions and intoxications of the hour, could yet inspire the statesmen of Versailles. For the first time in the records of mankind, the nucleus of a world-wide organisation had come into being. For the first time, though its outlines were twisted by the insincerities and imperfections of all human effort, the peoples of the earth had embodied their aspiration for peace in a living body. Its voice and its hands worked. It had its visible habitation, and its Assembly in which the will of humanity might find itself. For the first time in the records of our planet, our species was conscious of a purpose and groped for the mechanism through which it might be realised. The annals of these years bear witness to the limitations and difficulties of the League; experience may teach us that we must

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expand the conception on which it was founded into a more adequate embodiment of its idea. But on this rock, if our civilisation is to evolve in peace, the great society of the future must be built. From its early failures, if we have courage, we shall rise, and say of it what Mirabeau said of the Third Estate, "It was nothing: it must be everything."

The Sovereign State and the World's Need for Change

IF WE attempt to analyse the conception on which the League was based, three simple elements stand out. Its purpose is the preservation of the world's peace. It accepts the present structure of the world, composed as it is of independent Powers which jealously maintain their absolute sovereignty. It drew from this picture of the world the inference that the problem of maintaining peace must be the problem of inducing these independent states to accept the mediation or arbitration of the League, whenever a dispute between two or more of them threatened to lead to war.

It is probable that at the moment when they founded the League, the pioneers chose the only possible starting-point. The motive to which

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they appealed was the only one to which the world would have responded. Its wounds were still bleeding, and the one aspiration to which all civilised men confessed was the passionate demand that wars should cease. Again, it is certain that no Great Power was ready at this moment for the sacrifice of its absolute sovereignty. But if the world was composed of these isolated independent units, it was much that they should consent to submit their disputes to some arbitral procedure. In point of fact the Covenant stopped short of binding them in every case to accept the findings of the disinterested arbiter. This "gap" in the Covenant is a serious defect, but as we follow out the consequences which result from the League's starting-point, we may come to realise that other limitations which are still more hampering, were involved in the manner in which it conceived its problem.

The founders of the League started from experience, and inevitably it was the Great War which occupied the foreground of their thoughts. Their problem was summed up in the watchword, "Never again." They sought therefore to create an organisation which might have spared the world this catastrophe, if it had existed in July, 1914. The war had its ostensible origin in the Serajevo murders. If, automatically, and as a

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matter of course, Austria must have submitted her dispute with Serbia to impartial investigation and arbitration, could the war have broken out? Stated in this way, one must admit that the problem received the correct solution. If that tragic, but limited incident was in fact the cause, as it was the starting-point of the war, then (unless the "gap" had made itself felt) the machinery which the League has now set up, would have been adequate for this emergency. But few of us would be content to accept the events of that tragic July as the true cause of the war.

It was only as the war went on and men's minds threw off the habitual restraints and reticences of peace, that we began to realise how numerous and formidable were the psychological forces which made the war. Each side occupied itself in drawing up its lists of war aims. They were as motley as the crowd of partisans which each group of belligerents collected. The world, during these years, seemed malleable, and in their daydreams the will of each nation hammered it to its desire. Here a repressed nationality put forward its claim to independent life. There a nation with the wound of defeat in its memory aspired to the recovery of lost territory. The sundered fragments of a divided race felt the call of the hour which promised their unity. There were strata of opinion in

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both camps which looked to some economic gain—the acquisition of a coal-field or the control of a supply of iron ore. Not one of these aspirations was novel, not one of them owed its birth to the circumstances of the hour. The Russian governing class had always coveted Constantinople and the opening of the Turkish straits to their warships. The French, though they rarely spoke of Alsace, had never forgotten it. The Poles and South Slavs had never ceased to dream of racial unity, nor the Tchechs of casting off Austrian rule. For a generation Bulgaria had awaited the hour that should unite her to Macedonia. These wishes, then, were no new forces which sprang suddenly to life in 1914. They had always been present in the mind of each nation. They had always worked, albeit subtly and silently. Good men had repressed them; prudent men had concealed them; patient men had sought for compromises which might give them some partial satisfaction. But one thing they all knew—for their full satisfaction these wishes must await the outbreak of war. What Freud and Jung have taught us about the play of repressed wishes in the personal life of the individual has its application to national life. These wishes are never idle; their subtle influence upon national policy never ceases. The more tightly they are repressed, the more potent and

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poisonous may their working be. They may never directly provoke a war. Against that kind of direct provocation, the civilised, prudent, sophisticated majority in every adult European society has built up its mental mechanism of censorship, repression, and control. The suppressed wish of the French nation to recover Alsace could never have driven it into a war of open aggression. Indeed, whenever the more simple-minded and childlike sections of the nation, headed by some romantic figure like a General Boulanger or the poet-patriot Déroulède did begin to move in the direction of a war of *revanche*, the common sense and the schooled, civilised, behaviour of the grown-up nation dealt with them promptly, and closed their road to action. Nor were the Germans less civilised, or worse prepared to meet the direct temptations of the suppressed wish for change and war. Nothing is more remarkable in the history of the years that immediately preceded the war, than the refusal of the German Government and people to accept the opportunity for war which came in 1911. Their wish was for colonial expansion. If Morocco was destined to fall a victim to the needs of the stronger European peoples, then unquestionably the Germans had the better claim. They had the expanding, France the stationary population, and this region

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was suited to white colonisation. Their industry was forced to import iron ore, while France had supplies as yet undeveloped in Algeria, and here in the Atlas there was iron in plenty. And yet when the challenge came to war over Morocco, the will to war was wanting in Germany, in spite of the repeated signals which the Kaiser had made in his most theatrical style. One may fairly say that the mental mechanism which represses the wish for war and change was less developed among the Serbs; indeed, on their level of culture it hardly exists. Yet even in Serbia it was a secret society, and not the nation or the national government, which perpetrated the fatal crime that led, and must, by any reckoning of probabilities, have led to war.

But one has not disposed of these suppressed wishes, when one concedes that they do not directly drive a civilised nation to war. Their working is subtle and incessant. They may not avail to goad a self-conscious and reflective people to take the positive steps which will satisfy its wish, but they can prevent it from taking the steps which would hinder its satisfaction. The wish may not make war, but it can prevent peace. How often when the chance came for a reconciliation with Germany (as it came, for example, when M. Caillaux was in power) did the unspoken word "Alsace" make it-

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self dimly heard below the threshold of publicity and conscious debate, to thwart and delay the approach of the two peoples to each other, or to clog with insincerity the steps which they half decided to take? The unspoken word "Alsace" did not ring from the housetops when the crowds in Cherbourg or Paris cheered the Russian alliance, but did it not thunder in the secret chambers of every French citizen's heart? The spoken word which justified that unnatural alliance, explained every fresh increase in armaments, and reconciled the conscript to the prolongation of his term of service, was always "defence." That word was a cipher which French minds knew how to read. It sounded "Alsace" to the inner ear. "Never speak of it; never forget it," was Gambetter's epigram after 1870. Could one ask for clearer testimony to the working and existence of the suppressed wish?

Save after a war, such international machinery as Europe had developed before the Great War, for the conduct of its joint affairs, was of a rigidly conservative tendency. After a war, notably after the Russo-Turkish war, when a Conference of the Great Powers met, it might and did sanction considerable territorial changes, though even these were limited to amputations on the body of the defeated state. Even on such occasions, what the

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Concert or Conference did, was rather to ratify changes which had already been effected by victorious force, than to initiate changes itself. In the intervals between wars, its first principle was "to preserve the *status quo*"; at the best it tried in a fumbling way to patch and posset, in the hope, which invariably proved vain, that some minor adjustments and reforms would stave off the dangerous territorial problem, and delay, if it did not prevent, the outbreak of war. That was the record of the Concert, for example, in handling the ugly problem of Macedonia. It carried this dread of fundamental change so far that when, after the visible failure of its timid and inadequate reforms, the Balkan States formed their short-lived confederation and made war on Turkey in 1912, the Concert made itself ridiculous by issuing a declaration (which it afterward had the wisdom to forget) to the effect that none of the belligerents would be permitted to acquire territory, as the result of their improper conduct. It is easy to smile at the conventional efforts of these pre-war diplomatists and States to ignore problems which the plainest of plain men perceived, to preserve a *status quo* long after it had been intolerable, and "localise a conflict" which was destined to spread. They had the wisdom to en-

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dure the sore trial of looking foolish. They knew that fundamental change in a Europe linked up by intricate alliances must mean not merely war, but general war. They detected the suppressed wishes, if not in their own hearts, at least in those of their neighbours. They acted accordingly, in the face of massacre and wrong, on the well-trying principle of all social life, that it is expedient that one man should die for the people. By perishing unhelped, Macedonians and others in a like case were preserving the peace of Europe. After the war, one realises that there was more to be said for this organised callousness which called itself the Concert of Europe, than the indignant spectator of these wrongs would admit at the time. Three wars have ravaged Macedonia since 1912, and it is still oppressed.

WHEN one faces the difficulty—which in Europe at least one may fairly call an impossibility—of making territorial changes without war, one begins to realise how inadequate such arbitration as Sir Edward Grey proposed in 1914, or for that matter, such arbitration as the League might today apply, must have been to settle the real issue raised by Serajevo. It is possible, indeed, that a very able and authoritative

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Court, equipped with adequate powers of investigation (a thing very difficult to provide), might have cleared up the historical mystery which even now surrounds the Serajevo crime, traced its inspiration to the powerful secret society of the "Black Hand," determined the degree of guilt which belonged to the Serbian Government for its toleration of this international conspiracy, assessed the penalties, if any, which it ought to pay, and defined the safeguards which it should furnish for the future. That, indeed, would have settled the immediate problem, and for this occasion, at least, the world would have been spared the crowning mercy of the war to end war. In reality, none of the dangerous problems which bred the war would have been touched. The younger generation of the South Slavs living under Austrian and Hungarian rule, would still have felt itself, in one degree or another, oppressed. The young barbarians in the officers' clubs of Belgrade would still have dreamed of the destined war of liberation which should unite the South Slav race. Their favourite newspaper would still have called itself *Piedmont*, in allusion to the rôle which the one free kingdom of Italy played in her reunion. The peasant-farmers of Serbia would still have dreaded the economic power of their great neigh-

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bour to close its markets to their pigs. Every Serbian man of business, who could pull a wire or cast a vote in his party, would still have sighed for a direct outlet over Serbian rails and through a Serbian port, to the Adriatic or Mediterranean Sea. And among the German and Magyar ruling castes of Austria-Hungary, the belief would still have held its ground, that it was necessary, some day, to give a demonstration of the Dual Monarchy's power, in order to check the rebellious and separatist tendencies of its Slav populations. German bankers and industrialists, dreaming of the iron road to Bagdad, and of their commercial expansion in the Near East, would still have felt that this defiant Serbian kingdom, backed by the Tsar's protection, stood as a menace and an obstacle across the road of their advance. Finally, Russian Imperialists, in their turn, would still have dreamed of breaking up Austria-Hungary and of aggrandising the Serbian kingdom, in order to check the German advance, and to assure their own ascendancy over Constantinople and the Straits.

Here, then, was a complex of problems, racial and economic, so vast that any complete settlement must have involved an organic reconstruction of the entire East, from Prague to Bagdad. It de-

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manded, in short, measures as drastic as those which the Allies actually took in the Peace Settlement—as drastic, but more impartial and farseeing. What could a Hague Court, what could a Concert of Europe, what, even, could a League of Nations (if it had existed in 1914) have done to impose such measures? It dare not even make a recommendation, still less enforce it. Could it have settled the racial question by dismembering Austria-Hungary? Could it even have ordered her to adopt a federal constitution, to break the oppressive Magyar ascendancy, or to experiment with “Trialism” (the solution of the murdered Archduke)? When there are faults on both sides, as assuredly there were in this case, a prudent court is apt to remember that the weaker of the two is the easier to coerce; but could such a Court have sought a solution by bringing Serbia herself, under some plan of autonomy, within the Austrian system? To ask such questions is to answer them. Neither a territorial change nor an enforced constitutional change could have been dictated in 1914 by the united wisdom of Europe, nor could it be dictated today by the League of Nations. With the graver international tensions involved in this affair, and the immense economic issues, it would have been no easier to deal.

World Problems and International Legislation

THE illustration from the Serajevo conflict may serve to show how a naïve and inadequate analysis of the causes of the Great War misled the victors, when they tried to create a League which might prevent such a calamity in the future. Neither arbitration, nor the more elastic process of mediation, could deal with causes so obstinate and vast as those which actually led (if we confine our survey to the Near East alone) to the outbreak of the war. But even these causes, numerous though they were, are not typical of some of the issues with which a League must deal, which cherishes the ambition to abolish wars. One might fairly class the allocation of the world's supplies of iron ore and coking coal among the causes of this war. It revealed itself in the Moroccan struggle, which was a rehearsal for the actual tragedy. It showed itself in the German war aim to annex the French district of Briey, and in one form or another to control Belgium. It was part of the French motive for the reconquest of Lorraine and for that epilogue to the war in which French militarism sought to complete it, by occupying the Ruhr. It was, again, very evidently a leading motive with the Japanese Imperialists (now happily under a shadow) who sought during

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the war to reap its fruits by imposing their Twenty-One Demands upon China. Those demands amounted to the declaration of a protectorate, which would have been valuable for many purposes. High among those purposes ranks the need of Japan to assure to her own industries, and especially to those which supply her army and her fleet, a source of iron ore under her own political control. One might repeat this illustration indefinitely, by reviewing the relation of other important raw materials—especially oil and rubber—to the dangerous political tensions and the military preparations of the modern world. Imagine the impressions of some visitor to our planet from Sirius, if he could hold some of our microscopic persons in the palm of his hand, and extract from our alarm an intelligent answer to his questions about our recent history. "It appears, then," he might sum up, "that some of you who need iron in order to manufacture bridges, building frames, cannon, cruisers, and other things for your mutual use and destruction, do not possess it. It appears that others among you, who are free from the ambition to shorten your lives, by mining and working this metal, have ample supplies of it under your soil. What have you done to adjust this trifling miscalculation of Providence? It seems that you fought a war to settle this among

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other questions, and although eight millions of you gave your lives for the juster allocation of iron ore, and the liberation of little nationalities, you settled neither the one question nor the other. Your League remains to clear up the mess, but from all I can discover, it has never given one day to the discussion of this subject, nor has it the power to settle it, if it possessed the intelligence to desire a solution." And that, bluntly put, is the case. The League has never dreamed of surveying the world's needs and resources of iron ore, or of any other of these highly political raw materials, and still less has it attempted, by any device whatever, to assure a supply to those who need it.

One might go on to consider the still more delicate question of the distribution of population. It does not devastate the world, as it did in more primitive centuries, when the migrating hordes flung themselves upon the west, possibly because their pastures in Central Asia were drying up. But in one dominant instance it has certainly been a cause of armaments and has made, and may again make, the risk of war. Japan is overpopulated, and one cannot retort to her, as one may to some races which suffer from a consciousness of overpopulation, that the fault lies with her negligent agriculture. Both the Japanese and the

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Chinese have sought the solution in intensive agriculture. They cultivate their gardens, but the garden does not suffice. Racial standards or prejudices ban both these races from any emigration on a scale that would meet their needs, whether to the United States, or Canada, or Australia. Other races, notably the Italians, suffer from the same evil in a less degree, and seek their remedy in Imperialism. Here, if anywhere, is an international question. It affects in at least equal degree the race which desires an outlet, and the race which finds itself in possession of an undeveloped territory. If we could clear our minds, for the moment, of historical traditions, and view the question as one of social morals, with no criterion before our eyes save the good of our species, we should have to upset the assumption which underlies all our dealings with this question. That assumption is, that any recognised government has an absolute claim to use or abuse, in its own sole interest, the territories of which it stands possessed. Australia (to take that instance) has room in her immense Continental area for many millions of additional inhabitants—how many depends, no doubt, on the capital which could be provided for irrigation and the building of communications. Japan, China, Italy, India, and many more in a less degree, urgently need the land over which

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the Australian Government has sole control. The question affects each of them as nearly as it affects her. Yet, as things stand in the world today, they must sue, as for a favour, if they should desire to encourage the emigration of their populations to empty territories which are "hers," only because they are surrounded by a thin belt of coastal land, on which her citizens have settled. If, for any reason drawn from her own sole convenience, she refuses, she acts, as the world sees it, within her rights.

In this and in many a similar question, the time is approaching, when the world, at its peril, must learn to take a more constructive view of national rights. For it is only at the first stage of the discussion that such an issue seems to concern only the state with a surplus population and the state with empty lands. With the lapse of time, if no easy solution emerges, it may come to concern other states no less directly. For Italy (to take that instance) may feel herself driven, for lack of outlets for her population, to embark upon a conscious and reckless policy of expansion, thrusting an exploring hand at every corner of the earth where vacant acres beckon. As her eyes wander from Asia Minor to Albania or Georgia, from Angola to Abyssinia, and thence to North Africa, there is hardly a Power but feels itself disturbed.

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The peace of the world is affected in this case. India and China lack Italy's formidable capacity for securing our attention. They are not Great Powers; they cannot proclaim a new Imperial doctrine from the turrets of a super-dreadnought. And yet in the ears of imperturbable justice their distress may ring as loud.

The world's need is plainly for some supernational authority, which possesses the power and the right to direct the flow of populations beyond frontiers. It would have to consider such relevant factors of the problem, as the intense desire of the Australians to keep their country "white." One might not in the last resort admit their right to exclude immigrants of other races, who sought to come, under reasonable conditions, but one might well begin by enquiring, what, on this basis, they are prepared to do for Italians, Germans, and others who satisfy their definition of an acceptable immigrant. The ideal may seem infinitely remote, yet if one does state it, it would be that a World Government should ultimately in such a case have the right to decide that, subject to proper political safeguards, an area of relatively empty land in such a country as Australia, should be set aside for Italians, who should enjoy at least cultural autonomy within it. An organised world might even go further. It might provide, from inter-

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national sources, the credit necessary to ensure peace by large-scale emigration. That is a big, and in our day, perhaps, an impossible claim. But one may urge at least that emigration is a proper subject for international direction and legislation; the world, if it ever means to disarm, cannot forever tolerate the absolute sovereignty, in this matter, of each independent state.

This argument, if in any degree it has won the reader's assent, suggests that the League at its start was built upon an inadequate notion of the meaning of "disputes." We should make a vast progress toward a pacific world, if we could leave behind us the expectation that urgent and difficult problems in international relations must usually thrust themselves upon us in the form of a sharp difference between one sovereign state and another. Disputes of that type cannot be wholly eliminated, and they will call for adjustment by the machinery of arbitration or mediation. But in the graver cases, if a problem assumes that form, it is because the world has neglected its constructive tasks. The problem of rubber ought never to come before a vigilant League as a "dispute" between the United States and the British Empire. The problem of population ought never to come before it as a dispute between Japan and Australia. Long before this acute stage can surprise us with its

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menace of war, the League should have envisaged the distribution of raw materials, and the ordering of emigration, as questions which concern the whole world, and enlist its most imperious instincts of self-preservation. But the League, as its creators conceived it, possessed no powers of legislation adequate to the handling of such problems as these. The assembly was never meant to be an effective legislative body: its rôle is to register unanimity. And even if a beginning could be made in drafting a basis for the regulation of such wide matters as these, could we hope to escape a repetition of our experience with the Washington Labour Convention? If two or three considerable Powers were (as in that instance) to withhold ratification, the world could carry its schemes no further.¹

An abandonment of the high doctrine of sovereignty so complete as our argument requires, may seem unthinkable in our day, or within any period which practical men would care to consider.

¹ It may be useful to quote from one of official publications of the League (*The League of Nations: its Constitution and Organisation*, p. 10):

"This general regulation concerning unanimity is, of course, the recognition of national sovereignty. The League seeks solution by consent, and not by dictation. Sovereign states are not ready to be bound by majority decisions of other states, and successful international action, whether in League meetings or in inter-League Conferences, requires general consent."

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The rooted conviction which a state and a ruling race possess, that they enjoy absolute rights of property in their territory, is much too strong to permit, as yet, of the exercise by an international authority of the powers which seem to be necessary for the world's peace. The forces which make for change in the world are the creative factors in life. Change, indeed, is a biological, even before it is a political, necessity. A world from which change was banished would enjoy, in Leibnitz's phrase, nothing better than the peace of the graveyard. A people which ceased to struggle against conditions which thwart and hamper its development would cease to live. If war is the only means by which it can adjust the external world to the imperious needs of its own life, then we must recognise that it is an impulse of health and vitality which drives it into courses that may involve the destruction of itself and of the civilisation to which it belongs. Pacifism, as it is commonly preached, is an impossibly simple doctrine. It is worse than futile, it is a crime against the fundamental law of life, to preach perpetual peace, or to impose it, unless the world is capable of evolving an organisation which can ensure the widest and deepest changes without war.

We seem, then, to be confronted with a hopeless contradiction. To ensure peaceful change, we

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seem to require a supernational authority, which can impose the necessary changes, even upon strong, armed Powers—changes which may range from the widening of its regulations for immigration, up to the lopping off in the gravest cases, of territory to which it cannot justify its claim before the conscience of the world. On the other hand, it is certain that few states would today submit to “interference” and “dictation” on such a scale as this. Immigration is universally regarded as a purely domestic question. The producers of a given raw material, rubber or oil, for example, might voluntarily consent, for their own prospective gain, to join with other producers in a world-wide cartel, which would regulate and ration its distribution. But the same producers, and the state to which they owe allegiance, would regard it as an intolerable abuse of power, if the League were to exercise these same functions of regulation and rationing in the name of the general good. As for territorial changes, though limited transfers of disputed territory in border disputes have occasionally been effected by arbitration, usually in new and sparsely-peopled lands, it is unthinkable that any big change should be brought about by this means at the expense of the European territory even of a second-rate Power.

An examination of the reasons which explain

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this jealous regard for the rights of national sovereignty, would disclose some which are sentimental and some which are more rational. Why, for example, does it seem to make for the happiness of the average Polish father of a family in Warsaw or Cracow, that the republic to which he belongs, should possess vast reaches of territory inhabited by non-Polish races—Germans, Ukrainians, White Russians? What element of wealth or glory or security does it bring to him, as he trades or dances, as he rears his children or celebrates the Passion at Easter? Is it in his daily life of work and care, piety and amusement, a necessary or desirable factor? He may, indeed, feel himself enlarged and exalted as he contemplates the extent of his territory; he likes to think that the Poland of today is no smaller than the romantic Poland of the past; he may feel a thrill of pride when he looks in the mirror and sees the master of so many millions of inferior or less fortunate races. It is difficult to rate these naïve satisfactions very highly. Without them life would still be gay in Warsaw and elegant in Cracow. Do they balance the disturbance which discontented races can bring into the domestic politics of Poland, the cost and the nuisance of a strong police force, and the perpetual risk, not only of revolts, but of wars directed against Poland by the Powers

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(notably Germany and Russia) to which these alien races more naturally belong? If in a cold mood of calculation, the Polish citizen decides to ignore these risks, what is the material compensation? There are several apparent gains peculiar to his case; there is coal of excellent quality in Upper Silesia and oil in Galicia; the sparsely-peopled territories of the borderland may provide homes for colonists of Polish race. But there are two general advantages which may be claimed in all cases of this kind. In the first place the armed power of Poland has gained by these annexations some millions of conscripts, who will at need stop an enemy's bullet, and add to the weight of a charging mass. Experience shows that with some small use of tact, the conscripts of discontented races will serve loyally in their masters' armies. Irishmen have had their share in every British victory. In the Great War the Austrian Slavs fought well against Italy, if not against Russia. I have talked with Poles from Posen who were proud to have served under Hindenburg. To redraw the frontiers of Poland would mean, then, the loss of millions of young men who have, like the coal and the oil, a military use. To that Poland would never consent, and the French who reckon her armies among their own reinforcements, would infallibly take the same view. In a

world which has not disarmed, every state must wish, for reasons of safety, to aggrandise its military power by the possession of as much territory and as great a population as possible. In the second place, there is, under the economic conditions which prevail in Europe, an indisputable economic advantage in possessing a market under one's own political control. Poland can surround these alien territories by the ring fence of her own tariffs, and compel their inhabitants to purchase the manufactures of Lodz. So long as economic nationalism is the rule in Europe, so long must every state resist any development of international authority which might deprive it of territory.

Without anticipating, by more than a hint, the argument of this book, it is obvious that any weakening of the absolute sovereignty of the national state demands, not merely great changes in popular feeling, but also general changes in the military and economic structure of the world, which would deprive this proud sentiment of nationalism of the plausible basis in rational calculation to which it can appeal at present. As commonly happens in matters of great moment and complexity, we are turning in a circle. The world will not be safe from war till it has an authority which can decree the timely changes which the movement and growth of living and energetic peoples

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require. To these decrees, the sovereign state will never submit so long as its safety depends on its own armaments, and its prosperity upon the markets which it can monopolise for its own use. Yet in their turn, disarmament and the abolition of national barriers to trade seem to require a powerful international authority, which can first foster, and then in the last resort impose them.

Where, then, does the League stand in face of this imperious need for change? We must answer, I think, that it was not consciously present in the minds of President Wilson and his school when they first conceived the League. They were hardly aware of the existence of general world problems, which must be solved if war is to be avoided. The structure of the League creates no legislature authoritative enough to impose the general lines of a solution, and still less does it provide a mechanism of government, which could, from year to year, and from decade to decade, administer and modify the agreed solution, as the world's needs insensibly changed. Like the early pacifists, the Wilsonian school had an atomic view of the world's structure. It saw in front of it only a multitude of separate, sovereign states, and it was, in the main, content to keep the peace among them by arbitration and mediation. Even so it did not prohibit war. A state which has observed the

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stipulated period of delay may resort to private war, if the League's Council fails to recommend a unanimous solution.

One must, however, say rather more than this. Not only has the League failed to provide adequately for change in the world; it has actually become a force for conservatism. The victors ordered the world to their liking, and then perceived in the League an invaluable means of stereotyping their arrangements. Its primary functions are to watch over the sanctity of treaties and to protect its members in the enjoyment of all their present possessions. That is the plain meaning of the pledge of mutual defence (especially Article 10), which is the ruling idea of the Covenant. It is true that nothing debars a member from appealing to the need of change, and the League may itself take the initiative, when it perceives that the existence of an acute dispute threatens the peace of the world. But in any arbitration which might follow, or in any intervention by the Council of the League, one fatal condition would govern all the proceedings. The treaties which constitute the peace settlement are the accepted basis of any solution which any organ of the League might recommend or impose. They are the statutory law, which its courts may interpret, but cannot change. Its Council is tied by

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them, until the moment shall arrive when of its own motion a victor voluntarily abandons the seeming advantages which they confer. To put the matter plainly in a concrete illustration: Not even if the whole world felt outraged by the wrong done to the German population of the South Tyrol by its annexation to Italy; not even if war over this issue seemed imminent, could the League restore this territory to German Austria. What is much more serious, it could not lessen Italy's rights over this subject people by imposing home rule, or even by insisting upon cultural autonomy. Worse still, in the event of war, every member of the League (under Article 10) would be bound to come to Italy's support. In the ritual of the League, the sacred name of peace may be invoked to perpetuate the most monstrous injustice.

It is true, that a clause in the Covenant provides that the Assembly of the League "may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." This clause is not without value: a recommendation of this kind might have some moral effect upon the movements of a Power which was flagrantly defying the world's

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public opinion. But two things must be noted. In the first place it is exceedingly improbable that such a resolution, if it referred to any part of the Versailles Settlement, could secure a unanimous vote, or even a majority vote in the Assembly. For while each of the victors may, in private, criticise and condemn the intransigence of the others, each fears the first breach in the solid structure of the treaties. The moment one article is revised, every other article which offends impartial opinion is in danger. Even at a moment of extreme annoyance against Italy (and such moments are frequent), France and her satellite states would be bound to support her treatment of the Germans in the Tyrol, lest the Assembly should presently call in question the clauses which have decreed that other subject races shall endure perpetual degradation and ill-usage under Polish, Serbian, or Roumanian rule. It is, then, highly improbable that the Assembly will ever, in our day, avail itself of Article 19 to revise any part of the Versailles settlement. But if it should do so, it must first of all, achieve unanimity (in such cases an impossible condition) before its "advice" can have any formal validity. But even given unanimity, there is no obligation on any member of the League to accept the Assembly's advice. It would remain, after flouting the unanimous

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opinion of the world, a loyal member of the League; no penalty could be imposed upon it, and it would continue to enjoy all the advantages which membership of the League confers.

To sum up, then: the League is, on paper at least, a formidable organisation for mutual defence; it is well devised to stereotype the world which the victors constructed at Versailles; toward the promotion of salutary change it can at best contribute by registering the verdict of public opinion, provided it be world-wide and unanimous. In facing these limitations inherent in the first conception of the League, it is possible to realise that a further advance is necessary, without belittling what has been won. The creation of any World League whatever was a titan's step in the development of mankind. The defensive articles of the Covenant, though they may be abused to stereotype injustice, are a recognition of the solidarity of nations. They mean that an act of flagrant aggression suffered by one people, is a trumpet call to every one of its neighbours. And finally, though the provisions for the avoidance of war are incomplete, they do make it immeasurably more difficult for any Power to plan and execute a deliberate attack. The idea of the League, faulty though it may be, retains, even after these criticisms, its stimulus and its promise.

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Let us turn now from this preliminary study of the theoretical basis of the League to a brief estimate of its actual record.

The Work of the League

MY MEMORY goes back to a day in autumn of 1919 when I chanced to be in Minsk, on the borderland between Russia and Poland. The Red Army had its headquarters in the town, and rumour was busy with the fate of the troops whose bruised remains were soon to stagger back from the mined battlefields before Warsaw. One seemed to be watching a continent flinging itself into the zone of fire. Troopers from the Caucasus, in their gay, barbaric uniforms swaggered through the streets, or danced through the evening with the blond girls of the little city in its public gardens. At night one heard the hooting of the trains which carried to the front the divisions which had left the ripe corn standing in the calm empty spaces of Siberia more than a week before. Over the cobbles of the roads tired peasants led an incessant procession of jolting carts; the ponies nodded as they walked, and then jerked themselves awake again. Walking or sleeping, mile on mile, they were carrying their loads of

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cartridges toward the limbs and trunks of the Polish boys at their journey's end. Once it happened that two streams of these carts met outside my window. The same tired peasants stumbled along in the reverse direction, beside the same shaggy, reluctant ponies, and in each cart, on a bed of straw, a Russian lad lay stretched with bandages on head or limb. From the next street came the throbbing pathos of the Russian revolutionary funeral march. The two streams of carts paused for a moment while the band went by, followed by the burial squad with arms reversed. The ponies went to sleep, and the music of this hymn of pity and lamentation caught at one's breath and filled one's heart with revolt. And then I remember that an acquaintance of mine on the General Staff strolled in, and showed me a typewritten sheet with the news that had come by wireless. "This morning," the first paragraph ran, "the first session of the Assembly of the League of Nations met in Geneva." What did it mean? One seemed just able, from the recesses of memory, to recall something about a war to end war, and the formation of a League. It was meeting, then, in Geneva to inaugurate perpetual peace. But the ponies had jerked themselves awake again. The ammunition was rattling once more over the cob-

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bles toward Polish limbs, and the Russian lads were moving again toward the surgeon's table.

From their watch-tower in Geneva the elder statesmen of the League, if they had ever chanced to look around them, would have seen an endless panorama of such sights. The councils and assemblies of the institution which was to have ended war, have met to an incessant obbligation of artillery. It began with the invasion, which the Poles (with some French assistance) directed against Kiev and the Russian Ukrainian provinces. Then came the efforts of the Greeks, instigated by Great Britain, to acquire a lordly portion of Asia Minor. In both of these struggles the inaction of the League was masterly. None of its members used their "friendly right" to call attention to the state of war, or to offer intervention.

Twice the League attempted to arrest an invader, and twice it failed. The Poles, by a sudden raid, snatched the city and province of Vilna from Lithuania, while the League was actually the guardian of the lines which confined the forces of the two neighbours. Solemn resolutions of condemnation were recorded at Geneva after the event, but none of the penalties which the Covenant provides were set in motion, and Poland remains, to this day the recognized mistress of the territory which she snatched. After this event,

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as before it, she remained the *protégé* of France, and a few years later the League honoured her by raising her rank to that of a semi-permanent member of its Council.

The second of these affairs was the resounding dispute between Italy and Greece, which recalled with painful minuteness the sequel to the Serajevo murders. Italian officers, engaged in delimiting the Albanian frontier, had been murdered on Greek territory. Mussolini retaliated with a violence which sets one marvelling at the moderation which Austria showed in 1914, under much greater provocation. He allowed no time for inquiry, reflection, or intervention. He occupied the Greek island of Corfu, blowing some of its inhabitants to pieces in the process. And then he issued his ultimatum, which contained some of the identical demands which the Allies had thought intolerable when the Serbs rejected them. The Assembly of the League was sitting at the time. Italy disputed its right to intervene; it discussed this interesting, academic, question with much learning, and, while it debated, the Powers which were its leaders, ignored its duties and its claims by calling in the Paris Council of Ambassadors to regularise what Italy had done. So little had the lesson of Serajevo availed to make it difficult for

a Great Power to double the parts of judge and executioner in a dispute with a lesser state.

Greece is a member of the League. One cannot be surprised, then, that Egypt, who is not a member, though she is an independent and sovereign kingdom, has fared no better than Greece in two disputes with the British Empire. Once more the Serajevo motive recurred. A British general was murdered in the streets of Cairo. A military demonstration impressed upon the minds of the people and government of Egypt the unanswerable arguments of the British case. The ultimatum imposed an indemnity, and took the occasion to end, for all practical purposes, the rather shadowy part which Egypt had hitherto enjoyed in the joint administration of the Sudan. Swollen with just indignation, the British Empire emerged from the crisis greater than it went in, and felt better and bigger, for the testing experience through which it had passed. One cannot say the same of the League, which failed to notice that anything unusual had occurred. And there it may have been right; the episode was a normal happening in the life of empires. Indeed, in the early summer of this year, the British Empire, untiring in its efforts to preserve the independence of Egypt, continued the educative process by similar methods. Realising that it is a mistake to use

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violence to remove an unwanted foreigner who commands one's army, the Egyptians were attempting to achieve the same end by constitutional means. They proposed to apply the time-honoured expedient of democracy to the case, and were about to omit from their budget the provision for the salary of a British Inspector-General for their army. Three super-dreadnaughts sailed with great promptitude from Malta to Alexandria to complete the instruction of the Egyptians in the art of self-government. It is said that the subsequent conversations were amicable. We are a seafaring race, and we talk with especial ease and geniality on the quarter-decks of our own battle-ships. These proceedings also failed to interest the League.

Need one proceed with the enumeration? The League had no telescope capable of detecting, at a day's journey from Geneva, the invasion and occupation of the Ruhr. Then there is the case of China. A quarter of the human race engaged in civil war, an exercise which the Covenant does not mention. But the civil war was complicated by the military activities of more than one Great Power belonging to the League. China remained, throughout these events, a member, and her election to the League's Council was actually celebrated by a salvo of British guns. Her promotion

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coincided with the murderous bombardment of Wanhsien. It was possible for the British expeditionary force to sail to Shanghai, without the League's noting that any danger to the world's peace had occurred. So completely has Geneva ignored China, that one might suppose that it was still unacquainted with the remarkable results of Marco Polo's explorations in that quarter of the globe.

The rupture of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Russia passed with as little notice. It may be that the League had no formal standing in the war which, through two campaigns, engaged a considerable French army in the subjugation of the Riff. These tribesmen were never recognised as belligerents, a fact which in no way diminished the potency of the French shells. They had no more right to appeal to the mercies of the Red Cross than to invoke the intervention of the League. This, it was true, was not war within the meaning of the Covenant. It has been surmised, however, that wounds inflicted in operations which do not merit the dignity of that name, are occasionally mortal.

This negative record of the League belongs, no less than its positive achievement, to its history. It made no move to prevent two considerable wars. It tolerated the military operations of coercion

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which are the normal incidents of empire. Its passivity in the long Chinese crisis would draw, even from its apologists, the confession that outside Europe its writ does not run.

Five positive achievements stand out from the League's record in the political field. They suffice to measure its technical capacity to act for the preservation of peace. In the most important of these five cases it carried out the delimitation of a contested territory within limits which the Treaty of Versailles laid down. A *plébiscite* had proved that, even at the moment when Germany's fortunes were at the lowest ebb, a substantial majority of the population of Upper Silesia preferred German to Polish rule. But there were considerable areas in which the Poles predominated, and the problem was to separate these, without destroying the intricate network of industry and communications which the Germans had built up. No partition was possible which could have contented both sides. To some agricultural districts the Poles were clearly entitled, and they were bound to acquire an area which contained rich undeveloped deposits of coal. In spite of this, the actual division handed over to Poland some populous towns and districts, notably Kattowitz, which are German by race and choice, and form at the same time an integral, and one would have thought an inseparable

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arable part of the German industrial system. At the risk of seeming dogmatic, one may, without attempting a detailed argument, record what was apparently the general view among impartial Europeans (among whom one cannot reckon the French), that this piece of work was ill done. The explanation may lie in the composition of the sub-committee which the League appointed to report on the Upper Silesian question. A Belgian Minister, with a Spanish and a Latin-American diplomatist, both representing their governments in Paris, were bound to be sympathetic to the French view, and the interests of France were in this matter inseparable from those of her Polish ally. To add to these three a Chinese diplomatist was to make no adequate provision for the representation of neutral opinion.

The League had again to face a similar task when it arbitrated between Turkey and the British Empire in the Mosul dispute. The allocation of this territory raised the most complicated problems, moral, political, and ethnographical, and a candid commentator should begin by stating that it hardly admitted of a good solution. The commission which studied the question on the spot had evidently felt puzzled, and left the Council to choose between two widely different alternative solutions. In the end the verdict went in favour of the

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British Empire, but it was no secret that the ablest and most independent member of the sub-committee, the representative of Sweden, had held out against it up to the last moment. British interests won a substantial stake by the acquisition of Mosul. The weary Titan shouldered his load. It smelt like oil, but he called it duty. Yet one cannot fairly say that the national sympathies of this mixed population were disregarded. For its preferences were nebulous and contradictory and very difficult to ascertain. It was easy to be cynical over this verdict, and impossible to be enthusiastic. But it illustrated the considerable authority which the League possesses when it chooses to exert it. Here, in a very doubtful case, was a verdict, which could not, by its irresistible rectitude rally the eager support of public opinion, and yet it was impossible for the Turks to defy it. A standing arbitral authority renders an inestimable service to peace by its mere existence. One may make the same qualified comment about the verdict which handed over the Aaland islands to Finland, though there can be little doubt that their population was solidly in favour of a return to its former Swedish allegiance. That was a highly conservative verdict, but to it the Swedes bowed loyally. Decisions of this kind avail to keep the peace. The danger is that they seem too obviously

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to choose the easier course. A League which always acted in this way would, in the long run, strike despair to the hearts of nations which stand in need of drastic change.

Twice the League has succeeded, by prompt and drastic intervention, in stopping military operations in the Balkans, which might have been the prelude to war. The Yugo-Slav Kingdom had in 1921 actually begun an invasion of Albania. The threat of an economic boycott, which the League was prepared to organise against her, induced her to withdraw her forces promptly, and Albania recovered her territory. Again in 1926, the Greeks availed themselves of the pretext of a frontier incident to begin an invasion of Bulgaria—an exploit which they would hardly have attempted had not Bulgaria been disarmed. The League checked the raid and compelled the Greeks to pay for the murderous damage they had done. One would congratulate the League more heartily on these two achievements, if one could abstain from the reflection that in these instances the disturbers of the peace were minor Powers. Twice in such affairs, the League has failed (in Vilna and Corfu); twice it has succeeded. It is apparently just strong enough to coerce, in case of need, a Power of the size of Yugo-Slavia, but a little too weak to tackle Po-

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land. The authority of the League will compel respect when for the first time it ventures to act against a Great Power.

It is hardly by these political achievements, more than balanced as they were by failures in the same field, that the League is gradually overcoming the disappointments of its early years. If it has won for itself the temperate regard of European public opinion, and made itself indispensable in the life of our continent, it owes its place in the world's esteem largely to its social and humanitarian work and to the intellectual services which it has rendered by the investigation of international economic problems. Mankind asked for an authority, equally just and strong, which should impose peace, with justice and disarmament. That expectation it is far from satisfying. What it has indisputably achieved, was what few of us demanded or foresaw. It has, first of all, provided an organisation which can give effect to the vague sentiments of pity and sympathy, which before its day had lacked a channel of action. There was first of all Nansen's work, in gathering and repatriating nearly half a million prisoners of war, scattered, without the means of self-help, in countries too stricken and disturbed to aid them without support from outside. Without the care of the League it is probable that scores of thousands

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of these victims of the war would have perished in Siberia. Something, also, the League was able to achieve for the Russian refugees in Europe. Even finer, because it was more constructive, was its work for the Greek refugees from Turkey. Moved to sudden rage by the wanton war of conquest which the Greek Kingdom had waged against them, the Turks tore up the native Greek population by the roots and cast it out, resourceless and exposed to every disease that preys on hunger and grief. It took refuge in a country impoverished and disorganised by war and civil strife. The League turned a calamity into a blessing. Its international loan for the settlement of this population from Asia Minor in Greek Macedonia has, under its able supervision, healed the miseries of these exiles, repopled waste places, and added new agricultural wealth on a great scale to a neglected region. In a less degree the Bulgarian refugees have also profited by the care of the League.

One may add to this humanitarian record the services which the League rendered, first to Austria and then to Hungary, when their finances were hopelessly embarrassed by the shock of dismemberment and the consequences of monetary inflation. The League raised a loan for Austria, and appointed a controller, who has succeeded in

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balancing her budget and stabilising her currency. His work entailed, as was inevitable, drastic interference in the domestic life of this stricken state; it is certain that beneficial social expenditure was too ruthlessly cut down, nor can one forget that the process of stabilisation has led, as it usually does, to severe unemployment. The fact remains that this piece of work was carried through efficiently, under conditions which seemed nearly hopeless, and that, thanks to it, Austria enjoys as high a degree of relative prosperity as she is capable of attaining, so long as she is cut off by political and fiscal barriers from the markets of Central Europe, to which she enjoyed free access before the partition of the Dual Monarchy. One may ask whether the lever of finance might not have been used to modify the brutal system of reaction which prevails in Hungary, but here too the technical work of restoration has been thoroughly performed. These two achievements may, if the League cherishes high ambitions, point the way to an important extension of its work. Again and again, little backward states like Egypt have fallen into the grasp of expanding Empires, because spendthrift kings have turned to them for loans. The loan became a pretext for the setting up of financial control to guarantee the punctual payment of interest, and financial control entailed, as

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it usually will, the permanent loss of effective self-government. If in the future a needy state can apply to the League for a loan, there is every prospect, even if some financial control should be necessary, that it will be less galling and more disinterested, that it will be temporary and that at the end of the period of tutelage, it will leave the independence of the debtor intact. An application from Esthonia to the League for help in raising a loan has just been granted, as I write, on terms which involve no diminution of independence. This may be an important precedent. But, indeed, there is no limit to the work which the League might do in this way, if it should deserve the confidence of weak states which feel themselves overshadowed by the Imperial Powers. All of them might benefit by the advice and technical guidance which peoples of a more developed civilisation might give them, to organise not merely their finances, but their police, their system of education, and their communications. To the empires they cannot turn for aid without imperiling their independence. If the League should act boldly in this way, it can perform the civilising work of Imperialism, without its threat to freedom.

Two organisations occupy an important place in the League's organisation, the Commissions

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which deal with minorities and mandates, but because the most important part of their work is necessarily confidential, it is difficult to assess its importance. The former of these is charged with the duty of watching over the interests of the racial minorities in certain countries of Europe which undertook, in accordance with the peace treaties, to respect the rights of these unwilling subjects. They may, by complaint and petition, call attention to their grievances, subject to the restriction which may be inevitable, that these complaints must pass through the hands of the government under which they live. The permanent officials of the League are constantly engaged in investigating these petitions, and in many cases they have carried out their enquiries on the spot. Their prestige as servants of the League has more than once enabled them, by informal mediation and negotiation, to better the lot of these unfortunate races. One is inclined to think, however, that in grave cases the weapon of publicity should be used. One bows to the indisputable evidence that good has been effected through the League's agency in this way, but the fact remains that the plight of these alien populations (including the Jews) is distressing in Poland and Roumania, while for the Bulgarians and Albanians of Serbian Macedonia nothing has yet been attempted. The

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governments in question feel, not unnaturally, that they occupy an invidious position. Their conduct is subject to a measure of international control, from which other states escape. Italy, though her territory was enlarged by the peace settlement at the expense of the German population of the Tyrol and of the Slav minority in Trieste and its hinterland, is free from this supervision. Her treatment of both these races calls emphatically for intervention. There are other cases, of much older standing—that of Spain, for example, in her dealings with the Catalans—which would gain from international attention. The most one can say is that something was won for the future when the League was recognised, slight though its powers may be, as the guardian of these minorities.

The Mandates Commission reports to the League's Council and to the Assembly on the conduct of the various mandatory Powers in the discharge of their guardianship over the immature populations entrusted to their charge. It has discharged its duty with thoroughness and courage. Its reports are based on the fullest information. In the case of Syria, for example, it has heard (or its members have "unofficially" heard) the evidence of the representatives of the rebellious Syrian population. It has cross-questioned the

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French officials and discussed their policy very frankly with them. But it is a purely advisory body, and the Council, dominated by the Imperial Great Powers, is in a position to ignore its recommendations and its criticisms. It has had to endure a peculiarly insolent public rebuke from Sir Austen Chamberlain, who evidently felt that its zeal in putting searching questions about forced labour, inequitable taxation, native rights in land, and other inconvenient and delicate matters, was a threat to Imperial Powers, who are accustomed to do what they will with their own.

A full survey of the work of the League would have to deal with its ghastly exposure of the traffic in women and children, with its rather hesitating handling of the opium question, and with its first attempts to organise coöperation in the world of learning. But even this brief glance must attempt some estimate of the magnificent work of its health organisation. It has had in Dr. Ludwik Rajchman a director who continues the gifts of imagination and organisation with an enviable power of work. One may doubt whether during these post-war years any man has equalled his service to his kind. Under his inspiration it has grown from the smallest beginnings, until it is today the most fruitful and beneficent department of the League. It came into being to defend

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Europe against the epidemics which threatened to invade the West from impoverished Russia; it has become a general staff which leads the international struggle against disease. It has helped Russia to cope with the diseases which came in the wake of the civil war. It is studying and organising the means of combating malaria the world over. It has created, with a centre at Singapore, a sort of vigilance corps to watch the movement of epidemics in the Far East. It has begun to organise in Africa combined operations against sleeping sickness and other afflictions of the Tropics. It has surveyed the possibility of similar work in China. It has done so much in its few years of active life that one dares to hope that the next generation may see, as the result of its work, the lifting of whole populations, delivered from malaria and like scourges, to a new level of vigour and prosperity. It is probable, for example, that the prevalence of malaria in India is sufficient in itself to account for the physical inferiority of the Indian to the European adult. More than this, by statistical and other means, it is contributing powerfully to the study of the causation of cancer and other obscure diseases. Work in this field has hitherto been confined mainly to investigations within the limits of each nation; much may be won by organising comparative international study.

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But the main idea which informs the League's work may be summed up in the word standardisation. It began by standardising the therapeutic products of the biological laboratory, which used to vary in the most baffling and dangerous way. It is reorganising the world's supply of quinine. But, above all, it brings to the knowledge of every country what each pioneering nation has done in the field of social and preventive medicine. The pioneers, one may note, are not always the most advanced nations; Yugo-Slavia for example, has struck out new paths with amazing vigour and imagination. The League makes full use of the printing press for this purpose. Even more interesting is the system by which it arranges the interchange of public health officers, who by serving for a time in other countries, learn the methods which they have perfected. The purpose is to bring about a rapid levelling of the methods of preventive medicine in the more backward countries up to the standards which have been attained in the more advanced. Beginning with the struggle against epidemics, Dr. Rajchman is now preparing to apply a similar method to the care of children and the prevention of infantile mortality.

None of the pioneers of the League had foreseen such a development of its work as the Health Organisation has carried out. Under the pressure

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of the world's needs the League idea, narrowly conceived at first as the prevention of war, is evolving toward international government. The national state started as an organisation for police and defence, to become in our own day a complex instrument of social coöperation. The same evolution is taking place in our international life. The League began as policeman; it is already a healer. One foresees in this great pioneering effort of Dr. Rajchman, the first sketch of an immense undertaking to work out the conception of a common world civilisation. It is defining and broadcasting standards. As time goes on, it will come to seem dangerous and anomalous that any state should fall below the general level of the world's practise, in its measures for the prevention of disease and the care of child life. To define standards is only the first step; more and more the world will understand that it must come to the aid of needy and backward states which are struggling to raise themselves to the general standard. The fear that disease may spread from a neglected focus has already worked to stimulate the international sense of duty, and the League, backed by the Rockefeller Foundation, has given material aid both to Greece and to Poland, in coping with epidemic scourges. When once the idea is grasped that we are members one of another, there can be no limits

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to the spread of international coöperation and aid. The national state taxes the opulent West End of its cities, and spends what is drawn from their superfluous wealth, to bring some measure of health and education to the pitiful streets of its congested slums. The day may come when it will seem equally natural that a World Government should draw a contribution from great and wealthy Powers, to meet the needs of backward and impoverished peoples.

As yet we are at the stage of voluntary coöperation and aid and we have only begun to explore its possibilities. The international labour office represents another phase of this idea. The Washington Convention defined standards, even more authoritatively than the Health Organisation has yet done. It tried to generalise the eight-hour day throughout the world, modifying this standard in the case of Oriental states, where the exploitation of unorganised labour has hitherto known no limits. It tried at the same time to lay down general rules for the protection of working-women, mothers, and children, and to set limits to the use of such dangerous industrial substances as white lead, and to such unhealthy practises as the baking of bread at night. It has struggled in the same way to work out an international code for the protection of seamen, and even to lay

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down a common standard for agricultural labourers. So far, one must confess, it has defined standards, but it has lacked the power to impose them on reactionary governments. The British Government, one is ashamed to say, has stood in the way of the ratification of the eight-hours convention. Sooner or later the League will have to consider the means by which a common minimum of civilisation may be imposed upon unwilling interests. In the last resort, after due warning and the expiry of a time limit, the League might require its loyal members to exclude the exports of states which refuse to adopt the minimum provisions of its labour code. There can be no security for the advance of a humane civilisation so long as the produce of industries which observe a high standard, are exposed to the unregulated competition of industries which aim at cheapness by overdriving their workers. The Health Organisation and the Labour Office are coöperating to study such industrial diseases as anthrax, and proposals have been made by various governments that the League should undertake a comparative investigation of the control of the manufacture and distribution of food supplies in the interests of international public health, and again of the hygiene of school children. In the end one foresees that the League will be setting standards for

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the whole range of civilised administration. It would be a natural extension of its work that it should do for education what it has already done for public health.

In the Economic Section of the League lies the germ of an even greater growth, which we shall discuss in the sequel. Will the League one day attempt to control the international operations of banking, to regulate the gold standard, or even to dispense with it, by taking a value based on a commodity index as the unit of an international currency? Will it be bold enough to ration the world's raw materials and claim the power to regulate international trusts? Will it one day make frontiers obsolete, by organising, by steps and stages, some system in the exchange of goods and services which recognises the international division of labour? Here lies, as we shall argue in the sequel, the key to the League's future. In the meantime it has taken the first step. The Economic Section has, like the Health Organisation, the good fortune to possess a chief of unusual power; Sir Arthur Salter and his staff are making it the world's centre for the collection of international economic data and for the study of such movements as the growth of the international trust. It aims also at the focussing of world opinion by conferences. At Brussels it worked out

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a cautious but valuable series of recommendations for the stabilisation of the shaken currencies of Europe. At Geneva, this year, it obtained from a highly representative assembly, which even Russia attended, a set of resolutions which marked a tendency toward freer trade, at a time when the chief governments of Europe seemed still to be moving in the opposite direction.

In contact with the staff which Sir Eric Drummond has gathered round him in the secretariat of the League, one is impressed not merely by its ability and its vitality, but even more by its devotion to the international idea. Here are men who came, in mature life, after a purely national training, to an entirely new task. In discharging it, they have gained a vision of the general good of humanity, that has dwarfed and corrected the national outlook which is still that of the circles from which they came. It is not surprising that those members of the staff who come from the small neutral states should learn with ease to think internationally; they gain by stepping into a wide field of action. The startling thing is that Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Japanese, who have behind them a stronger national tradition and no sense of the narrowness of the sphere into which they were born, should acquire the international mind with the same thoroughness and consistency.

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Among these men and women it seems as natural to work for the common weal of all nations, as it seems in Paris or in Berlin to work for the exclusive good of France or Germany. There had been little in previous attempts at international coöperation in the sphere of government to prepare one for this happy adaptability. When diplomatists have worked together in a joint task, as in the brief period of Anglo-French control in Egypt, or in the common administration of Tangiers today, no common mind has emerged, and the result has been friction and humiliating failure. One can guess the reason for the difference. The diplomatists went into these joint operations as servants of a national state, and, loyal to their training, they continued to serve its exclusive national interests. But the members of the secretariat are the servants of the League; loyalty for them has come to mean devotion to its idea and not to any national flag. Work is the great shaper of men's minds, and this work is sufficiently inspiring to create from the sound stuff of human nature the tools which the world needs for its new task.

The League, as one sees it at Geneva, in converse with its permanent staff, seems indeed the most hopeful birth of our time. But a depressing sense of its powerlessness invades the mind of the observer when he quits this single-minded inter-

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national circle, and enters the room where trained parliamentarians are frustrating the hope of disarmament by arguing each for the interests of the Great Power which sent him to Geneva. Here, too, there is harmony. As King Francis put it amid his wars with Charles V: "My Cousin Charles and I are perfectly agreed: we both want Milan." That sixteenth-century epigram has not lost its force. These great empires are perfectly agreed: each wants the maximum of power. And while they want it, whether in the form of cruisers and conscripts, or of the untrammelled right to act in distant continents for their own aggrandisement, the idea of the League withers at every meeting of their councils and their conferences. They have not aimed at its growth, and under their paralysing leadership its authority has not grown. They have kept it small by their jealousies and timidities, until it seems that their whole study is to exclude from the scope of its survey every happening that vitally concerns the world. Turning a blind eye to the momentous clash of East and West in China; silent over the rupture of diplomatic relations between the British Empire and Russia; forgetful that the armies of three of its members still occupy on the Rhine the territory of a fourth; indifferent to the latest coercion of Egypt and careless of the dangerous dealings of

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Italy with Albania—the League's Council will yawn through a tedious agenda of routine, until the British representative rouses it to attention, by proposing that henceforward it shall meet not four times, but only thrice, in a year. The proposal is not an exact measure of the League's success in tranquillising the world.

CHAPTER FOUR

Locarno

MANKIND has never yet created for itself, from the darker regions of its brain, an eternal nightmare. At some point the fettered sleeper wakes, or else it happens that a friendly hand releases him. Throughout the ten years that followed the outbreak of the Great War, military power was the despot of Europe. But the occupation of the Ruhr was the last of its triumphs. In three successive efforts, during two eventful years, the sleeper was freed. Why one of these efforts failed, while two succeeded, is a study which may tell us much about the real forces at work in the world. With the Dawes Scheme, the banker took the place of the soldier as the acknowledged master of Europe. The attempt in the Geneva Protocol, to base the world's peace on a firmer foundation than the covenant of Versailles, failed lamentably in its immediate purpose. Like the covenant itself, it was the work of the idealists. Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot, without the backing of bankers or industrialists, attempted, as Mr. Wilson had done, to build with the mortar of logic. One cannot say that their structure tum-

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bled; it never stood erect. The third effort was the net-work of treaties woven at Locarno. It looked like the work of statesmen and diplomats, but a glance at the simultaneous movement which, for the first time since 1914, united the strongest forces in the capitalist society of France and Germany, suggests another origin. The conclusion of the Locarno treaties synchronised with the formation of the European Iron and Steel Cartel.

It may never be possible until the history of this period can be read in memoirs and diaries, to test the guess that the *rapprochement* of the Franco-German heavy industries was cause, and the Locarno system effect. The relation of politics to business is a problem which will always range us, according to our temperaments, in rival camps which talk in mutually unintelligible dialects. It resembles the controversies over matter and spirit, brain and consciousness. Does a movement on 'change, or in the banker's parlour where industrial directors congregate, precede and explain the speeches and actions of statesmen? Does a change in the grey matter of the brain precede and explain the march of a syllogism from premises to conclusion? Or shall we think of the two as aspects of the same reality, and talk indifferently of *Economics or Politics*, as Spinoza would write

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God or Nature? There is fascinating matter here for speculation. The fact is that the bankers openly worked, not only to draft, but to impose the Dawes Scheme. The political reconciliation of France and Germany, after ten years of unbroken warfare, which had engaged their armies incessantly round the collieries and smelting furnaces, came about as the owners of pits and iron works fused their interests in a Cartel. The uncompromising economic realist would deny that any change had taken place in the nature or the motives of the powers which control our destinies. These same heavy industries, he would argue, quarrelling over Moroccan mines and Turkish railroads, made the war. They prolonged it by their pre-occupation with the iron fields of Lorraine and Silesia. They continued, after the conclusion of a nominal peace, to wage it over the coal field of the Ruhr. They brought their twenty years struggle to an end when they formed their Continental Trust. What happened, on this showing, in 1925 at Locarno, was that capital demobilised the soldiers, and contented itself with the services which the politicians could render. For the idealists alone it had no use.

The mechanics of the act of salvation to which General Dawes gave his name, were relatively simple. M. Poincaré had proved for us by the

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occupation of the Ruhr, that military power had lost none of its efficacy as an engine of destruction. He shattered the fiscal and economic systems of Germany: he completed the ruin of the German budget and the German mark: the French franc felt the recoil of his blunderbuss; in the end he upset himself. In one thing only did he fail: he did not get reparations. The urgent need of the French Treasury for an accommodation gave American bankers their chance to step in as the arbiters of Europe. Throughout the perilous negotiations which followed the sitting of the Dawes Commission, the fact that only the American banks were at once able and willing to underwrite a loan, which would enable bankrupt Germany to make an immediate reparation payment to bankrupt France, was the condition essential to success. It would be a misreading of history to suppose that Europe spontaneously turned to the financiers with a request for economic wisdom. The necessities of France compelled her to swallow the wisdom which the bankers dictated. The settlement which they imposed, first of all in their report, and then at the Conference of London, was the first contribution of the economic expert to European peace. It offered a business man's solution of the problem of reparations that would have destroyed us all, if it had been left

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much longer to the soldiers and the politicians. There was much in the Dawes solution which one may question and regret, but it had to be accepted or rejected as a whole, and in the balance there is no doubt that Europe in general, and Germany in particular, were gainers. It ended the Ruhr occupation within a year; it broke down the customs barriers which France had erected between the Rhineland and the rest of Germany; it restored the railways of the occupied area to the German administration: it brought back to their homes the thousands of German officials whom the French had banished. It fixed no total sum which Germany ought to pay by way of reparation, but it did suggest tentatively the sum which she *could* pay, year by year, without involving herself and her currency in ruin. It made the impartial expert the judge of the amount of wealth which might safely be transferred from Germany to her creditors, and it bound the French (who had hitherto been their own final Court of Appeals) to bow to arbitration before resorting again to any of the forms of coercion which they dignify with the name of "Sanctions." It enabled Germany to balance her budget. It brought about the restoration of her currency, and ended the bad dream of inflation which had made life a nearly intolerable burden for her workers and her professional class.

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It protected her by a moratorium (complete during the first year, and partial during the following four years) from the exactions of the Allies. One may feel fairly sure that the figure at which it fixed her payments in a normal year (£125 millions), is very much beyond her ability to pay, or the capacity of the Allies to receive. If her exports could show such a surplus over her imports, it could only be by annihilating the trade of the victors in markets where they compete. But the mechanism by which her payments can be adjusted to her capacity, looks strong enough for its delicate work.

One may concede that the expert found the best of the few available paths out of the morass of Versailles, but we are not yet at the end of this complication. The Dawes Commission neither fixed any total sum as the debt which Germany owes, nor did it number the years during which she must continue to make these payments. She will not assent to this slavery for ever, and it is hard to believe that she will submit (or the peoples of Europe with her) throughout the period of nearly two generations contemplated in the terms laid down for the payment of inter-allied debts. The generation which came into the world after the Great War was over, will not, when it comes to manhood, and directs the nation's affairs,

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consent to labour to make good the follies of its fathers. In two other ways the Dawes Commission left an unwelcome legacy behind it. It insisted on the de-nationalisation of the German State Railways, which had been, until war and the ruined mark temporarily injured them, a model of efficiency, and a proof that solvency can be combined with public service. To the German working class and to socialists all over the world, it seemed that high finance had used its opportunity to destroy a great achievement in the realm of public enterprise: foreign coercion was invoked to do, for the benefit of the *rentier* class, what no German government, however reactionary, would have dared to do on its own responsibility. At the same time both the railways and the national bank had to submit to a measure of foreign control, albeit discreetly veiled. There is no surer way of arousing nationalist passion than the imposition of a foreign control designed to make the payment of a foreign debt the governing fact in a people's economic life. Nor was this all: these controls will not last for ever, nor should they under normal conditions be oppressive. But a more lasting and much bigger consequence may follow from a provision in the scheme which, technically, had much to recommend it. If in any year it is impossible, without danger to Germany's

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credit, to transfer abroad the payments which the scheme requires her to make, the amount which cannot be transferred will be reinvested in German industries. This means that, year by year, the victors instead of levying an annual tribute, will foreclose upon a mortgaged estate. The penetration of foreign, and especially of American capital, began on a considerable scale in Central Europe during the period of inflation. While Jewish dealers from Holland ravaged the countryside, buying up pictures and heirlooms at nominal prices, the bigger capitalist found his opportunity in the banks and industrial concerns of Germany and Austria. Europe, it seemed, was becoming an American Colony, which must work henceforward for the benefit of this imported capital. The Dawes Scheme revealed the power of the foreign banker over the embarrassed estate which is our continent, while at the same time it promised to extend the range and amount of foreign investment. The Scheme undoubtedly saved Europe from a much worse fate. But it was none the less a portent in our history, which seemed to warn us of the approaching end of our independence. Europe had ruined itself by war, and America was buying it up. Moscow in the pride of its aloof poverty, watched the process with malicious interest and flung at the Ministers of the democratic

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West the taunt that they had sunk to be bankers' clerks.

The bankers registered their triumph at the London Conference of August 1924. Next month idealism had its innings at Geneva. By a rare chance, progressive and pacific governments were simultaneously in office in London and Paris. For the first and last time since the close of the War, Anglo-French relations were cordial. The problem of reparations was at last out of the way, and the two Western governments set to work with a will, in a blaze of publicity, to complete the pacification of Europe, by a political settlement. Taking Security, Arbitration, and Disarmament as their watchwords, they sought to do what the Covenant had notoriously failed to do—to make the world finally warproof. For though their minds were busied with the needs of Europe, they offered their solution to the whole earth, and cast it in the form of an amendment of the Covenant. The "Protocol" which embodied the work of the fifth session of the League's Assembly, was a triumph of skilful draftsmanship. It remedied the more obvious defects of the Covenant. It abolished the right of private war. It closed the "gap" through which war can creep in past the sentinels of the Wilsonian clauses. For, as the Covenant runs, unless the League's Council

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has imposed on disputing Powers an arbitral settlement by a *unanimous vote*, they are free, after a delay of three months, to resort to war. That privilege the Protocol withdrew. For the first time a precise meaning was given to the term "aggression"—a meaning so clear that it could hardly be misinterpreted. The aggressor is the Power which defies the Council by violating an armistice which it has imposed, or disregarding its orders forbidding mobilisation, or resorts to war after refusing either to submit its case to pacific settlement, or to comply with the award. The Council was expressly armed with the right to forbid mobilisation or impose an armistice. When once enquiry into the facts should prove "aggression" in this sense against a Power, the consequences followed automatically. That Power was outlawed, and every member of the League was bound to collaborate loyally and effectively to ensure respect for the Covenant, to render aid to the menaced state, and especially to ensure the safety of its communications by sea and land, while the League would draw up plans for the economic isolation of the aggressor and for economic co-operation with his victim. At the same time, when the League declared that an act of aggression had been committed, the various treaties of alliance registered in its books would automatically come

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into force, but without this indispensable preliminary they could not be invoked—a provision which robbed them of much of their lurking menace. The various alternative methods for the pacific settlement of disputes were elaborated with much foresight. And finally, after the provisions for compulsory arbitration and mutual aid had made their contributions to the security of every loyal power, the world was invited to measure its new sense of safety at a disarmament conference, and only if this conference should have succeeded in its aims, would the Protocol have taken effect. A study, after the lapse of these years, of the many novel and ingenious details of the Protocol, does but confirm one's respect for the clear thinking and legal skill which went to its drafting.

A draft, however, it remained. The Conservative Government which came into power two months later, bluntly refused to proceed with it, or even to take it as a basis for further discussion. There were two main reasons for this refusal. Conservative minds were unwilling to make the large surrenders of national sovereignty which the Covenant demanded. In the first place they revolted against any unlimited obligation to carry every dispute to arbitration. This distrust of any universal pledge to arbitrate hardened into some-

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thing which resembled a principle in its rigidity. Sir Austen Chamberlain resisted the temptation to take an oath with all the stubbornness of a seventeenth century Quaker, and refused to conclude an unlimited treaty of arbitration even with Switzerland. Some of the reasons by which this refusal was afterwards defended, would tell with equal force against any agreement, even in a specific dispute, to be bound by an arbitral award, and it is difficult to reconcile them with our obligations under the Covenant.¹

There was a revolt even more vocal against the undertaking which the Protocol implied, to place the British navy at the League's disposal, if it should be necessary to help a State menaced by aggression. That obligation is morally latent in the Covenant, for "economic sanctions" could hardly be made effective without it; but the words which require us to collaborate in ensuring the safety of a menaced state's communications by sea and land, may have made it a little more explicit. That obligation was repugnant to the school of thought which would keep our own fleet to fight

¹ The Foreign Office went so far as to urge in the House of Commons through its Under-Secretary, that "we have no guarantee whatever that if an arbitral award went against us, we should be able to carry the legislation in this House." The same reasoning would make it imprudent to conclude almost any treaty.

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our own wars. It believes in remunerative bloodshed, and not in mutual aid.

The other main objection to the Protocol, from the British Conservative standpoint, was that since it applied to the whole world, it involved us in commitments which were much too wide. This was a surprising and scarcely imperial modesty, and it became clearer, as the discussion went on, that the government was thinking primarily of our insular security, and in terms which have scarcely varied since Pitt decided to take a hand in the wars of the French Revolution. The Pact of Locarno which took the place of the Protocol, created a grouping of European Powers, and ignored other Continents. The initiative in proposing it came from Berlin, and the probability is that the economic *rapprochement* between the heavy industries of France and Germany happened to fit into the strategical schemes which were in favour in Downing Street. The French had never recovered from their disappointment that they failed to obtain from Great Britain and America the joint military guarantee of their Western Frontier, which originally figured in the bargain reached at Versailles. The failure to secure this promised re-insurance was, indeed, the excuse which they constantly offered for their unbending attitude in the Rhineland. Mr. Lloyd George

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had at Cannes, on the eve of the Genoa Conference, offered to give a unilateral guarantee of the frontier to France. The germ of the Locarno idea was, first of all, that Germany should renounce for all time any claim to the alteration of this frontier, and that its inviolability should be guaranteed, by Great Britain, for the security alike of Germany and of France. Two traditional conceptions of British policy favoured such a pledge. Since the time of Pitt we had thought of the continental shores of the Channel and the mouths of the Scheldt, if not of the Rhine, as the outworks of our own island defences. The development of aërial warfare forced us to look at Europe with a bigger telescope, and the phrase came into fashion that the Rhine itself was our first line of defence. After fighting a war to annihilate the German fleet, we had now to realise that we no longer inhabit an island. In the second place, as we bestrode the Rhine with our impartial guarantee, we saw ourselves in a position to engage in the most kingly of all sports—the game of the Balance of Power. Free to decide, in the event of a conflict in the West, which of the two neighbours was the aggressor, we were accepted as the arbiter of Europe. It would have suited our traditional policy to confine the Locarno pact to the Western Powers, but France had her

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allies in the East whom she could not desert—the Poles and the Tchechs—and they were eventually included, but they received no guarantee from us which went beyond the Covenant. For protection they must look, as before, to France. We aimed at security by sections, and cultivated a geographical sense of duty. Within Europe and within the League a new group of the Locarno Powers was constituted. Holland and the Scandinavian Powers were left to luck and the League. Italy was a semi-detached member, but Spain and all the states of Eastern Europe, save Poland, were excluded. This singular grouping seemed to answer two distinct calculations, one political and one economic. In the first place it might serve to detach Germany from Russia, or as some Tory commentators plainly put it, to isolate Moscow. An uneasy intimacy has united the two most dissatisfied Powers in Europe, since they concluded their pact of friendship at Rapallo. Each had an equal motive for desiring fundamental changes in the structure of the map of Europe. They were also, in the economic sense, complementary units. To reconcile Germany with the West might also mean to turn her gaze away from the East. It was, from the first, a necessary detail of the Locarno system that Germany should enter the League. Desirable as this was in itself, it did not

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become less desirable to British Ministers because Russia remained outside. But at the same time this Locarno group (if we omit Italy) included all the industrial Powers of the Continent—France, Belgium, Germany, Poland and Tchecho-Slovakia—and all its heavy industries. It looked like the political façade of the Steel Cartel.

One cannot interpret the Locarno pact without a realistic glance at all the circumstances that attended its conclusion. But it would be grossly unfair to undervalue its contribution to peace. It was, first of all, an unprecedented act of grace on the part of the Germans, that they should declare their readiness to end the feud which had raged since the dark ages across the Rhine and the Western Frontier. Sir Austen Chamberlain struck a note of reconciliation, when he announced that the pact meant, above all else, an effort to forget the past. One ought, perhaps, to dwell on these things, and to pass lightly over the formal language of the treaties in which these governments expressed their confidence in each other. For, plainly, it was a cautious and qualified confidence. Sitting down with knitted brows to forget the past, the Great Powers at once envisaged the possibility that they may fail in this difficult moral gymnastic. What if Germany, walking in her sleep, should stumble into the old road across Bel-

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gium? What if France, by a lapse of forgetfulness, should recollect the path to the Ruhr? And so the effort to forget upon parchment resulted in the British guarantee of the Western frontier. Save for this new feature, the Pact made no notable advance beyond the Covenant. It is true that treaties of arbitration arranged for the settlement of disputes between Germany and all her neighbours of West and East. Each of these Treaties provided for the creation of a permanent Council of Conciliation to deal with disputes between each pair of Powers. Should these fail to adjust a dispute, it would go to the League's Council. And then the old gap in the Covenant reappeared; for if the Council should fail to recommend a solution by a unanimous vote, war is still possible and permitted. One must note too, that it left the French system of alliances intact and unmodified in the East. Poland and Tchecho-Slovakia are assured of French support in the event of a conflict with Germany, but she has no backer to whom she can appeal. And strangely enough, while the pairs of powers which took the pledge to arbitrate marched past in imposing files—Germany and France, Germany and Belgium, and Germany, once more, with Poland and Tchecho-Slovakia—one name was missing,—Great Britain alone neither gave nor received a pledge to arbitrate. She

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and she alone set up no permanent Council of Conciliation.

One judges a pact of this type by its fruits. How much has it contributed to the reconciliation of the former enemies and the appeasement of Europe? It at last opened the doors of the League of Nations to Germany. After many exciting adventures, she took her permanent seat, by right, as a Great Power, upon its Council. One may fairly say that this tardy act of good sense did much to raise her from her place among the pariah nations, and to restore to her her lost status. But two flagrant wrongs continue to remind her incessantly that she ranks only in name as the equal of the victors. They continue to occupy her territory, and the occupation has still another eight years to run. Cologne, indeed, was evacuated and restored to the Reich after a trifling delay. Two years after the conclusion of the Locarno Pact, the French were with much difficulty persuaded to consent to a slight reduction of the Armies of Occupation in the rest of the Rhineland, from 70,000 to 60,000 men. Very shortly after the Locarno Conference, M. Briand had, at a meeting with Dr. Stresemann at Thoiry, drawn up a tentative agreement, by which the Occupation itself was to be speedily ended, in return for a transaction which would have made the bonds

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secured upon the German railways immediately available for the benefit of France. The bargain was promptly vetoed by M. Poincaré, and one divines that Europe may have to pass through further crises, and witness much hard bargaining before the French garrison quits the Rhine. In spite of the British guarantee of the Western frontier, it is the obstinate contention of French military opinion that the security of France requires the perpetual presence of a French army of at least 50,000 men on German soil.

Nor does it seem probable that the Locarno system will do anything to bring about a reduction of armaments in Europe. Eight years after the peace, the Allies seem as reluctant as ever to lower their armaments to the level which they imposed on Germany. Their promise to disarm stands on record in the Treaty of Versailles; it lives rather in the memories of the Germans than in the consciences of the Allies. The inevitable happens; nationalist Germans look forward to the day when they may dare to defy this one-sided command to disarm, and in the meantime, they attempt, by one subterfuge or another, to circumvent the disabilities which the Allies have imposed upon them. Their secret armaments may not be formidable, but the constant effort to keep alive something of the old military spirit delays the advent of a stable

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peace. Locarno was a step toward it, but a halting and timid step. So long as France must rely on her seizure of the Rhineland, it will not come. Nor will it come while Germany must look across her frontiers at guns and conscript armies, and feel herself among Powers an Impotence.

WHEN one realised that the heavy industries, which so often seem to control and inspire ministers alike in Germany and France, were working for economic coöperation on lines parallel with the Locarno Pact, one enquired whether the first step had been taken toward a United Europe, which might one day evolve into a Federated Europe. Impatient at the obstacles which nationalism opposes to the ambitions of industry when it would trade on the grand scale, with a whole Continent for its market, would the Steel Cartel continue to carry the movement of unification much farther? It may be too early to judge. But this one may certainly say; in spite of some easing of the tension between Germany and the Western Powers, Europe seems further from political unity than it did when the Locarno Pact was concluded in the Autumn of 1925. The new fact is the restlessness of Italy. There are in Europe three dissatisfied Powers of the first

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rank. Disarmed Germany may watch for her chance to play a hand in a nicely balanced game, but she dare take no bold initiative. Communist Russia, impoverished but armed, can have no Allies among the Capitalist Powers, and her ambitions lead her towards the Far East. Italy alone is at once armed and able to find associates. The loot which fell to her after the common victory, was far from answering her expectations. She hoped to make the Adriatic a closed Italian sea. She claimed Dalmatia as her province, and Albania as her protectorate. She aspired to be the dominating Power in the Balkans, and she dreamed of an Italian Empire in the Levant, with Cilicia, or even Smyrna as its nucleus. Glancing around the globe for regions to colonise, her eye has rested now on Portuguese Angola, again on Abyssinia, and for a moment even on Georgia. But it is toward the possessions of France that the Fascist Press directs its attention with the most open and offensive stare—from Nice, Savoy and Corsica to Tunis. One has learned to make allowance for the theatrical rhetoric in which the Dictator habitually indulges, but if he does not act, he must amuse the gallery which applauds him, with a show of action. Incidents designed to encourage a defiant attitude toward France have followed each other rapidly, and all the while,

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military preparations continued on the Italian side of the frontier, which would be meaningless waste if Italy hoped and intended to live at peace with her neighbour. As if to make ready for some coming trial of strength, Italian diplomacy concluded a series of mysterious agreements, which would be useful if a struggle should come with France, or with France's protégé, the Yugo-Slav Kingdom. The kindred military dictatorship of Spain revolves in Italy's orbit in the West. Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria (all of them semi-Fascist States) and latterly even Greece, seem to constitute a group which looks to Italy as its head. This loosely knit Fascist coalition encircles Yugo-Slavia and presumably explains Italy's success in concluding the Treaty of Tirana which has converted Albania into her "protected" zone of interest. It is less easy to explain why the League of Nations has watched, without an attempt to intervene, the destruction of Albanian independence, and tolerated the blunt refusal of Rome even to discuss this scandalous Treaty with the Yugo-Slav government. One might be able to answer that question if one could guess the exact nature of the intimacy which prevails between London and Rome. One asks whether, in these days of Leagues and Covenants, British statecraft

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has reverted to the old tradition of the Balance of Power, and relies on Italy to counteract French predominance in the Mediterranean. For a time, while the dispute over Mosul was still unsettled, Downing Street reckoned on the armed support of Italy against Turkey. More recently it may have toyed with the notion of using Italy's Eastern group against Russia.

This restlessness, for all its froth and folly, has its explanation in an economic problem. Italy is over-populated. The surplus population for which she cannot find remunerative work, if it cannot emigrate to the New World, must pour into France and Switzerland to sell its labour. It has sent to French Tunis more colonists than France, for as homes for white men, Italy's own colonies in Africa are useless. It is, then, a popular Imperialism, based on the needs of the masses, which drives Fascism into schemes of expansion and threats of conquest. One may point out that Fascism deliberately aggravates its own problem by repressing even the most discreet advocacy of birth-control. It will one day have a use for the explosive force of this teeming population. It might do much by education, by road building and by agrarian reform to advance agriculture, and improve its own food supply in the backward and

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neglected South. Again, it has aggravated its own problem by destroying the promise of the coöperative movements, which the Socialist and Catholic parties had fostered among the peasantry. But Europe, faced with the disturbance and the alarm which this demand for expansion can cause within her own borders and beyond them, lacks the foresight and the solidarity which might work out a constructive solution. One can see a way of escape in either of two directions. Italy has her efficient industries which might be capable of considerable development, if wider markets were open. The lowering or the abolition of European tariffs would ease this and many other problem. If in addition, an international organisation could guarantee the supply of raw materials, coal and wheat, would Italy still see in militarist Imperialism her only hope of salvation? And if this were not enough, an organised world would survey its own empty acres, and assign to Italy, whether under another flag or her own, a field which her emigrants might develop.

One turns from this spectacle with disquiet and apprehension. Italy represents a tendency which is frankly contemptuous not only of the actual League, but of every form of international co-operation. It dare not subject her to discipline, and it is as powerless to aid her constructively as

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it is to restrain her. Across the aspirations of idealists, and the efforts of industry and finance to reconcile Europe and build a system devoted to work and peace, this barbaric imperialism flaunts its menace.

CHAPTER FIVE

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HAPPILY for mankind, the impulse which made the League of Nations is not exhausted. The need for unity forces itself upon us in our daily experience, and works as a ferment in many minds. It is seeking its appropriate form, and before it finds it, it may launch innumerable projects and lure us into many a stirring adventure. Indeed, if we are to believe Oswald Spengler, when the creative powers of a distinctive culture have spent themselves in realising its original view of the world, in art, philosophy and the pioneering inspirations of science, they turn inevitably, in its later age, to the task of organising its social order as a vast harmonious whole. If this late age, in his view, seems decadent, because it lacks the vitality to sing or to see fresh things, it has in abundance the energy which conceives a political structure on vast lines. It passes first through the phase of Imperialism, aspiring to bigness, adding territory to territory, in its passion to extend the physical field of its domain. There follows a period which cherishes a broad and universal ideal; stoicism and Christianity permeated

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Roman thinking; socialism fills their place in our own time. If there is any truth in Spengler's stimulating reading of history, it is creative energy, and not a mere weariness of strife which drives us toward the task of finding an orderly political form through which we may realise the fact of the world's unity. The seeming confusion of our efforts, the strife among the partisans of rival principles of unity, are themselves evidence that life is stirring within us.

Did the League of Nations attempt too much, when it sought at the first attempt to unify the whole world? The doubt is natural, though the answer to it springs straight from experience. The war in its later phases enlisted every continent among the belligerents; even China and Brazil were drawn in. If war may inflame our whole planet, peace must spread its organisation as widely. But this answer is not complete. One may concede that some sort of organisation for peace must cover the whole globe—possibly a general treaty of arbitration, and some understanding over armaments. But if we ask for much more than this, if we look for the beginning of international government, is it a wise ambition that attempts to set up, at the first attempt, an international authority for the whole earth? One might pile argument on argument to justify this

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view. Is not the field too vast? Are not the possible subjects of contention too manifold and complex? Are the civilisations of East and West as yet sufficiently akin? Can one easily fuse China, or even Japan, in a single closely-knit super-state with England and France? One cannot plan a political structure as one designs a sky-scraper. One wants more than a rule and compass to sketch the outlines even of a Federation. If states are to fuse into a single organisation, they must have lived through a long chapter of history in common; they must confess the same philosophy; they must be passionately aware of some common purpose which unites them. There was life from the beginning in the United States of America, firstly because they had fought shoulder to shoulder in the war of independence, and also because they professed the same democratic individualism as their common political idea. Should one add that they spoke the same language? Language is certainly a mighty unifier when, in the same speech, one has heard the same words of command ring out beside the same blood-stained standard. There is life in the Soviet Union, in spite of the diversity of language, for here too men mingled their blood amid the privations of the civil war, and agreed to mould their social and economic order on the same Marxist pattern.

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Perhaps we must wait until some emotional experience, lived in common, fuses us into a whole that is felt. It may be objected that the war itself was such an experience. But apart from some acquaintance with the inconveniences which it caused, can one say that Asia and Latin America felt the war? Did it mean for Peking or Rio de Janeiro what it meant for Brussels or Vienna?

It seems plausible, then, to suggest that we ought rather to have begun by realising our unity by continents. The United States of Europe is, as it happens, an ancient aspiration. There is evidence that Henri IV and the Duc de Sully projected something of the kind. William Penn attempted to revive their plan, and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre made an elaborate sketch of a permanent confederacy which was to unite the Christian monarchs of Europe, guarantee them forever in the possession of their kingdoms, and ensure perpetual peace among them. Rousseau paraphrased his unreadable book; it served Kant as the basis of his great treatise; it influenced the Tsar Alexander I and took shape for a time in the visible world as that Holy Alliance which free men gladly allowed to perish. There was, as Rousseau put it, nothing impossible about the abbé's scheme, save that princes should even adopt it, and Kant was so firmly of the same opinion,

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that he stipulated that his league of perpetual peace must consist of republics. There is nothing so melancholy as the history of a venerable hope. With punctual malice Europe has twice celebrated the centenary of the abbé's book, by an outbreak of universal war. It was characteristic of that age that all these pioneers confined their plans and their speculations to Europe, and even Turkey lay outside the scope of their fraternal charity. Indeed, Henri of Navarre would have inaugurated perpetual peace by leaguering Christian Europe in a crusade against the Turks. Within the circle of the Christian European family, men could conceive a lasting confederacy; beyond it lay barbarism. But it was not these idealists, it was Napoleon who in fact came near to creating a united Europe—or rather two. The first obeyed, the second destroyed him. There are moments when one could regret the failure of his mighty effort. Europe won freedom, and used it to perpetuate its national feuds.

One can trace the survival of this European idea in two forms in our own day. The first has the merits of unconsciousness, the second all the defects of an academic theory. For as we have seen, the Locarno system might serve as the nucleus of a special organisation of Europe within the framework of the League of Nations. It is

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a rough sketch, drafted by practical statesmen, who would have scoffed at the idea that they were founding the United States of Europe. Morally and geographically it is an imperfect essay. It excludes Russia, and may, indeed, have been formed to isolate her. It includes neither the states which were neutral during the war, nor the lesser states of Eastern Europe, and Italy stands in a semi-detached relationship to it. It lacks any economic basis in its formal structure, though, as we have seen, it came into being as a sequel to the Dawes scheme and the *rapprochement* between the French and German heavy industries. With all these imperfections, it none the less removed what has been for many a century the chief obstacle to the reunion of Europe. On paper, at least, it achieved the reconciliation of France and Germany, stabilised their frontiers, and brought in England to guarantee perpetual peace between them. It is too soon to say whether the Locarno system has brought "olives of endless age" to Europe; their foliage has a withered look already.

The theorists were, as usual, prompter than the statesmen, and produced a scheme which has every merit save reality. One began to notice the existence of a Pan-European school of thought immediately after the war. It seemed at first to be

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confined to Germany, and even there it was a tiny and eccentric minority, grouped round the *Vossische Zeitung*. Throughout the period when Frenchmen and Germans could think of each other only with savage animosity, it urged reconciliation, and looked forward to the closest economic co-operation. Its distrust and jealousy were reserved for the British Empire, and it seemed to voice a continental sentiment which regarded our island as something alien to Europe. Its aim was to make a continental federation apart from England and even, as some members of this school conceived it, against her. It has since taken shape in a loosely-organised international movement, and in a widely-diffused book, *Pan-Europa*, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi has given its plans definite form.

The idea, as it is now debated in Europe, accepts the League of Nations as a permanent and world-wide organisation, but it proposes to take full advantage of the clause in the Covenant which smiles on regional groupings. The member states of the League are to arrange themselves in six continental groups. Between these groups obligatory treaties of arbitration, which will bind each continent as a single responsible unit, will ensure the peace of the world. It is also obvious that disarmament must be arranged between the con-

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tinental groups. The Council of the League will continue to be the supreme super-national authority, but it will represent no longer the member states, but the groups as single wholes. The proposed grouping is evidently tentative. The British Empire, which is already a federation, stands alone as a single political unit scattered over the world, and so also does the Soviet Union, which covers a vast area of Asia as well as of Europe. The two Americas grouped in the Pan-American Union constitute another unit. "Europe" as a "political continent" covers an area at once narrow and wide. England, Russia, and Turkey are excluded from it, but on the other hand it includes half of Africa (the colonial possessions of France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal), together with the scattered colonies of France and Holland in Asia, Oceania and even America. It is suggested that China and Japan should stand alone, apparently as separate political units, and no very convincing attempt is made to provide for Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Siam, Abyssinia, and certain minor states, like Liberia, which do not fit naturally into this grouping. The arrangement, it will be seen, is rather political than geographical, and the word "continent" has lost its natural meaning in the process. On this plan, the Council of the League would consist of delegations representing Pan-

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America, Europe, the Soviet Union, the British Empire, China, and Japan.

The thinker who gives precise definition to a fluid, popular idea renders an invaluable service. In this case, it seems to me that Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, much against his own intention, has succeeded in demonstrating the impossibility of any symmetrical continental grouping. His division satisfies the test neither of economics, nor of politics, nor even of sentiment.

(1) The economic interests of at least three Great Powers, America, the British Empire, and Germany, are world-wide. The first by the growing diffusion of its capital investments, the second and third by their dependence on foreign markets and sources of raw material, are almost as deeply engaged in the affairs of other "continents" as in those of their own. Economics cannot be controlled by these continental groups. What is true of trade and finance, applies no less to such an issue as emigration. Either then the World-League and not the continent will be the real authority in such questions, or the present economic chaos will not be greatly improved.

(2) Nor is it easy to see that much is gained for the harmonious conduct of the world's politics by this arrangement. The Count seems to think that the Pan-American Union is a much more vital

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organisation than in fact it is. Would the Latin-American republics welcome a plan which would shut them up in one closed compartment with the all-powerful Republic of the north?

Again, one asks whether an arrangement would be workable which would, in effect, burden the whole of West Europe with the obligation of defending not merely France, but her widespread colonial possessions. By virtue of her possessions in Asia or Africa, she must be in constant touch, friendly or hostile, with all the other continental groups. Her frontiers march with British West Africa, and she is the neighbour of China. Holland and even Portugal are in the same case. Italy is thrusting a pioneering hand toward every quarter of the compass. Will you make Norway and Germany responsible, if France should be involved in some fresh Fashoda incident on the Nile, or if Italy should again invade Abyssinia? Would Spain or Holland care to join in a guardianship over Poland in her dealings with her Russian neighbour? If there is joint responsibility, there must be joint control. The thing would be workable, only if West Europe should become a federation, so closely knit that all the states which compose it should place the conduct of their foreign relations in the hands of a single Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible to a federal parlia-

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ment. Even then, it seems to me, one would have to take a further step; one would have to pool all these colonies, treat them as the joint possessions of West Europe, and administer them from a single Colonial Office.

That solution of the colonial problem would raise several other issues. If one were to assign half of Africa to West Europe, would not the question arise in a rather acute form, why these valuable possessions, which enjoy a virtual monopoly of some important raw materials, should be controlled by only a fraction of the more advanced peoples of the earth? If they are a trust to be administered by disinterested supermen for the good partly of the whole earth and partly of their inhabitants, is not the whole League their natural guardian?

It would, moreover, be in many ways highly inconvenient to ignore the fact that Africa and Asia are natural geographical units. If we are to organise groupings throughout the world, they also have their claims to some measure of unity. They have their problems of intercommunication. Their climate makes special problems of health. And, lastly, their inhabitants may one day be conscious of their racial and cultural affinity. So long as territories are divided, as they are today, by the brutal accidents of history and conquest,

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one must endure such anomalies as these. But when once one begins to face the possibility of a rational redistribution, is it wise to ignore the natural inclinations of peoples? Before a generation had passed, the Arab race, for example, might feel it as a wrong that it should be assigned partly (in Syria and North Africa) to West Europe and partly (in Egypt and Mesopotamia) to the British Empire.

(3) One might pursue these same questions into regions dominated partly by politics and partly by sentiment. Soviet Russia, for example, is under a cloud, and Europe may not be unwilling to thrust her into a separate compartment. But I should doubt whether all the other Slavs have lost the sense of their affinity to the great mass of their stock so completely, that they would welcome this division forever. The ties of language and culture can still bind.

The same thing may be true of the three sovereign Mohammedan states, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, for which the Count makes no definite recommendation. They might want to form a seventh "continental" group. But if they did so, would they not gravitate toward the Soviet Union, as a natural ally against Western Imperialism? And should we then escape an irre-

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dentist problem, as they looked out at Syria, Mesopotamia, and even at India?

Again, one must place a very salient mark of interrogation against the proposal to isolate Japan as a separate continent.

Finally, one comes up against the most baffling of all these problems of redistribution—the problem which history set to mankind when it allowed the British Empire to spread over five continents. The Count has solved it by treating the British Empire as one of his separate “continents,” and leaving it to manage its own affairs in its own way. But could one ignore the fact that economically, and even in the military sense, Canada belongs to the American continent, and India to an Asia which has in this scheme no recognised place. If the “continents” could ever be in reality self-contained units, each following its own political and economic policy, the result might be, before long, the break-up of the British Empire. The geographical ties which pulled England toward Europe, and Canada toward America (to mention only two of many instances), might prove in the end stronger than the ties which history has made. But the Count, to do him justice, is aware of the difficulty, for he suggests that Europe must give some military guarantee for the defence of the British Isles, though not for the rest of the Em-

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pire, and again, that some special commercial convention must link England (but not the Empire) with West Europe for purposes of trade. One asks how much would then remain of the unity of the Empire which, even today, thanks to the Locarno treaties and the separate diplomatic representation of some of the dominions in some of their relationships, is growing shadowy.

But to Englishmen who have the international mind this proposal to isolate the British Empire as a separate "continent," and to cut off England from Europe, must seem reactionary. Our culture is European, and the more we isolate ourselves, the less fertile will it become and the less will it contribute to the common stock. Any arrangement which concentrates our minds on our "own" Empire must aggravate our tendency to Imperialism, and blunt our sense of fraternity with other peoples. Our own social development cannot be isolated from that of the continent. Our labour movement, in particular, has learned to work in close touch with the trade unions and Socialist parties of the Continent. Our problems resemble theirs, even more closely than they resemble those of our own dominions. We are exposed especially to European competition, and Europe in turn to ours. One may fairly say, for example, that wages, hours, and conditions in

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coal-mines constitute a single European problem. Conditions in the Ruhr react almost as closely on conditions in South Wales and Northumbria as conditions in these two British fields affect each other. Closer Anglo-Continental unity is a necessity of progress for labour, alike in Europe and in England, and any reorganisation of the world which made a joint advance more difficult, by raising fresh political barriers, or checking the association of the workers in these countries, would be an offence against social progress. Morally and intellectually we have everything to gain from the mutual stimulation and exchange of ideas, which come about more readily when men work within a single political unit. That unit does not exist today, nor will it be created tomorrow. But it would be a disaster to social progress to dig a new political Dover Strait between England and the Continent.

These destructive criticisms may serve to show that it would be a difficult, if not an impossible, task to arrange the world symmetrically in continental groups. But the thing which may seem impossible and undesirable, if we think of it as an immediate possibility, might none the less come about gradually, through a natural historical development, which would proceed at different paces

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in the various quarters of the earth. If West Europe is ripening for this evolution, one sees no reason why she should delay her union, until the two Americas, for example, were ready to form a confederation and in that guise to enter the League. It would be easy to give Europe a single delegation in the Council and Assembly of the League, while its other members continued to be represented as national units. But that would hardly be possible, unless the system of counting votes were so altered as to take account of populations and other relevant factors. Again, it may be that we must seek some international solution of the problem of Imperialism before such a grouping could be workable. That presupposes, however, a closer federal structure for the unitary "continents" than the Pan-Europeans seem to contemplate. Finally, since the supply of capital and the interchange of goods are being organised on a world-wide basis, it would be well that the central authority of the League in the economic field should be consolidated before its subdivision into continents takes place.

The more valuable part of the Pan-European idea is, to my thinking, its analysis of the conditions which must be realised before Europe can banish the causes of war which are fatally working

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within its own limits.¹ It is clear, as we have seen, that the question of nationality is as dangerous a source of disturbance as it was before the war. It is, moreover, improbable, if not impossible, that any juster redistribution of territory could be effected without another war. What, then, is the solution? If one cannot alter frontiers, can one make them unimportant? "European frontiers," as Count Coudenhove-Kalergi has said, "will cease to be dangerous so soon as they become invisible." In an earlier chapter we tried to divine the reasons which induce rational citizens of a victorious Power to maintain frontiers which involve the suppression of conquered races and the consequent danger of revolt or war. Firstly, he gains thereby an enlarged market which he can monopolise by fencing it with tariffs. Secondly, he gains human and material resources, which aggrandise his military power. The rational citizen of a conquered race who finds himself under alien rule is bound to desire a change, because he rarely enjoys effective equality in political rights and opportunities, or effective liberty for the enjoyment and development of his national culture.

In a sanguine mood it is just possible to con-

¹ A similar analysis will be found in an earlier book of mine, *A League of Nations* (1916).

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ceive the removal of these three causes of strife. Economic nationalism is deeply rooted in the commercial and industrial structure of Europe. It was, however, possible for the Germans in the last century to unify their many independent kingdoms and principalities in a customs union. Perhaps by gradual stages the same measure of economic unification may one day be achieved for West Europe. Again, with an obligatory system of arbitration and conciliation, backed by a treaty of mutual guaranty on the model of the Geneva Protocol, one could, on certain conditions, imagine a genuine measure of disarmament throughout Europe. Those conditions, however, are as difficult as they are important. The first of them is that West Europe should learn to live on neighbourly terms with the Soviet Union, and that sufficient confidence should reign between them to permit of the arbitration of disputes and of mutual disarmament. The second condition is that the haunting problem of Imperialism should be solved. Europe cannot dispense either with great armies or with air fleets and navies, if it must hold unwilling continents, for the purpose of exploiting them as its possessions.

Finally, it is essential, when one looks at this question of frontiers from the standpoint of the racial minorities, that their situation, at all events

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in the matter of cultural rights, should be rendered enduring. This is not, as more than one model proves, an impossible, though it may be a difficult, condition. It is difficult because it presupposes an unusual tolerance and a large-minded freedom from vanity on the part of the minority. The reader may be surprised when I cite Soviet Russia as the model which in this matter Europe would do well to follow. In no country had cultures and languages, other than those of the ruling stock, suffered such pitiless neglect and suppression as in Tsarist Russia. It was comparatively easy for the leaders of the revolution to reverse this execrable tradition. The revolution itself began with a revolt against the Slav Nationalism and Imperialism, which were prolonging the Great War by their extravagant pretensions. Its mood was to condemn everything characteristic of the old order and to make all things new. Many of its pioneers were themselves members of the depressed races. Finally, they had learned from their socialist schooling a deep distrust of every phase of nationalist thought. Everywhere the ruling capitalist class tends to use racial and national intolerance to divide the workers and divert their attention from social and economic questions. The recognised answer of the Russian governing caste to any stirring of discontent among

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the masses, was to launch an attack on the Jews, while in regions like the Trans-Caucasus, which have a mixed population, the political police would organise a feud between Tartars and Armenians.

The Socialist view, whether Jaurès stated it with philosophic calm, or Lenin coloured it with the bitter experience of a Russian rebel, has always held that the one precious element in nationalism is the heritage of a peculiar culture which should become from infancy the foundation of a child's intellectual life. It is possible to cherish this gift from the past without neglecting the cosmopolitan storehouse, whose doors education will open to the growing child. But no education, however enlightened and advanced, can compensate a child for the loss of a grounding in his mother tongue, which must always be the natural vehicle for the expression of unforced emotion. The words in which one has talked to one's mother and courted one's sweetheart, will always mean more than those of any other tongue. Alike for this reason, and to spare a child needless mental labour in his tender years, it is the first rule of education in a country of mixed races, that each should receive at least its elementary schooling through the medium of the mother tongue. But a proper concern for the self-respect of racial minorities demands much more than this. They

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will never feel at home in the state to which the accident of history has assigned them, unless they see that their own language enjoys equal rights with that of the majority. The practical inconveniences which flow from the use of several languages will in the end involve less loss, spiritual and even material, to the community, than the discontent and the hampered mental development which must result from an enforced uniformity. Above all, the life of mankind will be the poorer, if it loses any of these elements of temperament and vision, which are subconsciously embodied in every national language, in ballads and folk-songs and the whole heritage of popular decorative art and music.

But, save in this respect for national cultures, Socialist morality insists on rejecting or transforming the whole state of mind which one associates with nationalism. The tie of fraternity which links together all who contribute by the active work of hand or brain to the common coöperative stock of the world's wealth, is, in our day, more fundamental, more worthy of cultivation, and incomparably less liable to abuse, than the primitive associations of the clan and nation. A man is my brother, though he may differ from me in speech or even in the colour of his skin, when both of us are serving a common purpose and coöperating in work for the common good. "A man is

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not my brother," as a Russian writer has put it, "merely because he chastises me with a truly Russian knout, or insults me, while he cheats me, with racy Russian oaths." One may have to qualify this international interpretation of social duty, by recognising that though I may have the same obligations toward a fellow-worker in India, as toward my neighbours in my own town, I have not the same opportunities for discharging them. First of all, in Burke's phrase, a man must learn to "love the little platoon" to which he belongs. But there can be no place in this Socialist Ethic for the partialities and partisanships of nationalist patriotism, which in the society of today is commonly a disguise, conscious or unconscious, for the economic appetites of the governing class. Socialists, indeed, must often have the courage to practice an inverted patriotism. In international conflicts the right division of labour and the proper disposition of forces, is that each Socialist party must concentrate on combating and criticising the egoism rather of its own country, than of the opposing nation.

Russian practice has faithfully carried out this international doctrine. The Empire was transformed into a federation. Every race which inhabits a sufficiently large and compact area has been granted limited political autonomy, but com-

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plete cultural autonomy. Not only is this true for races like the Ukrainians and the Germans of the Volga, which are on the same level of civilisation as the Great Russians; the principle has been extended in the most generous way to races like the Tartars and the half-nomad Bashkirs, which up to the Revolution boasted no civilisation of their own. Even where (as in the Tartar Republic) the better-educated Russians form a big minority of the population, the administration is composed mainly of Tartars. The rule in mixed communities is always that each is endowed with schools, elementary, advanced, and technical, in which the mother tongue is the vehicle of instruction. Russian is, however, very wisely taught to the Tartars, but Russian children are also expected to learn the Tartar language. Wherever a distinct racial stock prevails in a small local area, the same generous rule is observed. Thus there are little *enclaves* in the Ukraine in which Polish is the recognised official language. It is startling for those who knew conditions in the Jewish "Pale" under the old order, to see official notices and names printed in railway stations and streets in the Yiddish language with Hebrew characters, as well as in White Russian. Everything which a poor state can do to encourage even the most backward and primitive national cultures is being done

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with fine generosity. I have heard in Kazan extracts from a Tartar opera and seen a Bashkir play, and the state press provides for the first time books and newspapers in these languages. In Georgia, which is in some respects a blot on this record, the administration is Georgian, and much has been done, at considerable cost, to preserve the neglected national literature of past centuries. One may say, indeed, that save perhaps in the Ukraine, where the pendulum has swung too violently against the Great Russian minority, national questions have ceased to be an element of disturbance and strife throughout the Soviet Union. Every national culture enjoys its rights, and every race has its fair part and its measure of influence in deciding the policy of the whole Soviet Union. A Georgian or a Jew may rise with ease to the highest positions in the central administration of the Federation.

What has been done in Russia amid revolutionary conditions, and under the influence of Socialist doctrine, will not be repeated elsewhere with the same thoroughness. So long as men retain the old view of patriotism and with it an exaggerated esteem for the dominant national culture, the most that one can expect from them is that they should do from prudent calculation some part of what Russians have done with enthusiastic conviction.

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It can be at the best a gradual development. A race so able in practical matters as the Tchechs will move (as it is already moving) rather less reluctantly in this direction than the Poles, the South Slavs or the Roumanians. But even to Poland experience teaches its lesson, for there is a Polish minority in Germany, as well as a German minority in Poland, and the risk of reprisals makes for moderation on both sides. But Europe has to realise that the present enforced acquiescence in the disposition of territory at Versailles will not last forever. Sooner or later, if German minorities (to take only that instance) continue to suffer such intolerable wrongs and insults as the Italians inflict upon them in the South Tyrol, a remedy may be sought in war. When men are forced to change their family names to the nearest equivalent in the language of their conquerors—a ridiculous but wicked practice which the Italians follow, at the expense of the Germans in the Tyrol and the Serbs, at the expense of the Bulgarians in Macedonia—they will seek the first opportunity to recover their self-respect. Europe dare not wait for the slow dawn of wisdom in minds which do not habitually harbour it. This is a continental issue which concerns us all. Without the aid of British and, one may add, American blood and treasure, neither Italians nor Poles nor Serbs could

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have won for themselves the opportunity to tyrannise over other races. If we stand aside, disgusted yet inactive, we shall be taught in a still more bloody catastrophe, that we are our brothers' keepers. If Europe means to organise itself for peace, the first step is to proclaim throughout its borders a general charter of cultural liberty, which the more civilised among us must impose upon the young barbarians who have come into premature possession of guns and aircraft. That charter must guarantee, to every racial minority which inhabits a sufficiently compact area in adequate numbers, autonomous government for its schools, a fair share of the public funds provided for all cultural purposes, including education, the use of its own language not only in its schools, but for all public and official purposes, and, finally, equality in all civil and political rights, including the all-important right of association. One means by all this much more than the use of the mother tongue in teaching the multiplication table; one means that the national schools may foster the national culture and tradition; one means that if it is the practice of a state to allocate funds to encourage literature, the arts, and historical research, the minority shall enjoy a proportionate share of them; an opera-house, for example, with a great tradition, like the German opera in Prague,

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must not be starved, because the Tchechs very naturally wish to encourage their own native opera. It must not be forbidden (as it was in Prague) for shops to exhibit signs and tickets in the minority language; there must be no obstacle to the formation by the minority of clubs, or even of parties. The Charter must apply to every European state, the old as well as the new. Its observance must be guaranteed by the whole Continental Federation (if that be the appropriate name for the West European group of states), and enforced by a system of inspection and enquiry. If a state should systematically violate the Charter, then the Federation must not shrink from expelling it from its ranks. To defend such a state is too heavy a liability.

Toward this development Europe must move, if it is to avoid wars and revolts inspired by the passions of nationalism. The danger is not imaginary. The next national war may not resemble those of 1848, which in Italy and Hungary found their leaders in the nobility or the middle class. What will happen, more probably, in the future is that the masses of a race which resents the suppression of its national culture, will, in its mood of revolutionary discontent, turn to communism for inspiration and to Russia for support. That is visibly happening in the Balkans, where repres-

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sion usually has an economic as well as a nationalist motive. One has seen the Bulgarian peasantry of Macedonia, forbidden by their Serb conquerors to form an openly nationalist party, flocking to the banner of a Left-Socialist, which soon became a Communist party. The same thing is happening under Roumanian misrule in Bessarabia; and during the brief Soviet revolution in Hungary in 1919, I was impressed by the part which the national humiliation of the Magyars played, in making the movement popular, as in its early days it certainly was in Budapest. These races know that the Soviet system has found a working solution for the question of nationality, which brings peace to all with satisfaction for each.

It is, none the less, a sharp reversal in the development of Europe during the last century, that one is demanding. For every student of history realises how the idea of the sovereign state has been enriched, since the end of the eighteenth century, by the conception of nationality. There is no necessary connection between the two. In the old world, an Emperor of Austria ruled, without discomfort or disloyalty, over the strange polyglot collection of races, which his dynasty had acquired by a series of fortunate marriages. While Latin was the official language, as up to the last century it still was in Hungary, no one

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dreamed of associating a national language or culture with the idea of this feudal state, and consequently no one was persecuted because he used a tongue other than Magyar. Nationalism, as we know it, became a state-aided fanaticism, partly because it was associated with the democratic revolt against personal rule and the relics of the feudal order, and partly because the new popular state assumed the charge of education, which had belonged to the Church. If that was a gain for free thought, it was a loss for peace, for the Church, at least in Catholic countries, was cosmopolitan. If this was part of a fated historical evolution, that is no reason why the present generation should allow itself to be fettered by a heritage, which dooms great regions of Europe to fruitless and perpetual strife. Even where manual weapons have been abandoned, men still perpetrate those racial divisions at the ballot box in these mixed states. One has, for example, in Tchecho-Slovakia the pitiful spectacle of two divided Socialist parties, both professing the same creed and both belonging to the International which summons workers of all lands to unite. Yet of these two Socialist parties, that of the Tchechs has habitually joined the governing coalition, while that of the Germans is as inevitably in Opposition. So long as politics are made to revolve round the

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issue of racial and national rights, men cannot concentrate their minds upon the claims of social and economic progress. The general recognition of the charter of national rights would free men from this obsession.

To put it bluntly, it is necessary for the peace and progress of Europe that the idea of the state, which is still the idea of power, should lose its association with nationalism, language, and culture. Nationality has its own voice. It speaks in ballads and folk songs. It may speak in operas and epics. But why must it speak through cannon? The natural frontiers of a language are the doors of the homes in which children speak it at their mother's knee. Why must it have its barriers of sentinels and customs houses? With these military and economic purposes, it has no logical or useful connection. It may thrive freely, without uniforms and the pomp of sovereignty. Englishmen and Frenchmen grow up happily unaware of the cruelty and intolerance, which this confusion between the idea of culture and power can cause. One must have lived in such a country as Macedonia before one learns to understand and to hate its barbarous fascination and its distorted idealism. It perverts not the worst, but the best of men, because it springs from the social instincts of our nature. It will drive gallant youths, be-

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cause they are chivalrous and self-sacrificing, to prowl as bandits in the mountains, there to rob and murder for a national idea, until one day their shapely corpses lie mid the cinders of a burned village. And what divides them from their conquerors? Ivan's son, if he be a Bulgarian, must die, that the name upon his tombstone may read Ivanoff, or endure eternal shame, if a Serb official should write him down in the census lists, a living Iovanovitch. Swift's satire was mild when he conceived the quarrels of the Big- and Little-Endians. To realise the degradation of nationalism in regions where it must spell rivalry, one must have watched, as I have done, the consuls of three European states, each with the prestige of a Great Power behind him, quarrelling, in order to decide which national flag should wave above a little charitable hospital where a few peasants tossed in fever. Sanity will come to great regions of Eastern Europe, and to some parts of the West as well, only when we understand that the valuable element in nationality is culture, and that culture needs neither the policed frontier to confine it, nor the national state to defend it.

If this development could go hand in hand with military and economic disarmament, frontiers would lose their importance. Within a generation it would no longer seem impossibly

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difficult, nor urgently necessary, to alter them. A state which lost a little territory would feel itself neither weaker nor poorer. Some flagrantly iniquitous frontiers like that of the South Tyrol might melt away, when strategy ceased in a demilitarised Europe to matter. No one would feel alarmed if, in a disarmed Europe, a pacific Austria joined a contented Germany. In other cases, perhaps in most cases, the gain from any change might not balance the loss from the disturbance to habit and usage.

One can then, when one chooses to toy with theory, imagine conditions under which Pan-Europa might be realised. It would be easy, at last, to conceive a revision of the Versailles map, but equally it would matter comparatively little whether it were revised or not. The fading, if not the obliteration, of economic frontiers would bring a new prosperity to an impoverished continent. One oasis of peace would exist in the world. Nationality would have become an intellectual stimulus instead of a political curse. The conditions, as we survey the actual state of Europe, seem difficult. But have we even yet stated them all? Can one conceive the reunion of Europe, if its states and peoples should remain divided by sharply antagonistic political systems? Could one incorporate Fascism in Pan-Europa? To me

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that seems impossible, even more impossible than the inclusion within it of Soviet Russia. Communism more firmly than any other doctrine is an international faith. Fascism is nothing if not nationalist. Italy, one often suspects, is in the League to wreck it, and the official party press (there is, in truth, no other) pours the most brutal contempt not only on the actual League (which may at times deserve it), but also on its idea. If one could overcome this first difficulty, that Fascism is a doctrine of nationalism and a cult of force, could one expect the labour, or even the liberal, movements of Western Europe to welcome Italy and the meaner Fascist States into a federated Europe, while their comrades were persecuted and their sister parties suppressed? Fascism has dug a deep trench across Europe. Democracy has been driven into the narrow territory north of the Pyrenees, the Alps and the Vistula. South and East of this line, liberty is a foreigner. While this division remains, the old moral unity of Europe is a memory. These, then, are the conditions which must be realised before Pan-Europa can cease to be a dream. Let those answer, who have plumbed all the deeps of human folly, whether the statement of these difficult conditions gives precision to a workable scheme, or reduces it to an absurdity.

CHAPTER SIX

Moscow and Asiatic Unity

PROBING whether the world, in its need for unity, may find it first of all Continent by Continent, let us turn from Europe to Asia. It may seem at first sight fantastic to suggest that there is here any problem which can concern the world within our own generation. In the case of Europe one may speak of reunion. The memory of the Holy Roman Empire, limited though its sway was, has never wholly disappeared. At no time did Asia realise even this imperfect degree of unity. The Catholic Church laid a basis for the civilisation of our continent, broader than either Mohammed or Buddha could achieve. Again, there have long been at work in Europe political agencies which profess a single doctrine and purpose, of which the labour movement is the most powerful and the most conscious. There is nothing comparable to it as a unifying force, in Asia, unless it be the infant and alien power of the Communist Party. But of all the many points of contrast, the most striking is that Europe is her own mistress, while it is only over patches of its vast surface that Asia can summon

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for action a will of her own. Unity may seem improbable in Europe, for one discerns no resolute agency which can bring it about. But this one may say, that if the will to unity should inspire any big and intelligent section of her population, she is free enough and strong enough to realise it without the fear of external opposition. There is no other continent which would place its veto on European union as Louis Napoleon sought to frustrate the unification of Germany. It is otherwise with Asia. A large part of her population is subject to British, French, or Dutch rule. Its greatest mass, the uncounted millions of China, is still struggling to realise national unity; it is fettered by the bonds of foreign financial control, and while it struggles, there are formidable foreign armies on its soil.

This last point of contrast does not necessarily render unity more remote. On the contrary, every analogy from the history of nations suggests that the opposition of external forces gives passion and consciousness to the impulse for unity. Nations have commonly reached unity in the struggle against a dominating Power who sought to forbid it. Italy united because Austria stood in the way, and Germany because France threatened her. And so, conceivably, it may be in Asia. These populations, with their endless diversities of race, re-

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ligion, and culture, which never dreamed of unity before they knew invasion, might come to perceive a common interest in resisting the invaders. It is this possibility, as yet no more than a question flung at the veiled shape of history, which makes the unification of Asia a moving topic for speculation. It can happen only through struggle. Europe may fuse placidly; Asia's unity is a theme for drama.

The difficulties seem overwhelming; one realised them, the other day, when the tentative suggestion came from Moscow that the independent Asiatic states should join the Soviet Union in forming an Asiatic League of Nations. Such a grouping would be viewed by the colonial empires of the West as a challenge. Inevitably the Asiatic states themselves would be jealous of the dominant influence of Russia, nor could the continental group be completed, while India and the French and Dutch possessions remain under their present masters. But there are other obstacles, material as well as cultural. Asia is far behind Europe in the development of the means of communication which have made the West a single physical unit. Asia has been "opened up," as our significant phrase goes, by intruding Powers from overseas. Their purpose was never to facilitate the communications of Asiatic peoples with one another. They

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aimed rather at fostering trade between the Asiatic markets and the metropolis. The railways, accordingly, run for the most part from the coast inland, and do little to link up the native peoples. Indeed, the only significant exceptions to this rule are the Russian Trans-Siberian, the Bagdad line, and the pilgrim route which connects the north with the holy cities of Arabia. For the rest, if a man in Peking would journey to Angora or to Teheran, he must cover the greater part of the distance by skirting the coasts of the entire continent in a foreign ship. Such trade as there may be between the Asiatic states is mainly in the hands of European merchants. Even more important when one considers the material basis for unity, banking, like shipping, is a foreign service, which makes this continent tributary to London, and in a less degree to Paris and New York. The accumulation of native capital has barely begun, and though the operations of native banks have their importance in China, they are as yet local in their range. When one turns to social intercourse, one would have to register the important fact that the peoples of Asia know infinitely less of one another than they know about the West. They flock to the schools and universities of America, Japan, and Europe. They are penetrated, even in the remote interior, by Christian missions. They must learn

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some European tongue if they would gain access to modern civilisation, but even this common foreign culture-language is not a wholly satisfactory means of intercommunication, for while English prevails in India and the Far East, French is more widely studied in Turkey, Syria, Persia, and of course in the French possessions. Constantinople has its European quarter, which dates back to the great days of Genoese and Venetian trade, but how many Chinamen or Indians would one find in Stamboul? Angora and Teheran have their little European colonies, but an Asiatic stranger, save from countries just across the land frontiers, is a rare visitor. These peoples know neither one another's lands, nor one another's languages, and their educated class has more acquaintance with the politics of Europe than with local happenings in its own continent. The very agencies which scatter telegraphic news throughout Asia are western, and view the stirrings of its peoples through Imperial eyes. There is only one native institution which serves in any way to bring the peoples of the East into human contact with one another—that touching survival from the age of faith, the pilgrimage which every good Mohammedan should make once in a lifetime to Mecca. In European ships, obedient to the rules of quarantine which the West imposes, the Turk will meet

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the Javanese at the black stone which recalls the rites of the pagan past; Syrians and Indians, Persians and Chinamen, will venerate together the Prophet's tomb, which stands for an ambition to unify the East, that failed and left behind it only a legacy of division. For this unifying force came with a sword, and for many a century it has been an obstacle to the unity of Asia. For if the pilgrims feel that they are one in Islam, its fanaticism sunders them sharply, not only from other Asiatic stocks, but even from those of their own race and language who profess an older creed.

The past laid no foundations of unity for Asia. If she can unite, it must be under the influence of modern and alien ideas, with some intrusive power as the engineer of the combination. It must shatter, in the process, much that to us seems characteristic of her outlook and her institutions—her mysticism, her indifference to this world of illusion, her quietism, her passivity, her willingness to submit, during the brief unreality of this life on earth, to the rule of any conqueror, native or foreign, who will take upon himself the burden of organising her mundane affairs. The Asia which unites, must be secular, realistic, and in some broad sense of the word, democratic. That development has been proceeding rapidly among the educated class for a generation or more. The Turkish state,

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twenty years ago, was still a theocracy which reinforced the supernatural claims of the caliph to obedience by a disreputable police organisation. It is now a secular republic. Islam struggles to survive by evolving a modernist movement. If the Chinese Republic lacks as yet the form of a working democracy, it was none the less a portent in the history of the East, that the Emperor could be degraded from the throne whence his ancestors had regulated the procession of the seasons. Western observers, who are apt to think of the background of Eastern society as if it were the scenery of a theatre, may lament the disappearance of these venerable and picturesque properties. Nothing has vanished that had life. Even the creative art and craftsmanship of the East had become long ago the repetition of a formula. Its great periods had exhausted their creative impetus; no culture can be fertile forever in isolation. There is more to hope from the renaissance which should follow the first startled contact with the West, than from the piety which repeats the mumbled lessons of the past. There is neither beauty nor originality, it may be, in the present phase, but at least there is life—the vitality of a wrestler, who strips himself to struggle with taut and naked muscles. If the new attitude to life should undermine the crystallised religions of the

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East, one would count their decay a gain for humanity. One questions whether the populations of India will ever unite for effective social action, until rationalism has made a bold and open assault on Islam and the Hindu faith alike. Whether one thinks of the economic advancement of India, or of raising its women and its lower castes from their present degradation, its prime need is the smashing of its superstitions.

The objection may form itself in the reader's mind that the renovating and insurgent movement, as we know it in the East, cares nothing for continental unity, for it is avowedly and even passionately nationalist. The word, though Indian and Chinese both use it, may mislead us. It would be a mistake to identify this Eastern revolt with nationalism as we have known it among Irishmen or Tchechs. There is, indeed, the same claim to call one's soil one's own, the same resentment against the insolent efficiency of an intruding governing caste, the same overvaluation of every characteristic of the native culture. But Irishmen were engaged in a duel with the British, and the Tchechs with the Germans. In the East (save perhaps in India) the struggle is a general engagement. Whether it be colour, or the profession of the Christian religion, or the possession of a high mechanical civilisation, which is felt to mark

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the distinction most clearly, the dividing line is always between East and West, Asia and Europe.

Ever since the Genoese and Venetian traders were allowed in the early days of the Ottoman conquest to set up their own courts on Turkish soil to judge their own people, the system of "capitulations" has helped to generalise the antagonism. It was not originally felt to be a humiliating system. The East, until it learned the lesson from us, had no conception of a secular state. It understood divine legislation, not a man-made code. Each religion had its own revealed precepts to enforce, and its own cadis, bishops, or rabbis to interpret the divine ordinances. Each Christian Church in Turkey was permitted to judge within its own community, according to its own canon. Moslems had their own judges, Greek Christians or Armenian Christians theirs. It was a natural extension of this system to permit Europeans to have their own consular courts to decide their complicated commercial cases, which the Old World Turk, who was country gentleman or soldier, proudly refused to understand. It was only in the last century, when the Turks began to build a ramshackle secular administration on Western models, that the whole overgrown system of extra-territoriality was felt to be an insult and an anachronism. As I saw it at work in the

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latter days of Abdul Hamid, it seemed like a perpetual conquest. Every consulate was a rival focus of government, and every consul had become the protector of one or more of the subject races of the Empire. The Serbs were the clients of Russia, the Albanians of Austria, while Armenians invited massacre by clamouring alternately for British and Russian protection. Only the Jews were safe, for they had no great friend.

If this latter complication is absent in China, the system of extra-territoriality has there reached an even more insolent development. Not only are Western residents exempt from Chinese taxation and the jurisdiction of the Chinese courts and police; they have their settlements in all the more important ports, whether on the coasts or on the great rivers. In these they enjoy their own municipal government, and though the Chinese inhabitants pay rates and form a majority of the population, they may not vote for their governing councils. These settlements employ their own foreign police, and the gunboats of the Western Powers have usurped the right to patrol the Chinese rivers, even in the depths of the interior, in the interest of these intruding foreigners. An Englishman, when he walks in China, cannot quit British soil; he carries the British Empire in his boots. But as in Turkey, the system is interna-

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tional, and the resentment which it excites, turns in some measure against all Europeans. From the days of the Crusades down to the latest intervention at Shanghai, Europe has tended to mass its standards when it carried its arms into Asia. Again, the insolence from which the natives suffer is not felt to be peculiarly English or French; it is the insolence of the white man, the insolence with which he clothes himself when he puts on jacket and trousers. Its perfect expression, whether in India or China, is the rule which excludes natives from the white man's park, or club or hotel. That rule, by affirming the solidarity of the white continents, calls Asia to life. Our colour sense yields neither to education nor to religion. We do not baptise a native Christian into our privileged fraternity, nor can any Asiatic, by acquired learning, graduate for equality even with the most ignorant and least sensitive whites. Our white religion is in practise less universal than Islam, which lifts even the negro to fellowship with white-skinned Moslems. I have seen white troops in Turkey obey a coal-black negro officer without the faintest sense that they were thereby degraded.

Because our contempt is general, the reaction against it is general, and Chinese and even Indian "nationalism" is, in consequence, more than a

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revolt against a particular European government or race. It is the angry affirmation of the rights of the Asiatic man. One may trace this state of mind even in India, though Indian experience is usually limited to the ways of one white race. In its need for self-assertion, the extremer type of Indian nationalism has lately begun to revolt against every creation of European culture, however impersonal or international it may be. An insulted Asia must turn its back on Pasteur or Einstein, because their skins are as white as Clive's. Nationality in Asia used to mean religion; we are teaching it to mean hatred. This is, no doubt, a morbid and passing phrase, and it may be a local Indian peculiarity, but it has its importance as a symptom. One does not note it in Turkey. But there also nationalism, such is the megalomania of our species, has tended of late to expand into something wider. The old Imperial Turkey sought to revive the pretensions of the caliphate, which meant something more than the spiritual headship of Islam. The caliph was more than a pope; his tool was not St. Peter's key, but the Prophet's sword, and in virtue of it he claimed a species of suzerainty over all Moslems. The Young Turks, who had, for the most part, abandoned the old faith, played for a time with the Pan-Turanian idea, and might have tried, if their

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power had endured, to unite the various branches of the Turco-Tartar race under their own leadership—a mad scheme pregnant with innumerable wars. These aberrations are interesting only because they show the tendency of nationalism to burst its natural bounds and to pass into something wider.

In fact, the prophet of Chinese nationalism was at the same time the prophet of Asiatic unity. In a speech which Sun Yat-Sen delivered in Yokohama (November 28, 1924), shortly before his death he boldly proclaimed this ideal.¹ He began with a rapid survey of the recent growth of nationalism in Asia. Thirty years ago (so his argument ran) Asiatic peoples believed that European superiority was unconquerable, and that “enfeebled Asia was doomed forever to be the slave of the West.” He dates the belief that Asia can recover her independence to the victory of Japan over Russia. “When this desire [for independence] has reached its full growth, it will be time for the Asiatic peoples to unite, and then the success of their movement for independence will be assured.” Two civilisations, he continues, are in conflict. “Oriental civilisation emphasizes benevolence and righteousness; Occidental civilisation

¹ See a report in the *New York Nation* of March 2, 1927.

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emphasizes utilitarianism and force." Pan-Asiatic unity, he declares, must be based on what is distinctive in Oriental civilisation, "its emphasis upon moral values," but European science must be used "to develop industry and reform our weapons of warfare." . . . "We imitate Europe only for self-defence." It would be useless to invite Europeans to surrender their privileges in the name of benevolence and righteousness. One might as well negotiate with a tiger before skinning him. "If we wish to regain our lost privileges, we must resort to force." Japan and Turkey already have well-equipped armies. Asia has numbers on her side—nine hundred millions against four hundred. And then comes this remarkable passage:

"At the present time there is a new nation in Europe. This nation has been excluded by the whole white population of Europe, who regard it as a poisonous snake. . . . Russia has now come to a parting of the ways with its white kinsmen. Why? Because Russia believes in benevolence and righteousness, not in force and utilitarianism. She is an exponent of justice and does not believe in the principle that a minority should oppress a majority. Naturally, Russia comes to link hands with the Asiatics and breaks her

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family ties with the West. The Europeans, fearing that the Russians may succeed in carrying out these new principles, heap condemnation upon her as a rebel against the civilised world.

“We talk about Pan-Asiatic unity. In the last analysis what is the problem we are trying to solve? Simply this: How can we Asiatics, who suffer at the hands of Europeans, resist their power? Or to put it differently, our question is: How can we free the oppressed peoples from the oppressor?”

In these naïve terms Sun Yat-Sen preached the idea of an Asiatic League of the Oppressed. His words have become for China a testament and a programme.

Had this nationalist awakening in Asia come a generation earlier, it might have remained what in most countries it is, an essentially middle-class movement—the struggle for power and self-respect of the merchants and professional class, which aims at effective self-government in order that it may adjust taxation, fix tariffs and recruit the personnel of the administration to its own satisfaction. But the penetration of Russian influence, since the revolution, has introduced a new factor, unlike anything that we have known in history

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since France carried her armed doctrine over Europe. Russia, which had hitherto penetrated Asia as one of the armed Great Powers, sought now to enter it as a missionary and an equal. She came, indeed, as a pariah among pariahs. Banned herself from the society of the great Imperial Powers, she stepped down to the level of the subjugated Asiatic peoples, appealed to them as a rebel who had just won her own battle against an Imperialist coalition, and offered to aid them and even to lead them in the struggle for emancipation. Everywhere she gave proofs of her sincerity. In Turkey and in China she voluntarily abandoned her rights and her privileges under the Capitulations and the system of extra-territoriality. She restored to Persia the immense sphere which had fallen to her when Tsardom joined with the British Empire in tearing this ancient kingdom in pieces. She gave up without compensation some exceedingly valuable concessions, including the strip of land which she owned on either side of the Russo-Chinese railway. All this was done with a certain instinct for drama. When the first ambassador of revolutionary Russia entered Persia, he halted in Tabriz, called the people together in the market place, and publicly apologised, in the name of the Russian nation, for the wrongs which its former rulers had done. Something de-

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cisive had happened, since the days when the Cossacks hanged the chief leaders and priests of this city like bandits on its walls. And, then, Jew and rationalist though he was, he paid a ceremonial call of apology upon the abbot of the exquisite shrine which a Russian gun had violated many years before.

Here was a new phase in the relations of Europe with Asia. Russia had the originality to talk to this continent, as one human mind talks to another—though what she had to say may have been occasionally less admirable than her manner of saying it. We have traded with Asia; she carried ideas. Could anything be more pathetic in its limitation than the innocent emphasis with which British Ministers will repeat, in every official utterance, the declaration that we have no purpose in China save trade? Here was a vast population of four hundred millions of men, a sensitive and original civilisation, and innumerable problems, social and political, which called for a helping hand. In it all we saw only a unique market for our goods and our capital. From the day when our guns burst open its doors for our opium chests, we have been consistently true to this ideal. For eighty years two nations have been in contact, but they have touched, only as the brake touches the wheel, or the coin the counter. It has been an

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accurately mechanical relationship. For eighty years, in sailing ships and steamships, the cotton bales and the opium chests, the silk and the tea, have floated up and down the waters of the Yangtse, while in our merchants' ledgers, to the scratch of quill or the click of typewriter, the credit page lorded it over the debit page. The millions of yellow men on the banks were our customers or our coolies, the human pack-animals who carried our wares into the interior, the teams who pulled our drays. So little did we know of them, that when at last the market revolted and our beasts of burden tramped in their thousands to proclaim their hunger and their rights, we were seized with panic and called the guns into play. We had never cared to reach the mass-mind of this people; indeed, it was our firm belief that it had no mind. Our practise was to deal with some "strong man" at the top, war lord or veteran of intrigue, whom we could bribe or intimidate. Through him with a minimum of trouble we thought we could manage the mass. The Russians had the originality to deal with it directly. They had the wit to understand our mistakes.

While we subsidised their enemies and blockaded their coasts, the Russians saw their chance of a counter-stroke and they saw it where Napoleon in a like case had seen it. He struck

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at London on the Nile; they aimed at London on the Hoogly and the Yangtse. They began, while their own civil war was still raging, by summoning all the tribes and nations of Asia to an immense cosmopolitan convention at Baku, which proclaimed the holy war against Imperialism. They then gathered from all over the Continent students whom they trained in their own outlook and their own methods, and sent them out to penetrate every mass of Asiatics which could be influenced to carry on the struggle against Imperialism. In China, above all, they did what the Western labour movement ought to have done many years earlier—they helped the infant trade unions, taught them the business of organisation, and through their agency carried the impulse of revolt from the middle classes to the masses. The national movement, which hitherto had been confined to the intellectuals and the merchant class, spread with astonishing rapidity to factory workers and railway hands, and even to the peasants in the villages. Thanks to this Russian influence, the national effort; even before it had attained its objective, the revision of "the unequal treaties," broadened into a social struggle, to which urban workers and villagers rallied together for the purpose of winning a new standard of life.

By these tactics, the Russians struck at Imperial-

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ism in its most vulnerable spot. When it drew up its code for India, and, again, when it administered British law in its consular courts on Chinese soil, there had always been one omission. These Courts never imposed the Factory Acts. The twelve-hour day was the rule in Shanghai; the old horrors of the early industrial age were repeated throughout the East, and a traveller might have applied to these Chinese children in the mills the terrible phrase which Defoe used about Yorkshire in his own day—"there was nothing above four years of age, but its hands were sufficient for its own support." We knew the facts. The Municipal Council of Shanghai had itself published a damning report on the misery of the workers in these mills, but the remedy did not come. Recklessly, until the period of strikes and boycotts overtook Shanghai, foreign merchants and industrialists accumulated their profits, and when at last the angry mob of wronged men faced them with difficult demands, their first reply was to fire. After the bloodshed in Shanghai, Canton, and Wahnsien, the rest of this chapter of history rolled on to its inevitable end. Europe, to Chinese eyes, had taken its stand, with arms in its hand, against the national revival and against the struggle of these downtrodden workers for higher standards. The Foreign settlements seemed to be the allies

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of the war lords (who would from time to time prolong their brutal misrule with the aid of a loan raised by foreign firms), and these in turn had their own tried method of dealing with reformers: they shortened them by a head. Youth could not hesitate, and misery felt that it knew its friends. Europe seemed to have taken her stand across the road of the advance. Russia alone was helpful.¹

But, indeed, all over the East, wherever the lure of cheap and unorganised labour has invited foreign capital to establish itself, conditions prevail which seem to summon the revolutionary propagandist. The task must be, if anything, too easy; one has only to tell the truth. The facts are so shocking that any free exercise of the political imagination would spoil the effect. One reads that an outbreak, which the Dutch attribute to communist influence, has occurred among the workers in the plantations of Java. The world shudders for a moment at the ubiquity of Moscow,

¹ I am not speaking here of unofficial agencies, colleges, missions, and the like, though I imagine that, on the whole, as the crisis developed, through the fault of both sides, into a general engagement of "white *versus* yellow," they took the side of their own race, though more soberly and less angrily than the merchants. American official policy was, of course, one of studied reserve. China has to thank Washington, however, for imposing some moderation on the Tory impulses of Downing Street.

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but who dreams of asking what alternative hope the West had offered to this semi-servile labour?

One day, it may be, even the efficiency of the Indian police may not avail to exclude these influences from the British possessions in Asia; the infection, indeed, has lately spread from Hong-Kong to Singapore. If that should happen, the propagandist will find the soil ready for his seed. The case of the factory worker or miner in India might move the mildest reformer to rage, and one must remember that it is to escape from the still deeper and more hopeless poverty of the village, that the peasants flock to the cotton mills of Bombay, or the jute mills of Bengal. The spinning and weaving of jute into sacks and wrapping cloth is a big and thriving industry. Two-thirds of the world's crop of jute are dealt with in the seventy-nine mills on the banks of the Hoogly. Most of them were founded with Scottish capital. They are, in fact, a suburb of Dundee, projected East of Suez, where, as the poet of Empire tells us, "there ain't no Ten Commandments." Freed from these trammels, and untroubled till recent years by Factory Acts, with a big corps of European managers and engineers, this industry planted itself among a people chiefly busied, if we may believe the travellers, in thinking about God, and it has prospered as few of

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His children do. Its balance sheets show that in the ten years before 1926 it earned, when profits and reserve accumulations are added together, the remarkable sum of £300 millions. This comes to no less than 90 per cent per annum on its capital. Taking the lean years with the good, the inefficient mills with the efficient, you may put your money into Indian jute with the sure expectation of getting nine-tenths of it back every twelve months.

What is the worker's share? His present wage, for the usual short week, varies from 2s 2d to 12s or 15s in rare cases. His average yearly earnings amount to £12.10 (about \$62). But for each worker in this industry (there are about 300,000) the management has made on the average, each year, a profit of £100 per head. It would not be easy to find, west to Suez, a parallel case of an industry in which the passive shareholder draws his £100 for every £12½ which goes to the worker. But India is the jewel in the British crown.

Wages are not everything. What out of its fabulous surplus does this industry return, freely or under compulsion, to the workers it employs? Nothing, to begin with, in education. Their children, one and all, grow up in the shadow of the mill without schooling, even the most elementary, or the chance of schooling. Since the Washing-

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ton Convention, child labour is forbidden under the age of twelve, but in practice, so trustworthy investigators have told us, children begin to work at eight years of age, and by the dodge of working half-time in two mills each day, are frequently employed twelve hours daily. The workers live chiefly in unspeakable cabins of wattle and thatch, without window, chimney or fireplace, without light, water, or sanitation. Half of the children, says the Director of Public Health for Bengal, die before they reach ten years.¹ But the case of these jute-workers, one might suppose, is singular. It is so. They are aristocrats of the Indian world of labour. Their yearly £12.½ is wealth, for according to official statisticians the average Indian income does not exceed £4 (\$20) a year. These hovels and these profits—these are Empire.

In one country of Europe, and one only, these facts are fully understood, and in understanding them Russia has stepped outside the continent to which the geographers assign her. I had during a recent visit to Moscow the impression that this whole nation was turning its face to the East and embarking on a new destiny, as emigrants do when

¹ I have taken these facts and figures from the report of two able and sober investigators, Thomas Johnston, M.P., and J. F. Sime.

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they sail to a land of promise. The dream of world revolution had not been explicitly renounced, but it had faded into the distant future. Europe is manifestly stabilising itself: America is solid and unapproachable. But in China, as Russians read the news, the social revolution had actually begun. To an Englishman accustomed to the apathy with which all but a small and alert minority watches the affairs of distant peoples, the almost universal interest which Russians felt in the Chinese civil war came as a startling revelation. The barriers between two continents are down. But in fact those barriers had never risen high enough to obstruct the gaze of Moscow. The frontiers between Europe and Asia are an invention of the geographers. Back and forward across them the waves of migration and conquest have flowed throughout the history of Russia. If the Tartars carried Asia across them in the Middle Ages and transplanted it to Russian soil, the Russians have turned back the tide and made themselves at home, not as sojourners, but as settlers, and not in Siberia only, but on the very confines of China. Nature knows no more than history of these two separate continents: the railway that links Leningrad to Vladivostok does but ratify her planning. Nor have the Russians, outside the ranks of the former governing caste, any strong

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sense of their racial superiority over Asiatics. Of Asia they have never made a mystery. There is no Russian translation of Kipling's half-boastful, half-despairing "East is East, and West is West, And never the twain shall meet." They meet in Moscow without shyness. I spent an afternoon with the six hundred Chinese students of the "Sun Yat-Sen University" in Moscow. These young men and women, cheerful and even jolly, seemed completely at home in their new surroundings. They had learned Russian easily and quickly. And already they were thinking Russian. They had been nominated for the privilege of study in Moscow, partly by the Kuo-min-tang, and partly by an association of the nationalist professors of the Chinese Universities. They felt their task to be to become, in the widest sense of the word, interpreters who would translate the thinking of Russia and the Socialist West into Chinese. Some of them were busy in translating Russian and other Socialist books into Chinese (for most of them already knew English) and in printing them on a home-made press adapted to the Chinese script. Others were engaged in a still more fascinating task. With the aid of the light which they had derived from the Marxist reading of history, they were studying the records of their own country, especially during the period of the Taiping

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rebellion, in order to discover, what contemporary chroniclers ignored, the part which economic causes may have played in causing and shaping the popular movements of the past. At the same time they were familiarising themselves with the story of the Russian revolution, its causes and its methods, on the stage where its scenes were acted, and in personal contact with the actors. Economics, commercial geography, and above all the history of Imperialism made the rest of their round of study. Their teachers, it seemed to me, were learning in association with them almost as much about China as they were learning about Russia. Moscow had made them at home, and two of them, following the best traditions of the Great Revolution, had just been elected to the Soviet of the district in which their college stands. I have known Indian students in London and Oxford, and though they are fellow-citizens in our Empire, I doubt whether it has the same power to make them forget, as they move among us, the colour of their alien skins.

One may watch the delegates from the Eastern stocks within the Soviet Union, entering the Kremlin side by side with the Slavs; there is no racial separation. A Georgian (Stalin) is, at the moment, the most powerful man in Russia, and there are men from the most primitive Asiatic

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racés—Tartars, Bashkir nomads, and Uzbegs—who hold high elective positions. Into this family the Chinese would be welcomed without the effort which the same broad-mindedness would demand from West Europeans. From those Russians, indeed, who have drunk in the Marxist view of life, which can be grasped in its simplest outlines by minds which could make nothing of the master's algebraic formulæ, no effort is required. These Chinese are "workers and peasants." It seems to follow that their interests must be identical with those of other workers and peasants the world over. It is amazing how far, in understanding and coöperation, one can go with the aid of that key to sympathy. The Russian newspapers, as the Cantonese armies swept triumphantly northward, never announced their victories as those of Canton or "the South." It was always "Chinese workers" who had taken a city or suffered a reverse. This view may simplify the facts excessively, but it serves to put the Russians at home in what is for us the unintelligible chaos of the civil war. They have been through this bewildering experience themselves. In their struggle, also, armies were fluid and drifted from side to side, as fortune shifted. They understand the action of propaganda on the mind of the mass, and, indeed, the great service which they have rendered to the

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South was not the gift or loan of arms, or even the work of their military instructors; it was their teaching that in a civil war it is more important to win crowds than battles. As I read of the Punch-and-Judy shows which they have introduced into China, to gain the ear of the simple workers in the street, I too felt that I was living through a familiar experience, for in 1920 I had seen these puppet shows conveying their moral and political lessons in rough, humorous verse to the crowds in the public gardens of Moscow.

To readers accustomed to a world in which the average man watches the international scene—if he can be said to watch it—with complete indifference, how shall I convey the interest, the excitement, one may even say the passion, with which Russians followed events in China? In the trains rough workmen in their sheepskin coats would pore over the news and the maps, and discuss the military moves with surprising comprehension. I found myself at one moment the centre of a group of privates in the Red Army. They questioned me over every detail of recent events, hoping that from my English sources I might have some scrap of information new to them, but their knowledge was so full that it was difficult to add anything to it. When Shanghai fell, Moscow made holiday, and late in the night groups of workers, men

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and women, were still strolling singing through the streets, as though to celebrate a Russian victory. I went that evening to one of the concerts of the marvellous "Persymphans" band, the orchestra which plays without a conductor, as steadily and sympathetically, with its ninety performers, as the four bows of a string quartette which have learned by long practise to render the thought of a master with a single mind. The first trumpeter of the band came forward as its spokesman, and read out to us a telegram of congratulation which they had decided to send to Shanghai. They asked the consent of the audience to send it in its name also. And then as the orchestra played the Ninth Symphony, and the chorus of the Moscow Opera sang the "Ode to Joy," I realised that perhaps for the first time since they were written amid the excitement of those days of revolution, the atmosphere of that great age had returned with its expansive sympathy. There were many concerts that evening, up and down the world, but did any of them think of sending a telegram to congratulate Shanghai on its liberation?

Since the French Revolution there has been nothing in history like this sudden fraternisation of two peoples with histories and characters so fantastically different. One asks whether an alli-

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ance has ever been based on so broad a foundation of popular sympathy. It is for Russia the end of her isolation, and precarious though it is, it has filled her with hope. Hitherto she has had her friends among the eccentric minority in every country; misfortune has made her at moments Germany's uneasy bedfellow; but with China she links herself for the first time, with a record of service rendered, in a common struggle against common enemies. She feels an immense exhilaration, as she conceives the possibility of a lasting association which will link the innumerable millions who inhabit this vast, continuous continental space with the Baltic and the Yellow Sea. Here, then, is unity by continents beginning.

The objection rises at once to the mind that the Russians are counting too much on an accidental association, which may be brief. One does not see communism acclimatising itself in China. This patriarchal society, with the peasant masses at its base, will oppose an immense resistance of inertia. The merchants and professional men who made the Kuomintang, may have welcomed Russian aid—for who else was willing to help them?—but they are no more disposed to drift towards social revolution than their fellows in other lands. One may be sure, that the Communist International, which ruined its own prospects in Europe,

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by its doctrinaire folly and its unimaginative ignorance, will commit every possible mistake in China.

Again, as conditions become more normal, will not the immense volume of business which China transacts with Europe, America, and Japan outweigh the political sympathy which links her to Russia? The weak point in this Russo-Chinese alliance is that it has no economic basis. The natural associate of China would be an industrial country, which would exchange its manufactures and machines for her foodstuffs and raw materials. For a generation, at least, Russia can hardly hope to become an exporting industrial country—though some wild optimists dream of such a development. It is more probable that China, when she wins internal peace and acquires fiscal autonomy, with the right to develop her own native industries behind a protective tariff, will come near to satisfying her own industrial needs. In any event, sea-transport has the advantage over land-transport, though a Russian might answer by dwelling on the possibilities of aërial shipping. But when one looks into the future from the angle of Moscow, there are other possibilities which are even more disturbing. What if the British Empire should at last succeed in making a worldwide coalition against Russia? Again, one foresees the possibility that London and Tokio may one day

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overcome the present coolness, which separates them in their Chinese policy, and unite against Russia in a policy of unlimited intervention. These, however, are speculations, and a Russian might answer, firstly that in either event American opposition must be reckoned with; secondly, that even a blockade would not separate two neighbours, who have a common land frontier, and thirdly, that any Anglo-Japanese action in China would only accentuate Chinese nationalism, and compel it to rely more than ever on Russian aid and guidance.

The least calculable factor in these reckonings is the attitude of Japan toward the Russo-Chinese block. One is aware of a sweeping change in the whole attitude of Japanese opinion, since the disastrous day when she took advantage of the pre-occupation of the other Powers in the World War, to present her twenty-one demands to China. She seemed then to have reduced the whole of this vast territory to a protectorate. The boycott of her trade, the revival of Chinese nationalism, and finally, the loss of Shantung and the ending of the British alliance at the Washington Conference, taught her that she had won her conquests at a ruinous cost. She learned her lesson more promptly and more thoroughly than her fellow-victors. Imperialism went out of fashion; the

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widening of the franchise marked the victory of the lower strata of the population over the military aristocracy; the labour movement began to strengthen its organisation in spite of the brutalities of the police; a new generation of young intellectuals, with a liberal or even a socialistic outlook, is winning its way to leadership. All this had its influence on Japanese foreign policy. Deprived of the support of the British alliance, and a little nervous in her isolation, she was ready for a cool reconciliation with the difficult Russian neighbour. Her sense of grievance over the treatment of her emigrants by America and Australia inclined her to view with a certain sympathy the Russian conception of an Asiatic League of Oppressed Peoples. Her attitude to the Chinese South, in spite of the severest provocation, was one of caution verging on positive friendliness. Though the coming to power of Baron Tanaka meant a momentary reversion to the old military attitude, one expects an early return to caution and sympathy. It is not impossible that Japan may ultimately make a third in the Russo-Asiatic combination. If that should ever happen, it would gain much more than a formidable naval and military partner. The economic problem would also be solved, for the indispensable industrial Power would have entered into alliance with the two agricultural neighbours.

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This possibility is the salient mark of interrogation of the next page of world history.

But Russians, when they count on the permanence of their influence on China, are making a calculation over wide stretches of time. They expect reverses and vicissitudes, which in fact have come since I was in Moscow. They think of the Chinese revolution as an immense process of social transformation, which has lasted fifteen years already, and may well last for another generation before stability is reached. Their reckoning is based on the belief that when the mass of a people is sunk in unendurable poverty, it must, sooner or later, throw itself into the struggle for power and conduct that struggle to a decisive close. The first objective may be to liberate the Chinese nation from the trammels of Western intervention and control; the second and more important objective will be to win for the Chinese masses the power to shape the destinies of their nation for the general good—or, as a Russian would doubtless put it, for the good of the workers and peasants. This may sound like academic Marxism, but it seems to have a basis in known facts. There is no doubt about the abject misery, at all events of the urban workers. Labour is so cheap that it pays to use human beings in place of draught animals or engines. Wages are everywhere so low that families

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can live only when mothers and children go out to labour. Even then their earnings do not attain a level which comes near a minimum physiological reckoning of the basis of subsistence. But these depressed workers have the instinct of association. They will combine in labour unions, and these unions will show an amazing contempt for death and torture and will organise strikes, boycotts, and even street fighting, under conditions which would cow their fellows in the West. These labour unions, moreover, belong with few exceptions to the "Red" International. Men are seldom moderates when from one minute to another they know that their heads may be severed from their trunks. In such a world one must either seize power or go under.

But China, the reader may object, is a land rather of villages than of cities, and in the cities of the interior the workers are seldom mobilized as yet in big industrial units. One might have said the same thing of Russia, but experience demonstrated there, that a party which commands the great cities, and with them the railways and their trained personnel, can in the long run, by working on internal lines, dominate the vast but unorganisable areas of the provinces. But need one assume that the Chinese peasantry must be hostile to the revolution? Peasants are the least conservative of

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mortals, until they have gained the land. One used to suppose that most of the rural population of China did in fact own land, and that the gentry were a class, small in numbers and far below the intellectuals in social influence. But the social structure of China has been changing rapidly during the past generation. The peasant had rarely lived from the produce of his little farm; he supplemented its yield by exercising a handicraft. Gradually, as the West has poured its machine-made goods into the treaty ports, prices have fallen and the old hand-looms no longer avail to save the village from hunger. Meanwhile the merchant class has thriven, and these men, together with the retired soldiers or bandits, and the magistrates or officials who have found the practice of justice remunerative, form a new moneyed class which in these days of disturbance and civil war regards land as the only safe investment. Usually by lending money which the hapless peasants could never repay, it has acquired big estates. These new landlords are absentees, who lack the traditions of the gentry. In some provinces this process has gone on so rapidly, and on so large a scale, that what was once an independent peasantry is now a class of tenants. The system of land-tenure is a species of *métayage*; the landlord, that is to say, takes a portion of all the produce

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of the fields as his tribute. His share is pushed to an astonishing excess. Russian experts produced evidence to show that it often ranges from 60 to 75 per cent and has been known to touch the incredible figure of 80 per cent. The poverty of the Chinese village may have some causes which are difficult to cure—the excessive subdivision of the land and the floods which sweep from the deforested mountains. But it wants only unity and resolution to deal with landlords who exact a toll of 80 per cent. When one realises that this peasantry, with happier memories behind it, has become only recently an enslaved proletariat, it is easy to understand the success of the Kuomintang in enlisting it in guerilla formations to harry the armies of the North. For the North stands not only for the aristocratic misrule of the war lords, but also for the interests of the landed and employing class.

The next phase in the civil struggle may be decisive for the future of China. The Kuomintang has accepted the help of these armed bands of countrymen. It must soon realise their hopes. Some of them already claim the land without compensation. Others would be content to pay a moderate rent. But what is a just rent? One might limit the landlords' share to 50 or 40 per cent of the produce. That would be a conserva-

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tive solution which the respectable and propertied Right Wing of the Kuomintang might accept. But what if the Left Wing were to propose 25 or 20 per cent? An economic issue of this kind cannot in the long run be evaded, and by its wisdom in handling it, the Kuomintang will make the choice between evolutionary and revolutionary change. One reads in the day's news that this war lord or the other has sent General So-and-so on a mission through the provinces, to refute communism with twelve executioners and a body-guard of two hundred well-drilled arguments. But will he sever the neck of Chinese misery on his block, and display the dripping head of the traitor to the crowd? That rebel will survive. The workers of the towns will not become more prosperous, because their trade unions have been suppressed; nor will the small farmer have more rice for his pot, because the generals are earning the good will of the propertied class. The social question may be silenced for a while by martial law, but empty stomachs do not forget it. Russia in these latitudes is more than a geographical expression; Russia has come to mean the tendency of misery to seek redress. That tendency cannot be held down forever, and the more foreign influence and the pressure of Chinese property insist on identifying the hope of social change with

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Russian ascendancy, the more certainly will Moscow's leadership return.

On this Chinese stage, one begins to realise, Moscow for the first time in the world's history is aiming at Imperialism, but especially at British Imperialism, a blow which may strike home. The loss of trade is reckoned in many millions each year; the loss of prestige has not been made good by military intervention. Indeed, it is hard to say what the expedition to Shanghai has achieved, save that by isolating the settlement it has in effect blockaded Lancashire. In these clumsy manoeuvres we have but succeeded in uncovering the inner logic of Imperialism. Our guns went out to protect British lives, but British lives were in danger, only because they must shelter under insulting privileges, and those privileges were valuable, because beneath them foreign profiteering thrived on Chinese misery. At the disrobing touch of Moscow the national struggle has become a social struggle, and in every white man's club East of Suez men understand that the battle front may extend southward. What is at stake is the right of the West to carry its machines to the East, and there to dictate, through its own courts and its own police, the conditions under which the native masses shall work. That is the essence of Imperialism; whether it hoists its flag over the land

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on which its wharves and its factories are built is an irrelevance. In these days it rarely has the honesty to annex. In this struggle Russia is the predestined leader of Asia, and one is not at a loss to guess why Anglo-Indians are now suggesting that in future a part of the British Expeditionary Force, which used to be reserved for operations in Europe, should have its permanent base in India. From that centre it could strike (as the *Statesman* of Calcutta explains) with equal ease at the Black Sea or the Far East. If that proposal is adopted, it will mean no less than Admiral Fisher meant when he transferred the battle fleet from the Mediterranean to the North Sea. On that day the first shot was fired in the war with Germany, though, like the imaginary projectiles with which astronomers bombard us from the moon, it took several years to reach its target. The unity of Asia cannot be achieved without struggle.

Of two things, one. Russia may fail: but if the West succeeds in fending off revolution from Asia, it can only be by subjecting Imperialism to a liberal education. The armed West would no longer dare to use its gunboats to protect exploitation; if it safeguards exported capital, it must concern itself with that capital's behaviour. But Russia may succeed. In that event, when the

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countless millions of men who inhabit the vast continental reaches of Eurasia solidify into a single mass, animated by one purpose, they will be the most powerful magnet which the East has known since Sinbad encountered the mountain of lodestone. Infallibly, this mass must draw to itself the other Asiatic peoples. It would wreck some empires in the process.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Pan-America

FROM a study of the difficulties which must attend any attempt to organize either Europe or Asia as Continental units, one turns to America with an instinctive movement of optimism: Nature, one might suppose, designed the New World for this destiny. Its isolation from other Continents relieves it from some of the problems which elsewhere embarrass the movement towards unity. Save Canada, no important part of its mainland owes allegiance to any non-American Power. What is hardly less important, no American Power had extended its sway beyond it, until in the last generation the United States acquired her possessions in the Pacific. But these seem negligible, as distracting interests, when one contrasts them with European Empires. The first psychological condition of unity is present in America: it can keep its mind intent upon its own affairs. It need not, like Europe, turn its telescopes incessantly to its distant estates; nor must it, like Asia, scrutinise every gesture of its distant masters. It is free, as Asia is not, to unite, if union should seem to it the wiser course. And, finally, it is

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relatively free from the deeper causes of disunion which afflict Europe. If Europe has a score of languages in which to cherish its memories of hatred and wrong, America has but three. Indeed, for all practical purposes, this Continent speaks English or Spanish. Nor have the feuds of the past a part in poisoning the politics of America, in any degree comparable to the sinister power of history in Europe. Save between Mexico and her northern neighbour, there are no resentments which one can liken to the enmities of French and Germans, Germans and Tchechs, Poles and Russians, Serbs and Bulgarians. The deeper scars on the face of this Continent were left by the swords of England and Spain, and both have retired from its active political life. Nor does any diversity in political forms complicate the problem. For even when a Latin dictator carries out a revolution with more than the customary spilling of blood, he acts in the name of the outraged majesty of republican democracy. Here there are neither thrones nor soviets, and as yet the *fascies* are absent. The pace of innovation is more headlong than in other Continents, and the stream of immigrant blood keeps traditions fluid. Are there any obstacles to union, save distance, the antipathy of two sharply-contrasted cultures, and

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the reluctance of every national state to surrender anything of its sovereignty?

The American reader will smile at this long-range view of his Continent. It may be as difficult to reconcile two antipathetic cultures, as to overcome the Babel of twenty. Forms of constitutional theory are unimportant; and when one turns to realities, it is possible that Soviet Russia and Tory England have slightly more in common than Venezuela and Massachusetts. It is true that history has devoted, as yet, a meagre, and by no means thrilling page to the international annals of this Continent, but what she has written she has graven deep. She has written the Monroe Doctrine. Nothing in the common life of Europe, from the Holy Roman Empire to the League of Nations, has had upon the Old World a formative influence comparable with the power of this Doctrine. The fact is that President Monroe, scarcely conscious of what he did, unified his Continent in one message to Congress. The question of the future is whether the form which he unconsciously gave to unity can be moulded, whether by liberal thought, or by the real forces of economic life, into anything organic.

The American reader must pardon the writer, if he continues to use his own language. The Old World has invented its own political terminology:

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I know no other. The Monroe Doctrine implied from the first what we should call a protectorate, over the greater part of the American Continent. Needless to say, President Monroe and the men of his day were innocent of any Imperialist intention. Looking round the world in 1823, they saw what Canning also saw, that the restored Bourbon Monarchy of France, which was engaged in re-establishing the dynasty in Spain, might soon proceed, in the name of Spain but for the profit of France, to re-conquer the revolted Spanish Colonies. Had it done so, not only would it have brought back monarchy to the New World; it would have extended over it the police system of the Holy Alliance, with its high doctrine of the autocracy of legitimate kings. In its motive, the Monroe Doctrine sprang from a perception (as the President's famous Message put it) that "any attempt to extend their system" (i.e. that of the Holy Allies) "to any portion of this hemisphere" would be "dangerous to our peace and safety." From that seemingly limited objection, the President proceeded at a bound to declare that "*any* interposition" for the purpose of "controlling" the "destinies" of the Latin-American republics by *any* European Power, would be regarded by the United States as an unfriendly act. The slow growth of the Doctrine through a century has

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often been studied by historians. Its implications had only to be unfolded, to convert it into what we call Imperialism, when we speak European. For manifestly (as Colonel Roosevelt pointed out) if the Latin-American States were permitted to indulge in "chronic wrong-doing," the temptation to "interposition" would become irresistible. Since the United States would permit no European Power to intervene, it followed that she must herself exercise the powers of an "international police." Logic runs on the same wheels in Europe. The Power that begins by protecting must also police. Nor was the most recent extension of the Doctrine which forbids European interests to acquire concessions in America, or at least authorises the United States to object to their claims, anything but a natural development. For intervention is apt to follow in the wake of concessions. Moreover (if one may continue to talk European), the Power which carries the burden of protecting and policing is entitled to its reward. One ends by regarding the territory which one protects and polices, as one's own exclusive sphere of interest. The Continent is, indeed, strewn with mining and railway concessions which belong to European, and especially British companies, but the tendency of American policy is to veto any addition to their number. One can carry Imperialism no further.

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As far back as 1895, Mr. Secretary Olney officially drew from the Doctrine its last consequences, when he wrote during the Venezuelan boundary dispute, in a dispatch to Great Britain: "Today the United States is practically sovereign in this Continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

One need not carry the parallel into minute detail; American Imperialism has not differed in its technique from the European variety. The loan of which the interest is in arrears, the mining company which cannot trust the native courts, the adventurous citizens whose lives are in danger, the territory which Nature designed for the building of an inter-oceanic canal, the flag which has been insulted—all of these have played their familiar parts in the conventional drama. The methods have been the same, from invasions in the grand manner, bombardments, blockades, and seizures of customs houses, down to the *coup d'état* by American residents (which happened, it is true, outside the Continent, in Hawaii) on lines reminiscent of the Jameson Raid. Only one expedient seems original—the ingenious device perfected in Nicaragua, which paralyses a native faction of which Washington disapproves, by declaring its capital a "neutral zone." The banker, the promoter and the concession hunter behave very much as they

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do in the City of London. Nor does the Republic differ from the Empire in the principles which appear to guide it in selecting its *protégés* and its partisans. Like the War-Lords whom we have favoured from time to time in China, their inclinations are invariably on the side of property: they allow no weak scruples to temper their respect for order: and above all, they will do as they are told. If we choose our friends by the same marks, we resemble each other in our enmities. What we fear and dislike is never the bloody, old-fashioned despotism, which loots and murders in the traditional style and fawns on the hand of a stronger than itself. Our extreme animosity is always reserved for the reforming government, which educates and awakens, the government which sows dangerous thoughts in the minds of semi-servile labourers, and threatens to confront us with a society in which we might lose our way. Wall Street could have forgiven the Calles régime in Mexico its lapses from its ideal; it found the ideal unpardonable. The City of London smiles tolerantly when Cantonese take bribes or murder: it cannot forgive their progressive aspirations. And if in our worse moments we resemble each other, we do not differ at our best. In the New World as in the Old, Imperialism

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has its philanthropic by-products. It builds roads: it founds schools: it fights pestilence.

It seems then that History has drawn the plan of American unity. The power which in wealth, naval strength, population, and capacity for organisation, overshadows the Continent, will continue to be, as Mr. Olney proclaimed, its "sovereign." One can readily foresee that the fate which has befallen Panama and Nicaragua, San Domingo and Haiti, will sooner or later overtake the remaining smaller states which surround the Caribbean Sea. Washington will nominate their Presidents: the marines will conduct their elections; on a favourable view, they may, like Cuba, enjoy intermittent periods of quasi-independence, with the Amendment of Damocles Platt suspended above their heads. Elsewhere the technique of intervention may be less direct. Venezuela, for example, is rather too big for a simple operation of police conducted by marines. Here one waits for a civil war (a posture which may be maintained without excessive patience), or, at need, through the good offices of an oil syndicate, one promotes it: the event is decided by an embargo on the supply of arms to the less desirable faction. In the bigger or more stable Republics (notably Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) a much subtler and more discreet technique must be adopted. Financial

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penetration takes its course, until all the Conservative interests are so inextricably linked, through loans, investments, subsidiary companies and agencies, with North American "big business," that their influence in local politics will conform to the wishes of the North.

There are, however, complications to be foreseen in this development. Conservative interests must engage in class politics, and sooner or later, as the consciousness of the masses evolves, they provoke a class struggle. Nationalism is aroused, and the dominant popular feeling, which masters the less wealthy and Conservative part of the middle class, as well as the workers of the towns, is one of vehement dislike and suspicion of the North. The turbulent anger of Buenos Ayres over the Sacco-Vanzetti case was more than a disinterested indignation at a miscarriage of justice: it was a way of expressing the ever-present dread of the Imperialism of the North; much as the fury of Parisian crowds may have expressed their bitterness over the millions which France owes to the United States. A sense of Latin solidarity in the presence of this Northern Imperialism grows perceptibly. A relatively advanced State like Argentina is not ashamed to feel its kinship with a backward and disreputable State like Nicaragua, and a bloody exhibition by hydroplanes of the

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ruthless power of the North is answered by proposals, in newspapers which are by no means radical, for a boycott of North-American goods. These are symptoms which very distantly recall the attitude of China towards Western Imperialism.

There is, moreover, in Mexico, a focus of active opposition against the North. It is grossly and ridiculously untrue to accuse the Calles régime of Bolshevism: Moscow, indeed, has been actively hostile to it. But Mexico does, like Russia, stand for an idea, and like all sincere devotees of an idea, she spreads it. Her idea is to defend the interests of the masses against the native monopolists in land and the foreign masters of finance, to raise the whole standard, material and intellectual, of Central American life, to promote the renaissance of the depressed Indian stocks and revive what is left of the submerged Indian culture. These are general aims, which have an attraction for the whole Sub-Continent, and the spectacle of what Mexico has done, and tried to do, has begun to thrill a few minds of the advanced younger generation in other Republics. Mexico feels herself just strong enough to give cautious and covert help to her immediate neighbours, when they are at grips with the Power which threatens her. She talks to them daily through the wireless installa-

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tions which she has handsomely given to them. One asks whether this emotional solidarity can ever, as the years and decades go on, translate itself into a political movement which might, in some form, unify the Latin Republics without the North, and in some sense against it. That is not probable, but even emotional solidarity is a force.

There are other complications, of which it may suffice to mention one; the South, on the whole, adheres to the League of Nations (one cannot feel certain that Brazil will finally withdraw), while the North stands aloof. The League, indeed, has recognised the Monroe Doctrine, but it supposed, when it did so, that the United States would join it, and one asks what will happen, if ever, in a world-wide crisis, the obligations of the Covenant should conflict with the Doctrine. If one South-American State should suffer aggression at the hands of another, will the League give it the support which the Covenant rather vaguely prescribes, or will it plead the Doctrine as an excuse for inaction? And what (to imagine a much more awkward case) would the League do if a South-American Republic, in a dispute with the United States, were to call on the League for support? A test of this kind would doubtless be more injurious to the League than to the Doctrine.

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Facing these facts, a realistic student of history would say, I think, that the unity of the American Continent scarcely constitutes a problem. It exists. It rests on economic facts, which grow every year more important. North-American capital is already the dominant real force, and must continue to strengthen its position. Its investments in the Centre and the South grow with incredible rapidity; while Great Britain has a diminishing surplus of capital available for exportation. It is inevitable that whenever a Central-American State is rash enough to oppose the interests of this financial power, intervention in one form or another will follow, whether by the passive method of refusing recognition (a method which permits its domestic enemies to supply themselves in the North with arms and credit), or by the active agency of the marine police. Nothing is seriously in doubt, about this forecast, save one momentous detail: could pin-pricks, financial penetration, withdrawal of recognition, and semi-official support for Conservative pretenders, suffice to wear down the challenge of Mexican independence? In the last resort, for a stake so substantial, Imperialism will face the costly inconvenience of war. For the rest one supposes that the present disposal of forces will suffice to give the reality of control. So long as the North is in effect "sovereign" on

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this Continent, little is to be gained by decorating the fact with the show of a political constitution. A mechanism which established a powerful system of arbitration and conciliation would be nothing but a nuisance to the dominant interests of finance. Why arbitrate when one can dictate? If institutions of this kind should grow, they will furnish rather such opportunities for discussion as exist at present, than a nucleus which might develop into an effective Continental authority.

There is, however, another possibility which Liberals would emphasize. The strong American distaste for Imperialism is not entirely a spent force. Prudent men are aware of the growing distrust of the Latin South, and liberal men are ashamed of the crudities of "dollar diplomacy." Is there in this enlightened public opinion a force which might one day support a like-minded President in a new development of the Monroe Doctrine, which would entrust a council, drawn from the whole Continent, with the formidable powers of intervention and control that have grown from it? One meets with that suggestion in liberal journals (notably in the *New Republic*), and it is conceivable that the sentiment behind it may grow. Without attempting to work out its detailed implications, it would mean, that if ever it should be necessary to control the revenues of a bank-

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rupt State, the decision would lie not with the Washington Government alone, but with some Pan-American Concert or Council. It would mean that the appointment of a receiver or controller in an embarrassed State, would lie with this Council, and that any police force which might be required, would be drawn from the whole Continent, or at least from its leading Republics. Such a system must eventually evolve some Covenant for the pacific settlement of disputes, and for mutual defence. Nor would it in the long run succeed in coping with the anti-social forces of Wall Street, unless it were to do what the Genevan League is beginning to do—undertake itself to organise financial aid, and even to raise loans for States in difficulties. The less it looked like a system of police, and the more it became an association for mutual aid, the better service would it render. In short, any whole-hearted attempt to carry out this idea would result in the creation, in one form or another, of a League of American nations, which might eventually enter into a close relation with the League at Geneva.

The prospects of such a development might seem brighter, were it not that efforts have been made for a century past to realise something of the kind. The idea of Pan-American unity was

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already full-fledged when the Panama Assembly met in 1826. Since that date there have been many Pan-American Congresses and many treaties of more or less importance; while a permanent secretariat exists, which keeps the Pan-American Union nominally alive. On at least three occasions there has been joint mediation in inter-American disputes—on the last occasion, in 1914, by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, between the United States and Mexico. Indeed, Colonel House has left it on record, that in President Wilson's mind, the idea of a Pan-American League preceded the idea of a world-wide League. One may call this a venerable tradition, but it does not seem to gain in influence as it advances in years. Nearly half a century has passed since Mr. Secretary Blaine proposed, not merely conferences to secure peaceful and friendly relations, but a Pan-American Customs Union, a Pan-American railway, and a common system of weights, measures and coinage. One asks whether the Southern Republics would venture today into any association with the all-powerful North, which required them to abandon much of their sovereignty. And, again, so long as "the dollar" can dominate domestic politics, and prescribe a policy to diplomacy, has it anything to gain, on a short view, by consenting to an association which

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must in some degree lessen its own ability to dictate? None the less, in America, Continental Unity exists: what the future must decide, is whether it shall continue to mean the hegemony of the North, or evolve towards federation and coöperation.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Principle of Empire

ONCE in a talk with Rabindranath Tagore, I led the Indian poet to describe the change which in his generation has come over the relations of his countrymen and mine. He and his contemporaries, he told me, had modeled themselves upon their English teachers. Our literature had formed their minds: the great Victorians from John Stuart Mill and Carlyle to Matthew Arnold and Ruskin were their heroes. Their thinking had begun to move to a Western rhythm. In the last twenty years all this has changed. An exaggerated and embittered nationalism has erected its barbed-wire entanglement around the Indian mind. Its defences are up not only against English but against all European influences. Our wisdom cannot leap this hedge; our poetry cannot charm it to bend. We irritate wherever we contrive to touch the mind behind it. And even against our science it is steeled. The reaction has gone so far, that this Indian mind, in its wilful antagonism, must reject even the objective evidence behind the Western lore which is least coloured by our personality. It prides itself on ignoring the lessons

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of our physiology and our hygiene. It rallies under Gandhi's leadership to a movement which involves the defiant rejection of our economics. The best with the worst, our utilities with our insolence, it flings upon the scrap-heap, because they are ours.

I have witnessed this state of mind myself in another country which knows us as conquerors. I spent a month some years ago in Egypt. The paralysing prestige of Lord Cromer had just been withdrawn; the revolt of a now conscious nation had just begun. I moved about uneasily at home in two worlds. The Egyptian nationalist intellectuals talked readily to me, because they knew me for an opponent of the Occupation. With the English officials and teachers I had the link of a common education. I could discern the virtues and defects of both these groups. The Egyptians were still extremely crude. Their native Arabic culture was a dead and sterile thing, while Western culture was not yet acclimatised in the foreign soil of their minds. The Englishmen, for all their arrogance, their lack of imagination and their inability to criticise themselves, had a steady devotion to duty, and a genuine wish to bring their gifts of character and knowledge to the service of the people of the Nile. I could sympathise with both groups and realise the tragedy of their situa-

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tion. But in the end I found myself summing it up in these words, "They will not learn, and we can no longer teach." The resentment and pretensions of one race, the mingled alarm and contempt of the other, had erected an impassable curtain between them. Had they come unarmed, with no imperial interests to serve, these civil servants and professors might have helped their subordinates in the ministries, and their students in the schools, for yet another generation. But the tramp of the khaki legions in the streets rang in the ears of the students, as they listened to the lectures on history and law. The citadel overshadowed the ministries, and the whir of the aëroplanes in the sky dominated the quiet voices of the English officials, as they talked with their native juniors about irrigation or the prevention of disease.

THOSE of us who profess an instinctive or reasoned opposition to Imperialism, make a grave mistake, if we deny its civilising mission, or doubt the sincerity of those who devote their lives to it. It has graven the superb epic of its courage and organising genius on the very crust of the earth, from ice-bound Siberia to the sands of South Africa. But always the gifts of educa-

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tion, intellectual stimulus and humaner government which it brings with it, are a by-product of its self-regarding activities. To bestow these gifts is rarely, if ever, the motive of the robust pioneers. If they have any motive which stands a little higher than material gain, it is glory and the aggrandisement of the mother-land. But the impulse which drives them to these "places in the sun" has usually been, either the desire to monopolise a market or a raw material, or the even baser reckoning that there is cheap and unorganised labour awaiting exploitation. When it is none of these things, it is a reckoning that springs from the interplay of interests with geographical accident. Tsarist Russia advanced along the paths that led to an ice-free port, or England must acquire the gates and the strategical posts which dominate the road to India. Unless it be in some of the British West African colonies, the civilising motive, which limps lamely after the acquisitive motive, in the hope of justifying violence after the fact, has never yet grown strong enough to restrain or transform the crude egoism of conquest. We have, it is true, introduced Western education into India, but our purpose was always to train a corps of satellites, who would serve our trade and our administration as intelligent underlings. To this day we have created no system of

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compulsory primary education, and the great mass of our subjects remain untouched by all the intellectual wealth which we have to bestow. We have done something for public health, in the sense that we have checked the epidemics which might have swept the cities where we do business, but we have done nothing to lessen the hideous sacrifice of childlife which curses every home in the Indian village. Order and security we can organise. The mechanism which grinds out its average profit of 90 per cent from the Bengal jute-mills is well oiled; but the mass of the people continues to cultivate by the methods of the Bronze Age, and stagnates in a poverty to which we would not condemn the most worthless paupers of our own Imperial race. The by-product of civilisation is a convenience which too plainly serves our own purpose. And because, in our strategical railways, our health service, and even in our colleges, the limitations of this purpose are legible to the awakened intelligence of a conquered but critical India, we have reached the stage at which the schoolmaster can still keep order in his class, but can neither teach it, nor inspire it.

The cultural gains which a conquered people derives from Imperialism are never so ample or so stimulating, as those which it might have drawn from the adventure of an unforced contact with a

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friendly but alien civilisation. A free people's mind may be dazzled at the first impact of a strange culture upon its intelligence, but its will retains its manhood, and its motions their spontaneity. And if in the end it reacts, it will do so without bitterness and violence, and the self which it rediscovers will have been enriched and fertilised by marriage.

WHEN once one becomes sceptical about the moral and cultural gains of Imperialism, the other problems, which it raises come crowding on one's attention. Even the economic gains are far from presenting a clear balance-sheet. In the old world of Europe, modern Imperialism had its origin largely in the over-rapid accumulation of capital by a small owning class. The internal market was starved, because the industrial system, in its struggle for profits, limited the purchasing power of the masses, so that the wages which they had to spend could never keep pace with the growing output of the machines. Since, by this policy of low wages, the industrial system limited its own internal market, it was driven to enlarge it by conquest. Towards the middle of the last century, it began to export capital as well as consumable goods. By this expedient it kept

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capital relatively scarce, in spite of its rapid accumulation. The rate of interest was thus preserved against a natural fall, and the passive owners kept their rewards high by comparison with those of the active workers. The leisured and privileged class was all the while erecting, in Asia and Africa, buttresses and bulwarks for the social and political privileges which it retained at home.

And in another and still more disastrous way this ruling class learned how to keep the wages of the homeland low. The coal mines of Central India, in which women as well as men work underground at a starvation rate, began to eat into the export trade of the British mines, till unemployment became a constant curse. The jute-mills of Calcutta, working at incredible wages, restricted the market of the older jute-mills of Dundee, and kept its standard of life at a level scandalous even to European ideas. And if capital also suffered in some degree by the misfortunes of the home trade, it was mobile and recouped itself by wandering abroad. On the whole, while Imperialism has enriched our economic life by opening up vast new sources of raw material and immense markets, it has tended to depress the conditions of the workers in the mother country, or at least to check the improvement which otherwise would have occurred.

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Imperialism is a vague word, and it is of the first importance to understand what its active principle is. The current use of the word, in which it means the literal hoisting of the flag on alien territory and the extension of one people's rule over the territory of another, is manifestly inadequate. Direct annexation has gone out of fashion during the last two generations. It is a crude method which rouses needless antagonism, and its results can be achieved by subtler means at a smaller cost to the purse and reputation of the Imperial Power. One may "protect" the weaker state, or carve out a "sphere of interest" from its territory. Financial control may give all that is desired. But short of these methods, an occasional act of intervention to protect one's economic interests may serve the same ends, provided that one has in one's dominating fleet or army the means of repeating it at will. A naval demonstration timed to coincide with the presentation of some demand, will often suffice to establish an empire's power to dictate. A weak nation rarely forgets these moments of involuntary hospitality, and for some years it will commonly arrange, by punctual deference to the representations of Imperial diplomacy, that it shall not again merit the attentions of a cruiser. By all these methods the empire uses armed power to reserve for its subjects some

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lasting economic advantage, which the weaker state would not willingly concede. With each act of coercion or intervention the authority of the empire is confirmed.

These interventions commonly start from what is now an accepted maxim in international life, that a state has the right and duty to protect its subjects from wrong within the territories of another state. This is an elastic principle, but, like the bow of Ulysses, it is only the mighty who can bend it to its full extent. It is of comparatively recent growth; it never occurred to Ministers of the British crown in the seventeenth or even in the eighteenth century that they should use the fleet to protect their fellow-subjects, even when they were the servants of the chartered Levant Company, from outrage at the hands of the Turks. Even today Ministers prefer in their public utterances to suggest that when on these occasions they intervene with arms, it is because the lives of our fellow-countrymen are in danger. The appeal to sentiment seems to be irresistible when there are women among them, and the Poet Laureate justified the Jameson Raid in verses as deplorable as his hero's morals, because there were "girls in the gold-reef city." But when the lives of our fellows are in danger, there is commonly a cause, which may be the original sin from which little

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nationalities are not exempt, but may also be the arrogance, the brutality, or the greed of the foreign residents. If white men must use coolies as beasts of burden, if they must get children to work at their looms, if they must collect native women for their brothels, if (as happened at Casablanca when the French felt constrained to land troops) they must drive a railway through a Mohammedan cemetery, if (as in China) they must flout the native courts, or exact from the native sovereign (as in Egypt) interest at a rate which would disgrace a Shylock, it is probable that these persons will sooner or later incur danger from the resentment of the native population. There is much to be said for William Penn's eccentric belief, that if white men would deal justly with red Indians, they need neither carry arms, nor summon the king's soldiers to guard their settlements. One rarely arouses murderous resentment by courtesy, chastity, or fair dealing. And indeed, even in justifying the expedition to Shanghai, some statesmen, a little franker than the rest, will mention British property as well as British lives. The property in question was not amassed by the rigid observance of the eight-hour day, nor yet by the payment of a living wage.

This modern extension of the right to protect one's subjects abroad dates from the middle of

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the last century, and the first public declaration of it was made by Palmerston, who promised that

“as the Roman in days of old held himself free from indignity, when he could say *Civis Romanus sum*, so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong.

Palmerston chose a singular case by which to recommend this principle to the world. A Portuguese Jew, a certain Don Pacifico, resident in Athens, who in some obscure way had acquired British citizenship, had a fantastic claim for financial compensation against the Greek Government. He refused to sue in the Greek courts, called in British diplomatic aid, and so far succeeded that a British fleet was sent to the Piræus with a peremptory demand for a settlement. But modern practise has improved on Palmerston's first crude statement of this principle. His claim that a state should protect its subjects from “injustice and wrong” sounds plausible. But better than cure is prevention, and the real business of diplomacy is now rather to support these interests, so that no wrong shall be done them, than to rescue them by an angry intervention after the wrong

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has occurred. The methods of support vary indefinitely. The financier or contractor may simply be introduced by the Embassy of the Imperial Power to the notice of the foreign government. His claims may be openly pressed, a practice to which Sir Edward Grey while Foreign Secretary confessed.¹ The pressure behind the demand of a group of British capitalists may even take the form of a threat that our warships will act if the demand is refused. That was done by the late Lord Salisbury on a famous occasion in China.²

¹ Speaking in the House of Commons on July 10, 1914, he said: "I regard it as our duty, wherever *bona-fide* British capital is forthcoming in any part of the world, and is applying for concessions to which there are no valid political objections, that we should give it the utmost support we can and endeavour to convince the foreign government concerned that it is to its interest, as well as to our own, to give the concessions for railways and so forth to British firms, who carry them out at reasonable prices and in the best possible way."

² Lord Salisbury in 1897 had endeavoured, in competition with a Belgian syndicate, to secure for a British group two concession for the building of a railway from Peking to Hankow. He objected to any offer of "special openings or privileges" to "other foreign Powers" in "the region of the Yangtse," while he demanded (at first in a friendly tone) that the Chinese Government should "invite the employment of British capital in the development of those provinces." The Chinese, however, who were unwilling to recognise the Yangtse Valley as a British sphere, gave this concession to the Belgians. Thereupon he instructed the British Minister to complain that we had been "badly treated by China in the matter of railway concessions," and to demand, by way of solatium, concessions for no less than six new lines. He was to threaten that "unless

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Nor does the support cease, after the capitalists whom Imperial diplomacy has recommended, have secured the concession which they sought. Even under the Labour Government, the Foreign Office avowed that it had, apparently as an ordinary matter of routine, supported by diplomatic representations the demand of a British railway company in Brazil, which the Brazilian Government had already rejected, that it should be permitted to increase its charges. The position is, then, that the conception of what is a national interest has been stretched to include the promotion and support of any venture in a foreign country in which private capitalists may desire to engage. The power of the Empire is behind them, not merely to protect their persons, but to back their enterprises. A government in the position of Brazil is given to understand (even if no crude phraseology is used) that in some degree it will incur the displeasure of the British Empire, if it rejects a proposal by which the British capitalists hope to

they agree at once," we should regard their action "as an act of deliberate hostility against this country and shall act accordingly. After *consultation with the admiral* you may give them the number of days or hours you think proper within which to send their reply." The British fleet concentrated at Hong-Kong, the Chinese Government capitulated, and the threat of naval action secured concessions to British capital for the building of some 2,800 miles of railways.

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derive profit at the expense of its citizens. One varies one's manners according to the status of the nation which one is addressing. If it is not perfectly white, if it is friendless, and if no Monroe Doctrine protects it, one may emphasise the obvious justice of one's demands by whistling for the Fleet. It is commonly said that the navy is an insurance for our sea-borne commerce in time of war. It would be no less true to say that it is an insurance for our investments in time of peace. Capital has acquired nationality; shares possess citizenship, and scrip can say, in Palmerston's words, *Civis Romanus sum*.

Some inconveniences follow from this modern practice, and some disabilities. So long as private capital can call up, to guarantee its profits, the clerks of the Foreign Office and the admirals of the Fleet, so long will it perpetuate militarism and prepare wars. To this practice in the main we must refer the rivalry in armaments which preceded the Great War—and survived it. The object was to gain a preponderance of prestige and power, which might be used for economic ends. "You cannot have prosperity without power," said Lord Milner in an address to the Manchester Conservative Club in 1906. "This country must remain a Great Power or we will become a poor country." One quotes this frank realism with a

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shudder, but when once this practise had been generally adopted by the Great Powers, one could not dispute the truth of such aphorisms. The disability is no less obvious. When once the government of a Great Power has habitually, in its thinking and in its actions, identified the national interest with the interest of exported capital, it blinds itself to any honest consideration of the good of the native population among whom this capital will earn its profits. It becomes the mouth-piece of the *rentier* class which lives upon these profits, and of the bankers, promoters, entrepreneurs, contractors, and merchants who direct the stream of its investments. The ruling class in England is as completely identified with these groups which guide the flow of Imperial capital, as it once was with the landed interest. The late Lord Milner, who once controlled the public finance of Egypt, became, some years later, the chairman of an Anglo-Egyptian bank. The younger brother of a duke served as a high official in the Foreign Office, quitted it to become a director of an oil company, and thereafter sat in the Tory Cabinet. Imperial policy is decided in a little social world in which men pass alternately from official to commercial positions, and spend their lives with guests and hosts and clubmates, whose incomes depend on the yield of their hold-

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ings in Indian mills, Chinese banks, and Sudanese irrigation schemes. A government which rests on this social foundation is as likely to concern itself with the good of the working population of India, China, and the Sudan as was the average employer in Lancashire in the early nineteenth century, when no Factory Acts regulated his mill and its "hands" were forbidden by law to combine. The Foreign Office will interest itself about the freight charges which a British railway in Brazil may impose; but was it ever known to concern itself with the wages which such railways pay?

No one would suggest that we have in the workings of Imperialism an ideal or even a tolerable mechanism for securing just dealings between the owners of exported capital and the native populations. To put the case in a rough and summary way, the empires intervene in the internal affairs of weak states with a single purpose—to promote the commercial gain of their subjects; they arm to render their interventions irresistible, and in the clash of interest between client and financier, labour and capital, and the two parties to a transfer of land, armed power is on the side of the exploiting race. The system works as one might expect: we revive the horrors of the early industrial age in China; we repeat the Norman conquest in Kenya, snatch the fertile lands, and turn the tribes,

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deprived of a sufficient means of livelihood, into a proletariat which must work to earn the wherewithal to pay taxes from which it derives no benefits, on any terms which the white settlers chose to dictate. What is monstrous from the standpoint of the less advanced races, is little better when we view it from that of the consumer outside the confines of the Empire. Armed power, as we have seen, is frequently used to secure for a Great Power the exclusive disposal of the raw material which his overseas possessions produce. The British Empire, by arrangement with planters in the Dutch Indies, contrives to use its ownership of the Malay country, to organise something approaching a "corner" in rubber. In the hope of breaking this monopoly the United States must retain the Philippine Islands and there foster the growth of rubber. Each has the excuse that in time of war its safety might depend on a supply of this essential material from its own possessions. The argument which is plausible in the case of rubber, may be extended to oil, iron ore, and several of the rarer minerals. The use of armed power to promote economic expansion has made anarchy in the world, and it contrives to perpetuate itself by the vicious circle of its logic. One must own Burmah, dominate Persia, and secure Irak in order to have oil for the navy, and again, one must have a navy

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in order to acquire and retain any overseas territories whatever.

Against this whole system there stands in protest and rebuke the doctrine of the right of self-determination, which the Allies proclaimed and applied to the enemies, while Moscow thrusts it as a charge of moral dynamite into the structure of the whole capitalist world. It may be a proper assertion of human right, when it is used to deny the claim of a Great Power to use its military resources to open up the territory of a weak people for the immediate gain of the leisured and investing class of the metropolis. It is a good gantlet to throw in the face of the conqueror. But can one maintain it from the standpoint of the welfare of the human race? There are difficulties in applying it. History did not begin with the Imperial conquest. The Normans might have pleaded that their claim to the soil of England was as good as that of the Saxons—each relied on the right of the sword. The Grand Mogul was as much an intruder in India, as the King of England, though his title was older. If conquest be an outrage, after how many centuries shall we condone it? “At what rate per cent per annum,” as Herbert Spencer once asked, “does wrong become right?” A morality, moreover, which omits to weigh the consequences of an international act,

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is no more than an irrational impulse. The Imperialist can usually remind us, so rare is innocence on our planet, that his victims were themselves engaged in much cruder barbarities than those which we lay at his door. In Africa he replaced the slave-raiding Arab, who wronged the black races more cruelly and more wastefully than we have ever done. Of the horde of slaves whom he transported across the desert, only a minority reached the market alive, and when he had taken their labour by force, there was no result to show for it, which could match the produce of our plantations. We can boast that we have ended slave-raiding, chattel slavery, and in some dark regions cannibalism and human sacrifice. Something, too, we teach, while we exploit. Can we leave Africa to revert to tribal war, with slaves as the stake in the barbarous game?

But what is this doctrine that the people who happen to be seated on any particular spot of the earth's surface have an unlimited right to it against all the rest of humanity? A rigid conservative might conceivably find arguments to justify this doctrine, but no Socialist could do so. The Russians have not abandoned Siberia to its aboriginal inhabitants: on the contrary, they are wisely and rightly transferring to it the surplus population of the poor and densely inhabited

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regions of European Russia. None of us would pause to respect the claim even of an ancient hereditary landlord in the Scottish Highlands, the head, if you will, of a clan, to keep his moors and his valleys for purposes of sport. We should say that the use which he makes of the soil is anti-social. Others can turn it to better account for the growth of timber, the pasturing of sheep, and the cultivation of crofts and small holdings. Why should we be more tender to Australian black-fellows? Because a savage tribe hunts game over the ground where copper or oil are hidden, can we, from a prudish dread of violence, deny these riches to mankind? On what page of creation's Domesday Book is that clan's title registered for eternity?

If we try to work out some statement of international morality, we shall with difficulty fit into it this absolute doctrine of self-determination. Our goal must be the good of the whole human society. To that test the savage tribe, the little nationality and the backward Oriental people must all submit. In the name of the general good they cannot defend the closing of their ports, the withholding from cultivation of fertile territory, nor the denial of their minerals to our industrious picks. The last word, in any question that concerns the general good, cannot lie with any one

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people. Morality, whatever our ultimate definition may be, must always involve some subordination of the individual to the social group, and of the smaller group to the larger. But while we must take this position against the anarchists of self-determination, our statement of international morality is not yet complete. We have called for the subordination of clans and nationalities to the Great Society which is humanity. It may have the right to overrule their primitive egoism, in the name of the organisation of the world's labour and the production of the world's wealth. But has any less august society that right? The world might very well say to Egypt: "Because the Suez Canal passes through your territory, and because it is indispensable to the common life and common wealth of West and East, we require from you guaranties that it shall always be open, and that no accident of warfare or civil strife shall ever close it. To that extent we ask you to submit to some restrictions on your unlimited independence." The world, when a world government exists, might well say this, and would have the right to impose its will on Egypt. It might even, if need were, quarter its international garrison, or station a squadron of its fleet, to police and protect the Canal. But has the British Empire this right? It is only one of the many users of

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the Canal, though its interest may surpass that of other Powers. There is this difference in the two cases. The coercion of Egypt by the British Empire, even on this relatively reasonable ground, resembles the overpowering of one individual by another. Each is a state, and states by Old World courtesy are assumed to have equal rights. It must always, to Egyptian patriotism, seem an outrage that British troops should be quartered on Egyptian soil. We should not, could not, so deal with France if the Canal chanced to pass through her territory. Egypt feels and resents the stigma of inferiority. Moreover, she realises clearly that British troops quartered in Cairo may well be used for less legitimate purposes than the protection of the Canal. British capitalism has other, and possibly less innocent, interests. And finally, when the British Empire constitutes itself the custodian of the Canal, it has the power not merely to open, but also to close it, and this power, in the event of war, it will use against its enemies, and in some degree against neutral shipping also. It is, then, to a particular interest, and not to the general good, that Egypt must submit herself today, and consent to limitations on her sovereignty which involve humiliation. There need be no humiliation, and no fear in peace or war that particular interests could exploit her, if she were to

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accept the guardianship of an international authority over the Canal.

We have spoken of humanity as a Great Society, which in the last resort may demand that the resources, the roads or the waterways of any part of the earth shall be put to the fittest use for the general good. Little would be gained if we were to conceive this Great Society as a leviathan which had rights against tribes and nations and owed no obligations in return. It would be unworthy of the name of society, unless it existed to guard the self-respect and the personality of each member, no less than to maintain the supremacy of the general good. The general good must not be the sum of particular evils. Each member of the Great Society is an end in himself, and humanity in Kant's phrase "a kingdom of ends." If for the general good it should be necessary and proper to override the will of a tribe or nation, the thing would be done with the sense that in so far as we must coerce, our Society had failed to realise its idea, which should live in all its members. It would strive to persuade, where an empire would use its guns. The empire may profess to educate. For how long has it ever tried to keep school without a machine-gun in the playground? The process of expansion has been hurried by the rivalries of the colonial Powers, and races have been flung

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unprepared and uneducated into sudden contact with an incomparably more efficient civilisation, represented by traders or settlers whose attitude toward them was in some degree predatory. A disinterested international authority, if it had to deal with warlike, pastoral tribes like the Masai of Kenya, which may possibly have occupied an undue extent of territory, would have set to work to aid them, and teach them to make the step to the agricultural stage of civilisation. It would rather have trained them to farm (a thing which has been done successfully in British West Africa) than permitted them to become degraded as plantation labourers for a white aristocracy. The process might have been slow, but it would have resulted in the development of a native society incomparably more advanced and incomparably happier than that of Kenya today.

Cases may arise in which it is necessary, even on a large scale, to take land of which native tribes are making a wasteful and inadequate use—if it contains minerals or oil which the world urgently needs, or if it is exceptionally fertile soil suited for the growth of some scarce but necessary tropical produce, which no persuasion or education will induce the natives to grow themselves. But in such unusual cases one would propose a safeguard. In no event must the natives be expropriated for

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the benefit of private firms or settlers. That should be done only for the benefit of a public enterprise, and its profits should be used exclusively for the benefit of the native race—to endow education, for example, or to build roads. The “good of the whole world” is a plea which may excuse some overriding of the customary rights of nations or tribes. But the plea must be honestly used. An empire cannot argue that it is the interest of all mankind which guides it to oil-wells, if it reserves the product for itself. This plea of the good of humanity cannot excuse interferences with national or native rights for the benefit of any one invading state or empire. An empire which tolerates, or carries out these interferences for the good of private individuals, is administering the law of the jungle. The rule must be that national independence and native liberties, national territory and native lands, national law and native customs, are all of them sacred and inviolable. Only the supreme world authority should be empowered to sanction an exception, and only then in obedience to the imperative need of the whole earth. This is a difficult doctrine, but a humane morality demands no less. The Great Society makes high claims upon us.

It may be too late to imagine a technique by which, without violence and without exploitation,

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the primitive peoples of Africa and the Pacific might have been educated into a more advanced civilisation. Some have been exterminated; others are dying out, and elsewhere the white trader or planter has already destroyed the fabric of native society beyond repair, and established vested interests which may be controlled but can hardly be abolished. The international authority which we have imagined, is no more than an hypothesis, and for many a year to come the utmost for which we can hope is the setting of standards, and the elaboration of a charter for the protection of native races, with some adequate system of international inspection to ensure its observance. But it may be a gain, meantime, to clear our own minds. Such moral defence as may be made for Imperialism can cover neither its historic origins nor its actual practice. It can gain validity only as we organise an authority which will ensure that the "trustee" shall not exploit his ward, nor the "teacher" his pupil. If the excuse for our expansion be that we educate and police where we carry our flag abroad, we must put ourselves beyond the reach of interested motives.

To sum up this discussion in another form, let us now see where the traditional doctrine of the independence of the sovereign state and the national right of self-determination stand. Both

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of them, it seems to me, hold good against the claims, the interventions and the assaults of single states or single empires. It is a barbarous relic of an organised and anarchic world that one state should use armed force or even diplomatic pressure (for diplomacy in an armed world is always the advance agent of force) against another state, to promote the economic interests of its citizens. But neither of these doctrines or rights have any final or ultimate sanctity, and neither of them is the last word of international morality. The last test, the supreme lawgiver, the final court of appeal, is the good of all humanity. To that the national state and the composite empire must give way.

When one has arrived at this conclusion, one is far from having disposed of the question. One has merely set oneself a problem. The difficulty which Palmerston tried to settle with his doctrine of unlimited intervention has still to be faced. In some degree, and under proper conditions, it seems desirable and even necessary that capital should be exported to distant and undeveloped regions in the form of steel rails or turbines or spinning jennies, or as credit to ease the transport and marketing of crops. Manufacturers, contractors, and bankers must have some guaranty of safety in their operations. If not to the Government which

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counts them its citizens, to whom shall they look? Can we give to Palmerston's *Civis Romanus sum* another and more appropriate meaning? In other words, can we devise some international mechanism which shall replace the armed protection of Imperialism? That may be our starting-point in the explorations before us, but this vast problem of Imperialism has other aspects of no less importance.

If we object to the scramble of the armed rivals to monopolise raw materials, what juster and more pacific procedure shall we propose to replace it? There remains the duty of providing disinterested aid and even guardianship for states or tribes which are too weak and too backward to care satisfactorily for themselves.

Before we turn to these constructive problems we must note, in passing, that we have already left behind us the idea of unity by continents as anything but a transitional solution, if it be even that. One cannot treat the world's affairs in closed geographical compartments. The operations of those states which Germans appropriately describe as "World Powers" (Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States) range far beyond any continent to which one could assign them. All of them have a world trade. Some of them invest in every continent. The duty of protecting their

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possessions (a word which means fixed capital no less than territory) could hardly be left to the "continent" in which they lay. America has a growing stake in Europe. Each of these Powers has a stake in China. Nor, if our doctrine of the Great Society be accepted, would it be consistent with international morals to leave Great Britain in sole charge of the minds, the destinies, and the raw materials of a quarter of the earth. As little has France the right to claim final authority over half Africa and a fragment of Asia. Not even if the United States of Europe were to take over the French possessions would this be a satisfactory solution. And if anyone retorts that this transcendental conception of all humanity as the Great Society is too lofty and remote for our practical world, I would remind him of the problem of armaments. On the plan propounded by the Pan-Europeans, continents instead of Great Powers would arm against one another. As the proceedings at the naval conference of Genoa have proved to us, disarmament is no easier when three Powers confront one another, than when we must reconcile a dozen. Disarmament will be possible only when the interests, for whose promotion Powers arm, are confided to the charge of an authority superior to them all.

CHAPTER NINE

Imperialism—The Way Out

THERE opens now before us, if the reader is willing to explore it, a difficult but inviting territory. The atmosphere may seem as rarefied as it is stimulating, for we are advancing into a land of speculation and hypothesis. The Great Society, which is all humanity, both is and is not. No hands have built its house; no parchment bears a record of its charter. To create the nonexistent is the task of our generation. And yet in the most reassuring of senses, the Great Society exists. It exists because humanity, in its finer moments of instinctive emotion, has built with sympathy and concern the house which is stronger than any fortress. Most of us have long outlived the limitation of sympathy which confined fellow-feeling to family or clan, to race or nation, and even in the strange features of Negro or Mongolian we recognise a reflection of ourselves. When the English nation gave to Japan a library to replace the rare books which the recent earthquake destroyed; when our grandfathers fought the vested interests of high society to destroy the slave trade on the African coasts, when Americans

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endow their schools and colleges in China, when white women organise to end the degradation to which Indian girls must submit for the pleasures of white soldiers, when Christians give, to carry the key of Heaven to the brown peoples of the Pacific, above all, when the nations join in appointing doctors in Geneva to work out remedies for African sleeping-sickness and Indian malaria—the Great Society has shaped itself in their minds, though they know it not. Even in our crimes we anticipate it. The World War was a perverted internationalism, for it presupposed our common interest in things that seemed to us so vital that we would die for them. When London pays wages to Shanghai, and New York draws dividends from the Ruhr, again, even if the wages should mean starvation and the dividends usury, they testify to our inextricable connections with one another. When our moving films carry our laughter and our pathos, our vulgarities and our romance, to Eskimos and Zulus, we act on the discovery that with all our divergencies of taste and custom, manners and morals, to most of the stimulations of perception our emotions respond in the same way. It matters to Stockholm and to Melbourne to what height the mountain of gold has risen in the vaults of the American Federal Reserve Bank, and men bidding in their Yorkshire

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accents at wool auctions in England bring fortune or penury to the pampas of the Argentine. When civilisation has reached this stage of development, when its cultural life and its economic existence have both overflowed national frontiers, the building of the visible and legal structure of the Great Society, is no more than a problem of organisation. The emotional change has been wrought in us. We have answered from within, as men must while they live, to the outward change in our economic environment. The pace and ease of our advance will now depend solely on the skill and the resolution which the more progressive among us display, in overcoming within ourselves and in the minds of our more backward fellows, the atavism which still clings to the jealousies and the narrownesses of nationalism. The chief obstacle lies in the fact that those nations whose leadership is indispensable in the advance to international government have, on a short view, the least to gain from the change. America, the British Empire, and France are the satisfied Powers. The first is gorged with wealth and the others with territory. What more do they ask from the world? The dissatisfied Powers—Germany, Italy, Russia—are either poor or disarmed, and cannot compel a change.

One argument there is, however, which should

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appeal to both groups of Powers. If we will not organise for peace, we must organise for war. It is difficult to measure the depth and the sincerity of the hatred of war which seemed all but universal in the early months and years after the Armistice. The weakness of such hatreds is that they are unconstructive. Most of us suppose that the dread of war in ourselves and our fellows can be trusted to respond to the needs of the hour, when the next war comes upon us. We rely on some spontaneous rally of public opinion, when the last tense week of doubtful negotiation confronts us with our danger. We forget how the Great War stole upon us. In London, ten days before the irreparable decision, the question of Ulster filled our minds, and if we troubled to think of Europe, it was only to fling a curse of irritation at Serbian murderers. There is no hope for us, until we realise that the next war is being prepared every day. Most of us are uneasy at the relations of the British Empire with Russia and China; all of us have our anxious moments when Fascist Italy plays with her theatrical antics on our nerves; some of us remember the botched map-making of Versailles; but a graver danger to peace lies in the silent, matter-of-fact appeals to force, which races who hate melodrama and condemn a threat as bad manners, make at every

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turn of their daily business. The entire practice of Imperialism is the chief of these dangers, and the root of it lies in the Palmerstonian assumption that it is proper for an empire to use force to promote the economic interests of its citizens. That the chief naval Powers may strive to reach an agreement to limit their sea forces, is scarcely even a mitigation of the risk. The very fact that all this shattering force survives the efforts to measure and restrict it, carries its own warning. If there were really the will to avoid the use of it, and the conviction that it is needless, would any sane nation spend on these hulks of steel the millions which would give it an adequate system of education? These navies remain competitive even when tonnage is equalised. The expert who consents to an equality in capital ships, does so with the firm intention of reaching superiority through other arms, or by better training and technique, or by a wiser strategic disposition of his forces.

The cure, then, the reader may say, is to "out-law war." Without a doubt that must be done. But in a stereotyped world the healthy forces of life will demand change when their environment irks and limits them; war will return under the name of rebellion, unless we create an international legislature powerful enough to decree change when change in the world is due. But can we

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leave to sovereign national states—or as the facts require us to say, to the Great Powers—the right to promote private economic interests by protecting them beyond their frontiers?

The easy answer lies ready, that if we all consent to obligatory and universal arbitration, this Palmerstonian principle no longer makes a difficulty. The empire may push the protection of these private interests, in Turkey, China, Egypt, or where you will, but it must stop short of war. This would doubtless be some improvement on the present practice of empires, but one foresees that subtle interpretations would make it remarkably easy to evade. In the polite world which obeyed the code of honour, one consented to fight a duel only with one's equal in birth and breeding. Empires have the same nice scruple about arbitration. Great Britain does not arbitrate with Egypt, and one notices a marked reluctance in Washington to submit to an international court the tangled legal questions which affect American investments in Mexico. And again, though one may promise to arbitrate rather than declare war, it has been found that much may be done with guns and ships without that embarrassing formality. If empires retain warships at all, can cruisers be forbidden to watch from Alexandria the progress of negotiations in Cairo? Such matters concern every good

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citizen of the world, and why not the captain and his crew? Or again, it is among the most remarkable discoveries of our enlightened age that 25,000 men with guns, tanks and aëroplanes may sail from the Thames to the Yangtse, and only the ill-disposed venture to call it war. I have it on equally good authority that though the American operations in Nicaragua in no way resemble arbitration, they also are not war.

But let us make a large and charitable assumption. Empires will stoop to arbitrate and warships will in future cruise only to enliven the tedium of peace. Is it then desirable that in Asia or Central America or Egypt, the diplomatic representatives of the Great Powers should discuss with the Foreign Offices of less exalted nations the exigencies or grievances of bankers, contractors, and owners or promoters of oil-wells or railways? These persons may have merit in their respective callings, and their cases, let us assume, are frequently, if not invariably, good in equity and law. But is this the relationship in which the forty millions of England would desire to stand with the four hundred of China? Is it to be clouded, because a Shanghai bank demands a half per cent above what China would willingly pay for a loan? Or is there less sympathy between two civilisations, because the material for a new

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railway is ordered rather from Berlin than from London? A relationship which centres on such questions cannot include the greater things in life. Inevitably, competition enters into it, and when Powers which are competing to "open up" China meet at Geneva to discuss a vital issue of European policy, there is a risk that they will barter. To secure, shall we say, the tacit admission that the Yangtse is a British sphere of interest, London will sell, it maybe, the national independence of Albania, or discover that the time has not yet come for the evacuation of the Rhineland. And if governments are, of right and necessity, the protectors of capital outside their frontiers, the chances are lessened that they will do much for the protection of labour. The more one habituates oneself to watch the consequences of this identification of the nations' interests with those of exported capital, the more frankly will one recognise its corrupting and dehumanising influence.

There is a comparatively simple device by which this tap-root of Imperialism can be cut. Arbitration (in the sense of a legal process) is, of course, the solution. But does one wish that this bank or that railway, having a difference over money with China or Persia, should come into court with all the prestige of the British Empire behind it? Can cases initiated by diplomatic process fail to have

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a political colour? Does one by this procedure make it easier for judges to be impartial? And finally (a minor matter, perhaps), is it obvious that the taxpayer should pay the legal costs? The matter becomes more complicated when one reflects that some of these trading and financial concerns are already cosmopolitan, and their numbers and importance are likely in the future to grow. The way of escape would seem to be to lay down the principle that the regulation of trade, investment, and credit, when the subjects of one state operate within the territory of another, belongs in the last resort to the League of Nations. The duty of protecting and promoting these interests would be taken, on this suggestion, entirely out of the hands of the Imperial or national state to which the traders and financiers belong. Normally, jurisdiction would belong to the state in which they traded and invested. But an appeal would lie to the Courts of the League, which it might, for the convenience of all parties, set up at two or three convenient centres in the Near, Middle, and Far East, as well as at The Hague. It follows that some means must be devised of investing these concerns with an international legal personality, so that they might sue in the international courts without the intervention of any protecting Power. There is no difficulty about this,

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when one thinks of the immense concerns which do most of our trading in China—the Hong-Kong and Shanghai banks, the Anglo-American Tobacco Company, Messrs. Jardine Matheson, and two or three more that one might name. But smaller merchants might form themselves into guilds or chambers of commerce. Firms or societies which registered themselves as international trading concerns in the books of the League of Nations (paying a fee for the upkeep of the courts) would have the right of direct access to these courts.

The moral gains of this arrangement are evident.

(1) In the first place, while the League must protect these traders against wrong, it is equally the protector of the native state and can have no direct interest, no national or social bias, to promote their interests at the expense of those of the native population.

(2) In the second place, the transfer of the duty of protection from the national state to the international authority would end the perpetual interested interventions to which weak states must submit, and lessen and simplify the work of diplomacy, while cleaning it of this pedestrian, if not sordid, commitment.

(3) When Wall Street and the City of London awakened to an understanding of what had hap-

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pened, it is probable that their enthusiasm for the maintenance of a numerous and costly fleet of cruisers would suddenly diminish.

(4) There is here a solution of the difficulty which recurs in China, Egypt, and elsewhere, over the capitulations and the system of extraterritoriality. The foreign residents are unwilling to trust the native courts, and it is true that the judges lack experience, that only the younger men have had a modern legal training, that the ugly heritage of corruption clings about them, and that at times (it may be through the fault of the foreign residents themselves) the wave of anti-foreign feeling might reach the courts. On the other hand, the consular courts are an offence to an awakened nationalism, and it is hard to believe that they are wholly impartial. The proposal to allow an appeal from the national to the international courts provides a safeguard. Nor should it be regarded by an Eastern state as humiliating, for in like conditions it would be open to foreign concerns trading in European states.

(5) If, on all these grounds, the proposal seems worth entertaining, there is another reason which seems to make it imperatively necessary. How will the world eventually deal with organisations like the Steel Cartel, which unites the heavy industries of the greater part of Europe, and operates

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in most of the markets of the world? Can France control by legislation what the Cartel may do in Austria, or a German court take cognisance of its doings in the Argentine? Or must it submit to forty varying jurisdictions, none of which or only one of which, could reach its central council and its reserve funds? If the League were eventually to attempt to regulate its prices (which in their turn govern wages) through what mechanism could it conveniently impose its decisions? The difficulty disappears, if we imagine the Cartel clothed with an international legal personality, which would enable it to sue or be sued in the courts of the League. Short of actual litigation, the arrangement would be convenient, and even necessary, for other important purposes. It was realised at the Economic Conference which met this year(1927) at Geneva that the League should study the operations of these international combinations. But it has no powers to require the production of balance sheets, or to take evidence on oath. Without these powers can it carry its investigations very far? Eventually the League ought to have, over these cosmopolitan trading combinations, the same rights, which the national state possesses, to control and even to tax.

(6) Again, one foresees that a development of this kind would result in the growth of a legal

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department of the League. What code would its courts administer? Might it gradually promote, whether by codification or by the precedents set by its courts, or by adroit suggestion and even by the interchange of officials, a certain standardisation, at all events of commercial law, which would correspond to the aim which the Department of Health is following? Difficult though this work would be, even a partial approximation in national codes of commercial law would be a great gain to world trade. One can imagine an international school of law at Geneva, which gradually would come to exert a decisive influence on legal thought throughout the world, and, indeed, we may one day see an international university under the care of the League.

But there is another service of the utmost value which a legal department of the League might render. It should be at the disposal of all immature states to render them disinterested aid in organising their systems of justice.

The method of Imperialism is to require a weak and possibly chaotic native state to receive instructors, "advisers" (or whatever the title may be) on the nomination of the protecting empire, to reorganise its courts, finances, army, police, or what not. A state which retained some virility, like Turkey in pre-war days, would usu-

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ally kick against these appointments, and the foreign experts (with the exception of the Germans in the army) worked under impossible conditions. A weaker state, like Egypt, submitted to the yoke, and realised (since the experts were accompanied by an army of occupation) that "advice" was another name for command. Occasionally an ill-organised state has dared to select its own organiser, without the approval of the Imperial Powers. Persia, before the war, picked the American Mr. Shuster in this way, but though he promptly won the confidence of the people and did excellent work in reorganising the finances of the country, he was soon evicted by the unanimous jealousies of Tsarist Russia and Liberal England, who blamed his lack of "tact"—a word which in less imperial languages might be translated "deference." The Russian advisers whom Dr. Sun Yat-Sen invited to Canton had a similar experience.

The way out of these difficulties may be that the immature state should apply to the League for organisers or advisers (as it might also apply for loans), whether it be its courts, its finances, its police, or its schools which it desires to improve. It is an encouraging symptom that Persia has already asked the League to nominate a director for her health service. The initiative in this pro-

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cedure belongs to the backward state, whereas in the past it has usually been the empire which imposed reorganisation. Until it feels the need for reform, it will commonly be useless to propose it. The presumption is that the League's nominees, whatever their national origin, will act in the interests of the state which they serve, and not to promote the expansion of their home country. The more directly the Secretariat of the League acts in making such nominations, the better will be the prospect of success, for in it, and not in the Council, the intimate spirit of the League is incarnate. If this possibility should develop widely, the League might even train civil servants and administrators whom it could appoint to such posts—a suggestion which shall be expanded on a later page. By such activities the League can take on its shoulders whatever was sincere and beneficent in the boasted “civilising mission” of Imperialism. The good can be retained, but the help which the League renders in this way will contain no threat to the independence and self-respect of a weak state.

(7) There is another advantage in the recognition of the international legal personality of concerns trading outside the home territory, which may become of increasing importance in the future. Where the state is itself a trader and engages in

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export or import, difficulties arise at present which have already led to diplomatic complications. The dispute between Great Britain and Russia is the most notorious of these cases, but there have been others. In one form or another, several of the British Dominions are engaging through official agencies in export trade. Everywhere the tendency is for agricultural producers to combine in coöperative associations for marketing abroad. These may not be state ventures, but morally they are national concerns, and in dealing with them the courts of the country with which they trade, would incur the risk of offending national sentiment in the producing country. The British Labour Party is committed to the proposal that the state should create disinterested national importing agencies for the purchase of wheat and meat from overseas. The objection has been made that this plan (which seeks to revive institutions which worked throughout the war in Great Britain, and for many years after the war in Switzerland and Norway) would complicate our diplomatic relations with the selling countries, and might lead to dangerous resentments and disputes. It is easy to exaggerate these risks, but in so far as they exist, the obvious way to insure against them is to set up this international legal machinery to deal with all disputes between states and interna-

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tional traders. A state trading concern would pass through these courts as a litigant, on the same footing as a big trust or a wholesale coöperative society. Diplomacy need never intervene, and there would be no irresistible temptation, when an ordinary trading dispute occurred, to appeal to the follies of national passion. To avoid misunderstanding, it may be well to explain that this proposal should not, normally or usually, interfere with the jurisdiction of national tribunals as courts of first instance in such disputes. It is rather a plan to provide a convenient court of appeal. There might, however, be occasions on which the League would start proceedings against an international trader in its own courts.¹

(8) Finally (to recur to the specific problem of protecting the material interests of advanced states on the territory of backward states) the reader may object that while these proposals may promise justice, they make no provision for police. My own strong conviction is that in arranging to deal justly with each other, men of different races have gone far to abolish the need for any special measures of police. Peoples whom we call backward and immature, are not in fact less law-abid-

¹ May I say frankly that I have had no legal training, and must apologise to expert readers for leaving the details of this suggestion deliberately vague.

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ing or more turbulent than races which stand on a high plane of civilisation. Indeed, they usually observe their own code of custom and their own unwritten laws with a fidelity which puts civilised men to shame. The risk of turbulence arises when white men either ignorantly violate native custom, or deliberately offend native morals and self-respect by their arrogance or greed. We shall fail hopelessly in our arrangements to ensure order, unless we realise that the problem is as often to protect "natives" against white insolence, as it is to defend white residents against native violence. Let us suppose, then, that the League has at the disposal of such a state as China or Persia a department of justice which would be willing, without risk to this state's independence, to lend it disinterested officials who would reorganise its courts and its police. Let us suppose, further, that international courts are open to deal with appeals from its decisions on major disputes where foreign interests are involved. "What, then, will you do," the reader may ask, "if such a state is too proud to use the League's assistance, if foreign traders are systematically ill used, and if, finally, anti-foreign riots break out, which may be due to mere 'fanaticism' and not to the fault of the foreigners? Will you then forbid a European

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state to exercise its traditional right to send ships or troops to protect the lives of its subjects?"

One must admit that such cases may occur, and that civilisation must have its expedient for dealing with them. Save as a protest against exaggeration and insincerity, the old-fashioned Liberal answer—that if traders choose to go to states which are known to be turbulent and ill governed, they must go at their own risk—is not entirely satisfying. For there may be cases in which the continuance of the trade they carry on is essential, or at least desirable, in the general interest of the world. But if that be the contention, we must follow it out honestly. Not even against a semi-civilised or barbarous state ought civilisation to tolerate recourse to lynch law. The use of "the big stick" against a Central American state by the United States, or against an Eastern state by the British Empire, is a procedure as lawless as the original violence. It can only perpetuate the rule of force in the world. By arousing nationalist passions and hatreds, it delays the reaction of "native" reason against "native" barbarism. But above all, such interventions are almost invariably a pretext for much more than the repression or punishment of turbulence. They are used to impose the yoke of the intervening Power on the "native" state, and to further private capitalist

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interests at the expense both of "native" interests and of world interests. When, as in the case of the Shanghai expedition, both the intervening Power and its victim are members of the League of Nations, we have a scandal which would destroy the League, if there were much left of it to destroy. For one Power to take military action on the territory of another, is an act of war and an offence against the League's peace.

There is only one possible rule to follow in such cases. If the provocation is grave enough and the danger sufficiently widespread to justify armed intervention, it is the League which ought to act. It should resent action by any single Power, as hotly as a well-organised state resents armed self-help by its own citizens, even when they profess to act in the interests of order. It might, indeed, authorise a single Power to act for it, but even then it would retain the direction of the expedition and of the subsequent negotiations in its own hands. But save in an emergency which admitted of no delay, it would prefer to arrange that the expedition should be international. To the objection that international action is usually slow and difficult to organise, I would reply that this is a safeguard against a too frequent resort to force. These emergencies recur with distressing frequency precisely because foreigners in such a

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country as China know how easy it is to invoke the aid of warships stationed on its coasts. To make the recourse to force difficult and infrequent is not to encourage turbulence. It is more likely to stimulate all concerned to exhaust every resource of persuasion and mutual comprehension. Men who have always a "big stick" in their hands are apt to dispense with courtesy, which in most relations of life is the surer protection.

Eventually the League may develop its own police force to cope with rare emergencies of this kind. But its wiser friends will, I think, deprecate much discussion of the means of coercion which it possesses or may come to possess. One does not recommend an institution to the loyalty and affection of mankind by staging it as the international policeman. Policemen are rarely loved. The way to increase the authority of the League is to enlarge the benefits which it confers. Every service which it renders to mankind must tend to make it indispensable. It is important, for this reason, that all the beneficent international activities which the world develops, should be centred in the League. They add to its prestige, or better still, to the gratitude which men feel toward it. Nothing will incline men to obey it, when the difficult testing time arrives, so surely as the realisation that they cannot live without it. The police-

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man might never require his baton, if he were the dispenser of our daily bread. The more intimately the League mingles, as the regulative authority, in our daily economic life, the less will it require armed force behind it. Conceive that it may come to stabilise our currencies and to regulate the world's volume of credit, make it ultimately responsible for the unhampered flow of the chief foodstuffs and raw materials in due measure according to each nation's needs, and it would be difficult for the most powerful industrial nation to dispense with it. The people of the British Isles know, at present, that they have, in the last resort, to thank the cruisers of the British navy for the arrival in their ports of their daily bread. Inevitably, starting from this basic fact of life, they must think as Imperialists. They will think as citizens of the Great Society, and give to the League the loyalty which alone can make the world secure, when they realise that the League ensures the peace of the waters which bear their cargoes, and rations to them the crops on which they depend for life. Only the Power which gives can withhold. The authority of the League must rest habitually on its right to withdraw its benefits from a disloyal member. The greater these benefits, the more irresistible will this penalty be. Unless the League can attach

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its members to itself by the boons which it confers, the probability is that its power to command them will crumble away, when the hour of crisis strikes. In the age of faith the Papacy ruled mankind by its ability to withhold the sacraments from princes and peoples. To that age they were the one thing necessary for this life and the next. The League must act on the same principle, and draw from economic science and the art of organisation the boons which to modern peoples will seem indispensable. With this foundation for loyalty, the League might in grave emergencies count on its members to respond if it ordered them to boycott or blockade a rebel or an aggressor, or even if it had to mobilise them for warlike operations. An international government which thinks first of all of scattering benefits, will seldom need to impose penalties.

CHAPTER TEN

The League as Trustee

THE reader who has followed the two previous Chapters with some measure of sympathy, will have grasped the tendency of the argument. The proposals which they outline, provide a substitute for whatever in Imperialism was inevitable or beneficial. These provisions for the international protection of exported capital, and for the rendering of administrative or financial aid to undeveloped States, would prevent the further expansion of Empires. But the immense problem remains of the unfree or half-free races and nationalities which are already incorporated in Empires, or move unwillingly within their orbits. Is there for these States and races any message of hope in the idea of the League?

The problem is far too various and complex for any single solution. The British Dominions, to begin with, scarcely constitute a problem at all. They are already equal members of the League. India, though at a distressingly slow pace, is on the road to the Dominion Status. Unless she reaches it within a very few years, she may be attracted by the magnetism of the Russo-Chinese

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mass of "oppressed peoples"; and one may perhaps say the same thing about French Indo-China, and less certainly of the Dutch Indies. The British Empire is too loosely knit to make a serious obstacle to the future influence of an ambitious League. It is not a fiscal unit, and the military alliance which is probably its fundamental basis, must yield to the superior obligations of the Covenant. If ever the League is strong enough to assume the guardianship of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian difficulty could be easily handled. The League would supply any legal or technical aid which Egypt may still require, and the right of appeal to the League's Courts would make it possible to dispense at last with the Capitulations. One supposes that within a few years Irak may be in a somewhat similar position. Leaning directly on the League, it might dispense with the peculiar form of tutelage which Great Britain exercises as its nominal "ally." The case of Syria is in some respects more difficult, for while the population is much more intelligent and better educated, it is not yet completely won for the idea of national unity, and must first overcome its savage traditional religious feuds. The French, one supposes, can hardly make their unpopular rule tolerable for much longer, unless they at last succeed in creating a federal national state, which can run itself

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with a minimum of foreign assistance. In that event, a stronger and more highly developed League might deal directly with Egypt and Irak. Palestine could not continue to be a "national home" for the Jews without a foreign garrison, and indeed one supposes that the British Empire was drawn to it, rather because it is an outpost for the defense of the Suez Canal, than from any disinterested chivalry toward the Jews. When the League can provide the necessary police force, it may be charged with this duty of reparation toward the race which Christendom has wronged so cruelly. Mixed though the motives may have been, which explain this positive contribution to the Jewish problem, there is a strong case for creating in the cradle of this race, a home for its national culture. One may very usefully recall the intention which the victors professed when they drew up the so-called "A" mandates for Syria, Irak and Palestine. Their view was, that though their populations were not yet able to stand alone, a period of guardianship would enable them eventually to do so. One endeavours to believe that their experience under their respective tutors has been educative. The fear of the aëroplane is the beginning of wisdom; that they may have acquired. One is not, then, misinterpreting these mandates, when one assumes that

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the disinterested mandatory Powers may one day be willing to admit that their wards have come of age.

There remains an Imperial problem, which if not permanent, will at all events outlast our generation and the next—the problem of Tropical Africa and the Pacific. One may exclude from the African Continent for the moment its northern and southern extremities. These have been, or are being colonised by white men. The Mediterranean colonies are governed as an integral part of France: the South African Union is a self-governing Dominion. Both give rise to grave racial problems, but history has made them the concern and responsibility primarily of peoples which have fixed their permanent home in these regions. Save possibly in Morocco, and certainly in the Riff, it would be difficult to undo what history has done. Abyssinia has so far retained her independence, and has survived the recent threat of partition into exclusive economic spheres of interest by Rome acting in collusion with London. Abyssinia might become a field for the direct civilising aid of the League. The readiness of the Mandatory Powers to relinquish their honourable positions as disinterested guardians, might be somewhat hastened by a strict interpretation of their mandates. The discharge of their duty is

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usually a costly obligation, more especially when the immaturity of the ward compels the guardian to persuade him, by military measures, that he does in fact feel what the Covenant calls a "preference" for the services of this particular tutor. The subjugation of Irak laid a heavy financial burden on the British Empire, and the prolonged rebellion of Syria has been a heavy charge upon France. There is no prospect that these costs will ever be recovered directly by the Exchequer of the Imperial Power.

What then, apart from the love which the Empire feels for its ward, is the motive for its discharge of these heavy obligations? Its material reward is reaped indirectly, and falls, rarely to the State Exchequer, often to the private interests which take their share in developing the immature territory. The colonies, though not the mandates of France, are conducted avowedly on a system of protected and preferential trade. They come within the French tariff fence, while all public works, including railway construction, are opportunities reserved for French capital. The protection of tariffs is forbidden in mandated territories, nor is it usual in the non-self-governing colonies of the British Empire. But in these latter, concessions of all kinds, mining operations, railway building and even, as a rule, the development of

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plantations on a large scale, are in fact reserved, by custom, though not by rule, for British companies. Though "the open door" is prescribed for all mandated territories, it is found in practice that subjects of the mandatory Power are more ready to take advantage of its wide invitation than foreigners. Whether this coyness is usually a disappointment to that Power, may perhaps be doubted. When, for example, the French entrusted a French institution with the official banking of Syria, and took the sinking French franc as the basis of its currency, they were manifestly making it easier for French firms than for foreign firms to trade with their wards. Whatever the explanation may be, it happens that French firms in French mandated areas, and British firms in British mandated areas, are found to be the best for the building of railways and even for the exploitation of oil wells. If it should ever be possible for the League, by more stringent supervision, to ensure that capital from less imperial sources should in fact establish itself more frequently within mandated areas, it is probable that the guardians might come to take a more flattering view of the maturity of their wards, and of their capacity for self-government.

We shall not advance rapidly toward this stage, unless the powers of the Mandates Commission

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are considerably strengthened. Sitting in Europe, it has no direct means of informing itself regarding the daily working of the administrations which it is expected to supervise. It may indeed receive petitions from the inhabitants of a mandated area. But a subject people will seldom dare to organise a petition against its rulers, until it is ripe for open revolt. It is significant that no petitions or complaints about French administration in Syria reached the League's Commission from Syria itself. But they rained upon it from Syrian organisations which have their base in Egypt or elsewhere beyond the reach of the French Government's police. One might propose, then, that the Mandates Commission should be empowered to employ inspectors, who should travel from one Mandated area to another. They would become aware of abuses before misgovernment had actually driven the people to rebellion. They would be in a position to make comparative reports on the results attending the various policies and methods of the Mandating Powers. The Commission might, indeed, follow up these reports by a continuous comparative study of the technique of colonial administration. And again, it might foster the interchange of colonial officials as the League's Health Organisation has done, so that they might familiarise themselves with the best

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methods of other Powers. But it may seem futile to speak of such ambitious plans, while the Council of the League, dominated by the Great Powers, openly displays its jealousy of the Mandates Commission. A further development of its work and authority can come only if it should receive the firm support and encouragement of the Assembly, and that again presupposes the growth of an independent temper in a body which meets too seldom to acquire the self-confidence of a sovereign Parliament.

The typical Imperial problem is that of negro Africa. One cannot imagine its peoples standing alone in the modern world within any period which concerns us. But can we rest contented with the present position? The quality of the white administrations varies widely, from the model British Colonies of the West Coast, to the scandalously mismanaged Portuguese territory of Angola, in which the slave trade, for the benefit of the cocoa islands of San Thomé and Principé, survives under the thinnest disguise. If one can defend the record of the older British possessions of the West, one cannot be content with British performance on the East Coast (notably in Kenya), and still less with Portuguese achievements. Most of these Colonies, again, are the sources of valuable raw materials, which are of importance to the indus-

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tries of the whole world. Can one assume that the whole world will always acquiesce in the control of these raw materials by the British Empire and France, with Belgium and Portugal in the second rank? Even if there were no actual return to the policy of differentiation which the British Empire adopted towards the close of war, that uncomfortable possibility remains. By a heavy export tax on vegetable oils destined for ports outside Great Britain, the British Empire sought to monopolise these oils for its own industries. The object of this reversion to the Colonial policy of the eighteenth century (when the American Colonies were obliged to sell their produce through British ports and dealers) was to destroy the German trade in margarine and cattle-cake, but the injury fell also on the Dutch manufacturers. This was an extreme and unusual instance of the evil which may result for the rest of the world, if the few Colonial Powers should follow an exclusive policy, but there are subtler and less offensive ways of attaining the same end. In so far as the Colonial Power obtains an advantage for its own subjects, whether by protected markets or by the monopoly of the produce of its possessions, or by reserving to its own contractors and financiers opportunities for capital investment, it restricts the enterprise of its competitors, and in-

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flicts a disability on their trade. The further we advance toward an international morality, the harder will it be to justify this system of privilege. If we aim at contentment and good fellowship in the world, it will be increasingly difficult to ignore the complaints of powers like Germany and Italy, which see themselves at a disadvantage in this respect. There is no answer to their complaints save that our earlier organisation of Sea Power enabled us to win this fortunate position for ourselves, and this answer is, in effect, an invitation to others to follow our example, and seize "a place in the sun" by force. What Germany aspired to do in the generation before the war, Italy is openly attempting in the generation which follows it. In plain words, so long as Imperialism endures, so long will the world's structure rest on force.

If, then, we are able to pay the masters of the world's Navies the unusual compliment of supposing that they were sincere in their aspirations for a world based upon justice, we must take another headlong stride toward Utopia. If the Mandate system be, in certain parts of the world, the guarantee alike of honourable conduct toward the natives and of fair dealings toward other white peoples, ought it not to be generalised? Why should we shrink from giving to the world, about the spirit of our administration in British East

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Africa, the same undertakings that we have given about the territory that was formerly German East Africa? And why, to put an even more pressing question, should the Portuguese colonies, in which the Slave-trade notoriously flourishes, escape the supervision to which the cleaner administrations of the British and French mandated areas must submit? The basic idea of these mandates—that they constitute a “trust” which the Imperial Power has undertaken, on behalf of the whole civilised world, in the interests of the natives—is the only ground on which any idealistic defence can be made for any form of white rule in the Tropics. When to this argument one adds the consideration that peace cannot be reconciled with the ownership of alien territory for purposes of exploitation, one is led irresistibly to the conclusion that the mandate system into which the Allies stumbled, because they were afraid to face public opinion with a naked claim to annex the German Colonies, ought to be extended to all their non-self-governing possessions. In this way, the Great Society, which is all humanity, incarnated in the League, would bear the ultimate responsibility for the destinies of all immature peoples subject to alien rule. This argument requires, that in these older colonies the charter of native rights, the rule of the open door, the prohibition of

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preferential tariffs, and the system of supervision and (one would wish to add) inspection, should prevail, as they prevail in the mandated areas.

A surrender so considerable as this by the great Empires of their proud claim to do what they will with their own, might well content us for a generation to come, but in these chapters which seek to develop the theoretic implications of the idea of the Great Society, so much has already been proposed which seems Utopian, that one need not shrink from a further application of the same difficult logic. If we were to generalise the idea of the Mandates in this way, we should still have left one objection to Imperialism standing. Having gone so far, could we be content with the haphazard work of history, which has assigned this work of colonisation to certain peoples, some, like the British, the French and the Dutch, in the van of civilisation, and others like the Portuguese, in the rear, while other advanced peoples, notably the Germans and the Scandinavians, have no share in it? Even if we could, by enforcing the rule of the "Open Door" all round, remove the economic grounds for the discontent of these latter peoples, is it defensible that their capacities should be excluded from this sphere of work? Logically, if we may give rein to theory, the only satisfactory solution would be the creation by the League of

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an international civil service, which should administer all these non-self-governing areas, under its direct control.

The objections to such a solution seem at first sight overwhelming. Each of the Colonising Powers has a tradition of its own, a technique for dealing with natives which suits the national temperament of its people, a conception of morality, and certain notions of law peculiar to itself. Colonial methods are a slow growth of history and experience. One could not choose at random Englishmen and Frenchmen reared in these distinct traditions, and expect them to coöperate harmoniously in the work of administration. There would be continual friction between them; the natives would be bewildered, and no standard would exist to which an appeal might be made. The case would be still more hopeless, if English or French juniors were ever to find themselves under a Portuguese senior. Must one acquiesce, then, in this diversity of method, and abandon the idea of international collaboration? That seems a despairing conclusion, for, after all, among these varying methods and traditions, some must be better adapted than others to the end of developing the native peoples. Here the British might with advantage borrow something from the French, and vice versa, and to both, it may be, German

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system and science may have something to teach. Moreover the objection that diverse temperaments and traditions make collaboration difficult, applies in one degree or another to every form of international coöperation. We cannot accept defeat on the threshold.

The key to this difficulty may be education in common. Once before in the world's history men faced this problem and solved it. History has two stories to tell about the administration of Paraguay by the Jesuits in the seventeenth century. Who, even today, can be impartial about Jesuits? Was there some truth in Voltaire's furious satire? Or did the Fathers build up, as their own chronicles record, a happy, idyllic society, a Christian Communist State, in which white men, ruling by virtue of their superior knowledge and ability, organised for the native tribes which trusted and idolised them, a life of peace, innocence, and plenty? Was their state destroyed in the end, not by its own faults, but by the predatory jealousy of their Spanish neighbours, who coveted their Indian protégés as slaves? One need not, for the purposes of this illustration, answer these questions. What is certain is, that the Jesuits did contrive, for a century and a half, to govern a state which at all events enjoyed internal peace and material prosperity. Their administrators and their officers (for the

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holy fathers commanded their own militia) were drawn from every Catholic nation of Europe, and throughout this considerable period of time, Germans, Frenchmen, Tchechs, Poles and Irishmen continued to work together with Italians and Spaniards. How was the miracle achieved? They obeyed a common discipline. They had one rule of faith. They had all been trained together in schools and colleges, which knew no distinction of race or nationality. Is it hasty to draw the conclusion that when men have been educated together, they can work together? If they can accept a common view of their purpose in work, they will find no insuperable difficulty in collaboration.

The vision which I sometimes indulge, is that the Mandates Commission of the League may one day found its own College, in which civil servants will be trained for the administration of the territories for which it will be responsible in Africa and the Pacific Islands. It will draw its students impartially from every civilised nation. The staff will be no less international. It should include men who can speak from ripe experience of the actual work of government in British and French possessions. To these would be added scholars and thinkers, who would give instruction in the languages of Africa, in economics, in the agriculture and hygiene of the tropics, and above all in

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anthropology. At the head of the college there would be some personality big enough to believe in the disinterested educational work which the civilised peoples have to perform in the tropics, and magnetic enough to inspire his students with his own faith. Our century has to make a testing experiment. Will modern men and women do in Africa for the love of humanity, what the Jesuits did in Paraguay for the love of God? For the League will do its work of civilisation indifferently, unless it can arouse in those who serve it, the spirit of love and devotion which inspires a religious Order. Can love for these backward, yet likeable races, inspire men to the self-sacrifice which patriotism can suggest, and the Great Society command the service which the national state never lacks? Will men, who must not be fanatics, suppress themselves and overcome their love of ease, as only the devotees of Communism seem to do in our modern world? I have seen enough of the spirit of the Secretariat at Geneva to believe that the international idea can awaken this ardour in service. I see the college (when I let fancy play with this idea) somewhere on the borders between Africa and civilisation, perhaps in Cairo, close to the ancient Mohammedan University of El Azhar, to which men gather from every tribe and race of Africa, there to learn, with

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prayer and humility, the message of Islam. In that atmosphere, these European students would learn to know the men whom they will have to govern.

This further plan suggests itself: the various colonies of Africa would remain, through the period of transition, under British, French, Belgian and Portuguese rule, subject only to the general supervision of the League. But, year by year, as the students, drawn from the whole civilised world, graduated at the administrative College, they would be nominated to every vacancy that occurred, without regard to nationality. An Englishman or an American might find himself appointed to a junior position in a French Colony, a Frenchman or a German to a place under a British Administration. At the end of a generation, the whole civil service of Africa would be international, and I suppose that men trained together in the League's College, in the same methods and the same spirit of service, would find no difficulty in working together. The Colonies might then be transferred without any break in continuity to the direct control of the League. The College, one may add, would be equally useful for training men who would act as experts and advisers, on the nomination of the League, when-

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ever backward yet sovereign States appealed to it for aid.

So, it seems to me, a world which sincerely meant to substitute internationalism for imperialism, might overcome the psychological difficulty of the transition.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

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LIFE is making good to the League of Nations what theory failed to provide. The gaps in its structure yawn no longer. If the statesmen who were its architects seemed to ignore economics, experience is driving the nations which compose it to realise its immense possibilities in this field. One can hardly say that it has even begun to think of itself as an authority which will one day make law for the world in its economic dealings, but it has taken the first steps which may lead it in this direction. It had from the first, as an autonomous part of its organisation, its International Labour Office, which aims at protecting labour the world over, and lays down general standards which its Member States should observe. It defined at the Brussels Conference, during the worst period of monetary instability in Europe, the principles which should guide banking in the effort to reach stability. The Barcelona Conference arrived at conclusions of the first importance for the regulation of international transport. There have been conferences which dealt with minor problems, like the nuisance of passports. In

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May of this year (1927) the League carried through with marked success a still more ambitious undertaking, when it held its World Economic Conference in Geneva. The delegates were the representatives of governments, though no government need be bound by their votes, and among them were not only the nominees of the League States, but also those of States which remain outside it, notably Russia. There were some serious omissions from its agenda. Finance, which had been dealt with at Brussels, was excluded, and so were the problems of raw materials, reparations and inter-allied debts. A vast field remained, however, which included tariffs, modern methods of "rationalisation" in trade, and the whole subject of cartels and combines. The resolutions were carried unanimously, but in spite of this, they were often definite and plain-spoken.

One may take the conclusions of such a Conference as an authoritative expression of instructed opinion throughout the civilised world, though it would be simple to suppose that opinions to which men assent, when they are under the eyes of their fellows from every nation, will necessarily guide them when they return to the familiar atmosphere of patriotism and limited interests. The Conference had a marked and consistent tendency. It had before it the admirable reports of the Secre-

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tariat, which drew, from a comprehensive survey of statistics, the conclusion that the relative poverty of the post-war world is due not to any decline in the production of foodstuffs and raw materials, nor to any inadequacy in man's power to exploit them, but to one form or another of maladjustment. "The main obstacles to economic revival have been the hindrances opposed to the free flow of labour, capital and goods." In fact, while the world's population was about 5 per cent greater in 1925 than in 1913, the production of foodstuffs and raw materials was from 16 to 18 per cent greater. But there has been no comparable increase in international trade: its volume rose in the same period by only 5 per cent. Throughout its session the Conference seemed to be applying the moral of these figures. It condemned every form of economic nationalism. It argued in favour of the highest development of the division of labour throughout the world. It was favourable to "rationalisation" and combination. It spent much of its time in sapping the barriers to trade, erected by the mania for self-sufficiency which afflicted Europe during and after the war. It stressed the "interdependence of nations," and sought to secure it by greater "liberty of trading." The President in summing up its resolutions declared that "international exchange

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of products best and most economically produced in different countries should be regarded as the normal rule."

One may test this tendency by the resolutions which deal with tariffs and kindred topics. The Conference declared that "the time has come to put an end to the increase in tariffs and to move in the opposite direction." It asked for a return to the system of long-term commercial treaties, which must be based on "the mutual grant of unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment." It called for the stabilisation and simplification of tariffs, and with some reservations condemned export taxes, especially when they involve discrimination. Finally it threw overboard the doctrine that tariffs can be regarded as falling "exclusively within the domain of national sovereignty," and urged that "concerted action among different nations is possible and desirable." It looked to the League, in this and every other field, as the natural centre from which "concerted action" should originate, though when it came to details, it rarely asked for more than enquiry and the collection of statistics. Its final resolution was timidly vague, but it seems to hint that the preparatory committee which organised the Geneva Conference would be a suitable model for the permanent economic or-

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ganisation with which the League should be endowed.

Conferences register conclusions: they rarely analyse the mental processes by which they were reached. Why, and in what measure, has it become essential that the world should take "concerted action" in the economic field? Perhaps the simplest and most comprehensive answer is, that in this field we first attain a positive and constructive conception of the meaning of peace. Peace will never arouse the enthusiasm of active and ambitious minds, while it remains a negative idea. When we think of it as the absence of war, we have not yet begun to understand it. The "mutual exchange of goods and services" is a dry formula drawn from the dialect of economists, but under it there lies an ethical principle. By the organisation of the world's work on the basis of the utmost division of labour, we are making of all humanity a coöperative society, which confesses that the good of its parts can be realised only through the good of the whole. Whenever the national State attempts, by tariffs or other arbitrary devices, to foster the production of goods which other peoples, by reason of advantages in climate, situation, native aptitude or the abundance and proximity of the raw material are better fitted to produce, this State is causing a maladjustment in the

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organisation of the world's work. It is adding, moreover, to the sum of the world's unnecessary toil. These are the grounds which stamp economic nationalism as an offence against peace; for peace must mean the highest development of the social ideal.

One conceives the future work and influence of the League in the economic field as a continuous attempt to give content and meaning to this positive ideal of peace. It would be an arrogance to suppose that one could define in advance the principles which it may draw from experience, but there are some guesses which one may risk. (1) It is obvious, to begin with, that every form of discrimination in the treatment which each State accords to the trade of other States, is an offence against the social ideal. By giving less favoured treatment to any State, one denies in some degree its full membership of the international society. One might, indeed, contend that membership of the League ought to carry with it the right to full equality of treatment, whether in tariffs or in commercial legislation. (2) It is worth while to correct the conception from which the League started—that its function is to deal with disputes—by noting that it serves peace no less directly whenever it enlarges the interests which nations have in common. The more it mobilises them for con-

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certed action, the more surely will they realise themselves as a society, and this society will penetrate their daily lives the more completely, with every addition to the list of matters which we admit to international discussion and regulation. The Conference of Geneva, for example, made a notable advance when it recognised tariffs as a matter suited for "concerted action." This guiding idea is the obverse of another which has engaged our attention throughout this book. To add any matter to the common concerns of civilisation is to withdraw it from the exclusive sphere of the national State, and so to diminish the range of the State's absolute sovereignty. (3) Though one may hesitate how to state the idea with precision, it seems to me that the League, in working out the international plan, must welcome everything which lessens the importance of territorial ownership. If a nation believes, for example, that its flag must wave over its markets, and over its sources of raw material, it has an imperious motive for conquest, and the crudest forms of imperialism. Whatever lessens the importance of ownership must also diminish the part which force plays in the world. "The open door" is a principle dictated by economic wisdom, but it is also a presupposition of peace. It is equally clear that peace demands conditions, whether based on usage or on

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legislation, which will assure to every industrial people access, in adequate measure and at world prices, to the raw materials which it needs, and this with such security, that territorial ownership will confer no advantage. (4) Lastly, in so far as the Great Society of mankind succeeds in becoming a conscious organism, it must value, above all else, the rights and the powers which endow it with the means of controlling and directing its own life and growth. There are certain enterprises, of which banking in all its forms is perhaps the chief, which seem to be for society what the glands which regulate growth are for the body. To regulate the flow of credit is also to control the pace and direction of industrial development. No people is self-governing which omits to acquire this sovereign regulative power. One may say that in a less degree the control of raw materials and the chief foodstuffs confers mastery over the life of a people. On their abundance and cheapness, and even more perhaps on the regularity of the supply and the stability of the price, the prosperity and development of a nation's industries will in great measure depend. The arguments which make it vital that a national government should, in the last resort, control these key services, apply also to the International Society. As we have seen, there are reasons which make it unde-

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sirable that the national state should exercise, by reason of its ownership of territory, any absolute control over the raw materials which it exports. We must choose then, between *laissez-faire* and international control. But, indeed, control at the source is not possible for the national state, unless it has in its own territory a completely sufficient supply of all the raw materials and foodstuffs which it requires. It is manifest that any control at the sources which can bring about stability in the world-prices of raw materials, must be international. If theory suggests, and experience confirms the possibility of control exercised for this end, we are renouncing an opportunity of moulding our own environment, if we neglect to endow the international society with this power. Our final ambition, then, must be to entrust the League with a regulative control over the general conditions which make the common environment of all our economic activities.

The Conference of Geneva hinted at some permanent economic authority within the structures of the League. Whatever form it may assume, its active brain will always be the Secretariat. The more its initiative and prestige are fostered, the more likely will it be to attract the ablest experts of all nations. There may be more diversity of opinion, about the composition of the Economic

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Council to which this branch of the Secretariat should be responsible. It seems proper that it should be based on the representation both of consumers and producers, and that among the latter workers should be represented as fully as employers. Whether States, as such, should also be represented may be a matter for discussion. It is obviously convenient to treat finance as a department distinct from the general economic organisation, while the Labour Office will naturally remain autonomous.

One may distinguish several kinds of activity among the functions of this Economic Organisation, and these it will probably develop in succession, as it evolves. In the first stage it may not be much more than an expert bureau for the collection and study of statistics and other information. But even in this stage it has the right to treat its material critically, and to draw attention to tendencies and abuses which call for action. From this it would pass easily to the investigation of grievances, and it should have the right to address remonstrances or suggestions to governments, for the remedy of what is defective or amiss. From this it might go on to arrange, where its representations proved insufficient, for the submission of the case to arbitration. In these phases of its development it is an active, initiating

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body, but it can work only by suggestion and negotiation, to set governments in motion. Before it can be armed with powers which it may exercise in its own right, it must procure legislation. This it can get at present only by the cumbersome process of bringing governments together to agree upon a Convention which imposes obligations upon them; but as the history of the Washington Labour Convention has shown, even this difficult achievement may be valueless, if one of the Great Powers, by refusing to ratify, gives to the others an excuse for delay. To remedy this distressing impotence of the League, one must look forward to an eventual strengthening of its Constitution, which will give the Assembly, with whatever safeguards, the right to pass, by a majority, legislation binding upon every Member of the League. Behind this legislation is it necessary that there should be "sanctions" and penalties? That would be a repugnant and difficult extension of the League's rights, save when a refusal to obey its legislation involved grave injury to its loyal members. In such cases a partial, or even a complete boycott of the trade of the defaulting member would be theoretically justifiable, though it would always be a risky measure to apply, unless flagrant aggression had roused the law-abiding members to anger. To my thinking, the power of the League to

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secure obedience, especially in the economic field, must rest upon the scope and value of the positive benefits which it confers. A State, when it is hesitating whether it shall adopt legislation, will have to weigh, against the inconveniences of loyalty, the losses which it would incur through secession or expulsion.

To test the value of these rough and tentative guesses at the principles and methods of the League's economic work, let us go on to consider how it might apply them to some of the more important matters which may ultimately fall within its scope—tariffs, trusts, banking, and raw materials.

The first stage of the League's work in dealing with tariffs and other artificial barriers which obstruct trade, is already defined by the results of the Geneva Conference. If the Great Powers permit the permanent economic organisation to come into being, it has a mandate to work in the spirit of these resolutions, by using all the resources of publicity, and by drawing the attention of governments to them. Some progress might be achieved in this way towards the lowering of duties, the stabilisation of tariffs over longer terms, their simplification, the extension of the free list, especially in the case of raw materials, foodstuffs and half-manufactured articles, and the adoption

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of a most-favoured-nation clause as a normal feature of every commercial treaty. One asks, since the Conference has declared that tariffs are a matter for "concerted action," whether representatives of the League might (as consultants) in future attend conferences at which commercial treaties are under discussion, or give evidence before Parliamentary committees which are considering tariffs.

Again, might the League's influence play a part in preparing the way for the constitution of Customs' Unions? The opinion is growing, albeit slowly, in Europe, that the poverty of our Continent, when one compares it with the United States, is due in great measure to the folly of our own fiscal arrangements. We deliberately limit our markets by our protected frontiers, and prevent the more efficient industries from reaching a *clientèle* large enough to develop to the full all the advantages of mass production, and "rationalised" trading. The able delegation from the German Trade Unions, which lately visited the United States, argued that the advantage which North America enjoys in its richer natural resources is balanced by the relative sparseness of the population, and the costly burden of supplying it with communications. It concluded a remarkable report with a plea for the adoption of the Ameri-

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can policy of high wages, and the creation of a European Customs' Union. Such a development may seem remote, but at the psychological moment the League might do much to promote it. But, at a much earlier stage, it might be possible for the League to foster a Danubian or a Balkan Customs' Union. Might it, by using its ability to raise loans for the benefit of a small State, or its influence to secure an alleviation of reparation charges, overcome the reluctance of some of these States to enter a Union?

A further step would be gained, if it could be established that membership of the League confers certain advantages in the matter of tariffs. It ought, at least, to be understood, and plainly laid down, that every Member has the right to most-favoured-nation treatment at the hands of every other Member. Might the League eventually go further, and bring it about, at first by recommendation and later by enactment, that members of the League should enjoy a preference of (say) 5 per cent, or even more, in the tariffs of all members, or that certain classes of their products should be placed on the free list? Privileges of this kind would add to the real value of membership, and strengthen the League's authority. I will not repeat here the arguments of previous chapters, that all non-self-governing colonies

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(whether mandated or not) should observe the "open door," and refrain from any discriminatory duties. This rule might possibly be so drafted as to apply only to Members of the League. Again, it is worth considering, whether in these colonies specific measures should be taken to internationalize the import of capital. Until this is done, the Imperial Power will continue to enjoy an undue advantage. At one stage of the long Moroccan dispute, France and Germany agreed that concessions for ports, mines and similar undertakings, should be confined to mixed companies, in which the nationals of both States should share in a certain proportion. The same principle has been applied to the oil-field of Mosul, for the benefit of British, French, American and Dutch investors. Might a general rule be worked out, which would require that no company holding a concession in such a colony, above a certain value, should apportion more than (say) 45 per cent of its shares to the nationals of the mandatory or Imperial Power? If banks, in particular, were constituted on this international model, there would be less reason to fear covert discrimination against the traders of other States.

In dealing with international cartels and combines, the chief weapon of the League will be, for a long time to come, publicity. It is essential

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that it should have the right to require the production of books, and to take evidence on oath. Here the fiction of an international legal personality for all international trading concerns would be indispensable. Logically one must go on to demand a right for the international authority to regulate international combinations by legislation, and even, if the necessity should arise, to control their prices and to tax their surpluses. But such developments lie far ahead: much can be won in the meantime by enquiry.

That the League must concern itself with problems of currency and credit was recognised when the Brussels Conference met. The doctrine which it laid down for stabilisation on sound lines has become classical. It is obvious, moreover (as the Conference saw), that the volume of credit cannot be adjusted to the volume of production by national regulation alone. A change in the American Bank rate has its instant reactions in Europe. It is clear that the common welfare can be secured only by the pursuit of a common policy by all the leading national Banks of Issue, and this presupposes continuous consultation among their heads. No formal arrangements have yet been made to give effect to the Brussels resolutions. But from time to time one reads that the chiefs of the national banks of England, France and Germany

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have met the heads of the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. The world looks on in silent awe. It can only guess at the subject of their conversations, and the result of their debates. But it recalls a similar meeting seven years ago, at which the decision was taken to plunge the world into all the horrors of deflation. Rarely do statesmen meet with power so absolute in their hands. Even when they meet to plan their wars, do they often hold in their grasp the lives of so many men? The casualties from that earlier meeting in New York must have run far above ten million unemployed in Europe alone, and behind each million there stood two or three millions of women and children. A simple rise in the New York bank-rate, if it be sudden and steep, may threaten disaster to every struggling industry the world over, bring privation to millions of workers' homes, and change the pulse of life itself. The imagination fails to grasp the gigantic changes in the distribution of wealth which may follow from such decisions. The process of deflation must have added nearly 2,000 million pounds of new and unearned wealth to the possessions of the *rentier* class in England, merely by raising the value of the War Debt—and other securities of recent origin must have expanded their value in the same degree. Yet the world permits such decisions to depend

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on the calculations of half-a-dozen men. America has wisely created a more or less representative board to bear the responsibility. But the effects are world-wide, and the world has no representative board. The League can certainly do something by study and enquiry to enlighten public opinion on this subject. It seems desirable that it should eventually be the body which organises these consultations between banks. If it can extend its influence in this field, one would hope that the control of the world's monetary policy may fall to a council which, with the highest technical qualifications, will combine some representative element, so that experts briefed by industry, agriculture and labour may modify the standpoint of the banker, who is apt to consider, above all else, the interests of the passive owners of wealth. Such a Council might one day have to assume control of the world's supplies of gold—if gold continues to hold its place; or it might, by its statistical work, at last make it possible to adopt a commodity index as the measure of value.

When one considers the possible functions of the League in dealing with raw materials, one opens up a stimulating and adventurous chapter. One would urge the creation of a world-wide authority in this field, on several grounds. (1) Stabilisation of the prices of wheat, cotton, wool

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and other basic materials would be of enormous advantage alike to the farmer, the manufacturer and the consumer. It would eliminate a great part of the gambling risk from the farmer's occupation, and enable him to concentrate on his technical tasks as a producer. It would make it incomparably easier for the manufacturer, reckoning on a steady supply, at an even price, to "rationalise" his own business. It would make it easier for farmers to build strong coöperative organisations, which would render the middleman superfluous, and rid the market of the speculative dealer.

(2) In the second place, it is manifestly the League's duty to ensure, to every industrial State, access on equal terms to the world's raw materials. By so doing, as we have seen, it would diminish the temptation to Imperialism. There is here a peace problem as well as a war problem. Manifestly the League ought to make it impossible for any Empire to do what Great Britain did in West Africa, and the United States in the Philippines, when they put a differential export tax on vegetable oils and manila hemp. Mr. Hoover has argued with much vigour against any form of State intervention, designed to regulate the price, or influence the output and distribution of raw materials. The list of materials which

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are in this case is not yet a long one, but it includes such important things as rubber, coffee and potash. It is not altogether easy to grasp Mr. Hoover's case. Would he feel the same intense indignation, if a combination of private producers should secure a monopoly without state aid? Or is he the unbending advocate of *laissez-faire*, who prefers anarchy, the waste of disorderly supply, and a ballet of fluctuating prices, to any attempt at regulation? One would sympathise more readily with his position, if from the premise that orderly marketing is desirable he went on to advocate control for the common good, not by a single national government, but by an international authority.

For the war problem, as it affects raw materials, there is no solution, save to abolish war. The answer, in an orderly world, to any Empire which declared that it must acquire this island in the Pacific, or that stretch of territory in Africa, in order that it may have sources of rubber or copper under its own military control in time of war, is that even in that unhappy event it can experience no shortage of these things, provided only that it is loyal to the League. The advantage which comes from owning the source of the raw material will be felt only by a Power engaged in aggres-

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sion. Few States would care to press a claim to ownership on that ground.

The records of the Great War contain a model which the world might follow (and improve), if it should again feel the need for a drastic control of raw materials by an international authority. The buying up of the whole exportable surplus of the world's wool clip, and the rationing of the wool to the industries which required it, was a gigantic feat of organisation. Save in the event of war, it is unlikely that control will come about in this way. The case for purchase by a single agency and for rationing is overwhelming, when there is an acute shortage of a material, but in normal conditions it may not be strong enough to overcome the objections of conservative opinion. What is happening to-day throughout the world is rather that the producers of certain raw materials are beginning to acquire control by forming coöperative "pools." The consumers organise much less completely in distributing coöperative societies. It is possible that the national State may one day enter the market as a purchaser on behalf of the community—as the British Labour Party proposes for imported wheat and meat. The State, if it were to embark on this policy would doubtless aim not merely at eliminating the gambler and the middleman, but also at stabilising

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prices. Its method would presumably be to cover its needs, as broadly as possible, through long-term contracts with organisations of producers, and to build up in abundant years a reserve on which it would draw in seasons of scarcity. The function of the League might be, firstly to study supplies and markets and to broadcast its information—a task which the agricultural institution in Rome already fulfils—and thereafter to act as arbitrator in determining prices, and as a court of appeal, if any country complained that it had difficulty in obtaining raw materials. Faced with such a grievance as Mr. Hoover's, it might eventually be able to mobilise a sufficient volume of public opinion throughout the world, to induce the British Empire (in the case of rubber) or Brazil (in the case of coffee), or France and Germany (in the case of potash), to accept nominees of the League, representative of the world's consumers, on the boards which manage these quasi-monopolies. A State which refused such a request from the League would put itself heavily in the wrong with public opinion. By such methods, which would safeguard the interests of consumers as well as producers, it might be possible to make these stabilisation schemes more scientific and effective than they are at present, by extending them on the same terms to producers outside the present

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area of control. If ever the League legislates for the control of international Trusts, it might secure the representation of the world's consumers in the same way on their boards.

This chapter must close with an apology to the reader. The field is too vast for this brief excursion, and it calls for a more expert guide. My purpose is satisfied, if I have managed to convey, by these meagre hints, that a World-Authority may have a vast and beneficent field of service before it, as organiser and arbiter of our economic life.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Disarmament

AFTER the experiences of this year it may seem a rash undertaking to write a chapter on Disarmament. For in the course of 1927 two conferences have met to discuss disarmament, and both of them have failed. Neither of these Conferences exhausted its problems. The first was a preparatory meeting at which America was present only as an observer, while Russia was absent. The second represented only the three chief Naval Powers. At the first the incompatible views of Great Britain and France, at the second the disagreement between America and Great Britain seemed to bar the road to further progress. Yet these two pairs of powers were but recently allies. One's memory went back to those years of intimate association, when by sea and land we were sharing all our resources. Here an American, and there a British admiral took charge, while in other waters the Japanese went hunting for submarines. So little was there left of the old competitive spirit, that from time to time British newspapers would describe with enthusiasm the rapid expansion alike of the American navy and of

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the mercantile marine. A common purpose united us. An addition to an ally's strength was an addition to our own. If we thought at all of the future, we assumed that the same purpose of enforcing the world's peace would continue to link our forces. No one would have dreamed of complaining that America or Japan had specialised in one type of fighting ship rather than another. If an ally was strong, while we were weak in big cruisers or destroyers as the case might be, so much the better for the common cause. Our deficiencies would be made good: the master idea would not suffer. It seems then to be as easy to arm in common as it is difficult to disarm. We all profess the same devotion to each other and to peace, but the most painful divergencies arise when we come to counting the number of cruisers which each of us requires to serve each other and the sacred ends of peace,—for that, as all confess, is the purpose of cruisers. When once one has put on the Breastplate of Righteousness, it is amazing how difficult it is to tear it off.

I am going to risk a violent paradox. It is gross folly to disarm. The only wise course is to arm. We shall never agree to disarm. But to arm in common, if there be a purpose which unites us, is remarkably easy. In the end it would come to the same thing. Indeed, when one scans

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the three programmes which were presented at Geneva, the probability, nay, the certainty is, that if we were to arm together, we could cut down our programmes and our budgets to a fraction of their present size. But the essential thing is a common purpose. Without it, indeed, arming might turn out to be as unfriendly an exercise as disarming.

By a violent wrench of the memory, let us go back to 1918. The common purpose which then governed our arming was the destruction at sea of German power. But all of us looked, or professed to look, to something wider—the preservation of the world's peace by the common adoption of some procedure—whether by arbitration, conciliation or legislation—for the peaceful adjustment of disputes. Were we sincere? A readiness to shed blood is commonly taken as a test of sincerity. We maimed or killed, by the best reckoning, about eight million men to prove our devotion to perpetual peace. Given this common enthusiasm, it should have been perfectly easy to arm. Our united Staffs, when the war was over, would have sat down, in the businesslike way that allies have, to measure our risks and our resources. They would have scanned the horizon for an aggressor. And when their moral telescopes had detected him in the bosom of a neigh-

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bour, they would have assigned to each of the allies his duty in repelling the danger to the general peace. One cannot say how many battleships, cruisers and destroyers they would have condemned each of us to build for the purpose of defeating this hypothetical aggressor. But evidently the lower they put the defensive quota, the less would the risk be, if one of the allies should hereafter break away, misuse his allotted armaments, and forget his loyalty. Certainly this Council of War would have felt none of the jealousies which rent the Genevan Council of peace. If Britain had a fine Super-Dreadnought to contribute, or an efficient flotilla armed with 6-inch guns, her contribution to the common defense would have been gratefully accepted. If America had a taste for 10,000-ton cruisers and 8-inch guns, they too would have come in handy. But one thing we may safely assume about this Council of War. It would have been a most conservative and economical body. If each of us had to build solely for the common good, it is probable that our enthusiasm for this form of expenditure would sensibly diminish. Conservative England is lavish when it contemplates building for national aggrandisement or prestige. It would count every ton and every gun that it gave for the world's safety. But sooner or later, by stern appeals to

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duty, and mutual incitements to altruism, we should have contrived to provide the earth with some sort of naval police force, which could deal adequately with any Power which refused to arbitrate, drive his commerce off the seas until he came to a better mind, and ensure in the meantime, that those of us who must import our daily bread, should not starve, while humanity imposed its will upon the rebel. In plain words, the only course compatible with common sense, and our social obligations to mankind, is to arm. Given sincerity and the common aim, the thing could be done very cheaply. To arm is the only policy for pacifists.

This Genevan Conference, in spite of its commendable zeal for arming, revealed the total lack of any common purpose. We all repeated, till it became the recognised ritual of the English-speaking peoples, that war between America and Great Britain is "unthinkable." But it was evident at each turn of the discussion that some of us are experts in the art of thinking the unthinkable. The admirals on both sides appeared to think nothing else. Why was it, that if America should use the whole of her allotted cruiser tonnage to build 10,000-ton ships, Britain would have to build as many of the same type? Must we make exactly the same noise, from guns of the same calibre, when we use our ships to salute the idea of per-

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petual peace? And why must America have a large allowance of 8-inch guns, to silence the 6-inch guns on the British armed merchantmen? One may, from an instinct of courtesy, leave the answer blank. But every thinking man who troubled to read the proceedings of this conference, has had to realise that we may one day do what today we find unthinkable. Sir Austen Chamberlain told the House of Commons that the peoples on both shores of the Atlantic have already "outlawed war in their hearts." If that be so, it is singular that we hesitate to outlaw it on paper. If this Conference had set to work with a general and obligatory treaty of arbitration as its starting point, the calculations in which both sides indulged would have become as nonsensical as they are indecent.

The melancholy experiences of these two conferences may be salutary, if it teaches us that a reduction of armaments, in any sense that would answer to our hopes of peace, is impossible without far-reaching political preparation. From first to last the Great Powers were reasoning from a conception of their rights which cannot serve as a premise for disarmament. They saw themselves as isolated political units, each clad in the mantle of its pride as a sovereign state, owing allegiance to no society and to no idea greater than itself. Their normal relation is one of competition, and

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each must desire the maximum of power for itself. The concession which they were willing to contemplate was that the greater among them should accept (whether sincerely or insincerely) equality in armed strength, while the lesser should agree to a ratio which would stereotype their inferior status in a world where all go armed. It might seem, at a first glance, that from this starting point one might advance by successive reductions to a point at which armaments would almost vanish. Why, if we do but retain equality, should we hesitate to cut down our battle-fleets in numbers, tonnage and armament, until eventually we face each other with half a dozen of the smaller type of capital ships? This reasoning breaks down, when one attempts to face all the realities of our situation. One might agree to cut down "active" armies. But the French insisted (and it was difficult to answer them) that all a nation's reserves of man-power must also be reckoned. Would it be equitable, for instance, to limit the trained reserves of France, when Germany can draw on a population which exceeds that of France by fifty per cent? And again, industrial resources are also a legitimate factor in the calculation, and here too, Germany has the advantage. The conclusion follows that France must have a greatly superior striking force, embodied in her active army and

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in her immediately mobilisable trained reserve, so that she may deal her blow, before her neighbour can mobilise all her potential resources. At the end of this tortuous yet cogent argument, "equality" turns into its opposite.

Nor was the British admiralty behind the French General Staff when it wielded logic on its own element. It too may be eager to disarm, but it points to an absolute limit. It has a "far-flung" Empire to defend, and though mankind might retort that it has never invited us to indulge in this luxury, the fact remains that Providence, in its inscrutable wisdom, has laid on the British Navy the duty of defending the many and lengthy sea-roads which link the British Isles with the Dominions. Not all the goodwill of Geneva will avail to reduce the length of these sea-roads by a single league. If a certain mileage must be guarded, one must have a definite number of cruisers for the work,—so many and no less, of a given speed—to patrol every thousand miles. Whether seventy light cruisers be really the indispensable minimum, for the purpose of ensuring that we may always draw wheat from Canada and mutton from New Zealand, the argument is, in its way, as sound as that which the French put forward. It is obvious that by this line of reasoning one rapidly arrives at an absolute limit below

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which the leading powers will not disarm. . The army of France (both active and reserve), is measured, in the minds of her staff, by the population of Germany; while the strength of our navy is fixed, because like Ariel, it must put a belt about the earth. These, unfortunately, are only two of the many reasons which Providence and the fertility of other races have provided to overcome the zeal of Admirals and field-m Marshals for disarmament. To complete the depressing survey, one need only add that Italy officially records her resolve to arm up to standard of the greatest Continental Power, while Russia's neighbours (including Poland) make her absence from this preliminary and bootless discussion a ground for refusing any reduction whatever. As they in turn have other neighbours in the West, it is to be foreseen that their refusal may be contagious.

Out of this blind alley there is no way of escape. Given the competitive view of the relationships between Powers, disarmament is nonsense, and one might dismiss all these efforts, as Mommsen dismissed the first Hague Conference; they are a "misprint in history." There is no hope of anything more than temporary truces and modest reductions, imposed for a time by the general poverty, until we advance from the competitive to the coöperative view of armaments. When

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the next Disarmament Conference meets, one would like to summon to its table, as a highly articulate "Observer," some Socrates who would entangle our admirals and field-m Marshals in a dialogue which would reveal the purpose of their armaments. These powers, save only America, have all of them signed the Covenant of the League. In what circumstances, then, may they have to conduct a war? The Covenant provides an elaborate procedure of delay, enquiry, arbitration, and mediation. If a Power has observed this procedure, and if the justice of its cause and the loyalty of its behaviour commend themselves to its fellows in the League, it can never in the future have to conduct a war alone. It will always have behind it at least the economic support of the rest of the League, and on its adversary will fall the tremendous penalty of total boycott. If it is one of the Locarno powers it may reckon certainly on much more than this. When France measures her strength singlehanded against Germany, and Italy against France, what is the nature of the conflict that they have in view? One can only suppose that they are gazing at the "gap" in the Covenant, and conceive that they may one day feel constrained to burst through it, and to wage against a rival a war which seems to the world's public opinion neither necessary nor just. One can

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see only one possible escape from this conclusion. It may be said that two Great Powers are outside the League, and have assumed none of the obligations of its Covenant. But Russia can no more menace the sea communications of the British Empire, than she can invade the soil of France. And with America is not war officially "unthinkable," as much for Frenchmen as for Englishmen?

To pursue these Socratic questions a little further; What really was the contingency which American and British admirals had in view, when they elaborated at Geneva their pedantic conception of parity in naval strength? In what circumstances (if we assume that something more was at stake than a childlike notion of prestige) would an exact equality in cruiser tonnage matter vitally to either side? Clearly it would matter, if the world were again to pass through the conditions which prevailed before America's entry into the Great War. If once again the British Admiralty were attempting to impose upon neutrals its stringent doctrine of the long-range blockade, and if once more an American President were addressing to London his strongly worded protests against our reading of contraband, our interpretation of the right of search, and our claim to ration the imports of neutrals, it clearly would matter vitally whether Washington had at command a naval

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force which could make its protests effective. For, in that event, we should have to make our choice: either we should risk war with the United States, or we should have to abandon the practises which gave us in the late war an absolute control of the seas, and enabled us to throttle our adversaries by starving their civilian population, and depriving their industries and their armies of essential fuels and raw materials. For there is much to be said for the view that petrol won the war: the Allies had it in abundance, the enemy went short. It was, no doubt, a commendable modesty which forbade British Admirals to state this issue with brutal frankness at Geneva. When they talked of the functions of our seventy light cruisers, they omitted to mention that a ship which may, indeed, be useful to convoy our merchantmen, laden with cargoes necessary for civilians and others, is equally useful for the purpose of driving the enemy's merchantmen off the seas, and for imposing our will on neutrals. The British Admiralty has, to put it plainly, an active no less than a passive interest in blockades. It arms to inflict them, as well as to resist them.

Again, the haunting question returns: In what circumstances do our admirals suppose that they may have to conduct a blockade? One can imagine two sets of circumstances, and only two. Either

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the blockade is levied by the League against an outlawed aggressor, or it is one which the British Empire is conducting of its own motion, for its own ends, against the better judgment of the League, or at all events without its countenance. In the former event it could not be a difficult operation even against a formidable enemy, for the greater part of mankind would be committed in advance to wholehearted support. If every State refused all intercourse with the outlaw, it would require little vigilance at sea to prevent essential supplies from reaching him. The seas would be closed to his flag, and if he had at the outset some raiders or submarines, which might attempt to prey on our commerce, the entire naval force of all the League's members would be bound to join our cruisers in hunting them down. In such a blockade, our navy would be acting as the world's police, and all the resources of the earth would be at our disposal to feed our island population.

It seems to follow that if ever the British Empire conducts a blockade single handed, or suffers it alone, it can only be because it has broken through "the gap" in the Covenant. In that event it might well happen that not America alone, but the rest of the civilised world, would find our pretensions insufferable, and would refuse, in a cause which it could not approve, to tolerate our claim to

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control its shipping and ration its supplies. Such a blockade as we enforced in the Great War, when we controlled the trade, and offended the self-respect of neutrals, in order that we might overwhelm their neighbours, by condemning to hunger and disease the women and children, the aged and the poor—such a blockade the world will not tolerate again, unless it feels that our cause is just, and the struggle inevitable. Yet it is only for such a single-handed blockade as this, dictated by national egoism, that we can conceivably require the all-powerful navy of our tradition.

When our imaginary Socrates had addressed these embarrassing questions to British Admirals, he might with advantage complete them by turning to their American colleagues. It was the practice of both sides in carrying the logic of the blockade to its utmost limit, which persuaded Congress during the war to expand its navy, till it should equal that of the strongest Power. Is the maintenance of the American doctrine of neutral rights still (as it seemed in the debates at Geneva to be) the primary duty of the American fleet? And here one must enquire, whether the significant development of President Wilson's thinking on this subject, has left its permanent trace on the minds of his countrymen. At the outset of the war he maintained the tradition of nineteenth cen-

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tury individualism. To trade with both belligerents was the right of a neutral, save perhaps in contraband of war (which neutrals would define as narrowly as possible), or unless a blockade could be enforced along the actual coasts of a belligerent. He realised, as the war went on, that the old conception of contraband had become obsolete. Almost every conceivable article of commerce has its use for armies, and when the whole civil population is regimented, the women no less than the men, one cannot even except foodstuffs. Nor can the antique conception of a local blockade be revived. When he entered the war, President Wilson silently approved and applied the British doctrine of blockade. At its close he rationalised the experience through which the world had passed, in his new reading of the Freedom of the Seas. In any future war which enlists World Powers, there can be no neutrals. Neutrality, when issues are at stake which must effect all our destinies, becomes a dereliction of duty. No single Power, for its own self-regarding ends, has the right to inflict on others the pains and losses of the blockade. But no less surely, the whole civilised world, acting in concert, has the right and the duty to mobilise every loyal friend of peace, and to use every form of economic pressure to bring an aggression to an end. The blockade, in

its modern extension, survives, then, only as an instrument which the Great Society will use to reduce a rebel against its pacific procedure to submission. No loyal nation will ever suffer it: no loyal Power will ever have to organise it single handed. One can make this Wilsonian doctrine intellectually and morally convincing, only when one denies the right of private war, and affirms that only the Great Society, which is all mankind, has the right to levy war, and only then for the general safety against a convicted aggressor.

Twice the world has come near to adopting this revolutionary conception. When Mr. Wilson embarked on the Atlantic with his doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas, it foundered at the first collision with the British Empire. The Protocol which the League provisionally adopted, when Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot jointly sponsored it, explicitly renounced the right of private war, closed the "gap" in the Covenant, and made arbitration universal and obligatory. There is no doubt that if it had survived the fall of the British Labour government, France would have ratified it with enthusiasm. The Locarno system took its place, but none of its treaties bound Great Britain to an unqualified promise to arbitrate. Sir Austen Chamberlain made his embarrassed apology: Great Britain had frequently gone to arbitration

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in the past: she would often do so in the future: her inclination to arbitrate was well known, and the world might rely upon it: but she could give no binding or unqualified promise. It seemed to follow, therefore, that there might some day be an exception to the unwritten rule.

Unfortunately, with every disposition to believe in our goodwill, the rest of the world, if we will give no promise, must provide for all emergencies; our exceptions make its risks. Sir Austen Chamberlain suggested our racial dislike of "logic" as the only explanation of this unwillingness to promise arbitration. There may, however, be a more prosaic reason. The Admiralty realises clearly what would happen to our doctrine of blockade, if in the course of our conduct of a private war, we were bound to submit our handling of neutral commerce to a neutral Court. Our absolute control of the seas would be ended. So long as the traditional view prevails in London of the right of an Empire, in the last resort, to levy war at its sole choice, so long will the necessity of preserving in our own hands the terrific weapon of the blockade oblige us to refuse the unlimited obligation to arbitrate. And so long as we maintain this private right of blockade, so long will it be impossible to attain substantial disarmament at sea.

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The fundamental question is the issue which has confronted us at every turn of this argument. The national state must consent to sacrifice its absolute sovereignty, if the world is ever to enjoy peace with security. It can prove its sincerity only by disarming, but it would be folly to disarm without a binding and general pledge to arbitrate. Disarmament cannot be treated as an isolated and technical matter. It will baffle us, until we find for the Great Society its appropriate constitutional form. It will elude us so long as we tolerate the crime of private war. It is conceivable only when the Great Powers sincerely face the prospect that the only wars in which they can be concerned, are those which the whole society of civilised peoples may have to conduct, for the common defence, against an aggressor who has refused to submit to the world's verdict on his case. When we reach this point, we shall not disarm. We shall arm coöperatively to meet a common peril.

When the principle which civilisation must adopt or perish, is stated in this uncompromising way, it may seem so difficult that it mocks our hopes. For this bold statement of theory the world is not yet ready. And yet the practical steps are simple, and by no means beyond the possibility of an early realisation. Only two are necessary. Great Britain must again consent to do what she

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so nearly did under the Labour government—she must be ready to sign unqualified treaties of arbitration. It is not necessary, however desirable it may be, that America should enter the League. It would suffice that she also should sign a general treaty of arbitration, and that she should be willing, in some form, to add to it the qualification that she will not plead her doctrine of blockade before a neutral Court, during any operations which have the explicit sanction of the League. If our enlightenment can but carry us so far, disarmament would present few difficulties. It will escape us only so long as we cling to the right of private war.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

World-Democracy

MEN commonly glide from one period of their historical development to another, with a lagging self-consciousness that awakens long after the frontiers have been left behind. The revolutionary change through which England passed during the swift advent of the industrial age, left scarcely a trace in contemporary literature. One might suppose that the novelists and poets of that time of vertiginous movement had never heard of a factory or a steam-engine. A philosopher like Godwin could discuss the structure of society in books as lengthy as his own span of life, without a mention of the new ruling power of industrial capital. Even Cobbett, who was painfully aware of what was happening around him, imagined that a well-directed agitation would avail to reverse the new tendencies and bring green England back again. When Robert Owen, some years after the return of peace, compiled, for the benefit of the bewildered philanthropic world of London, a statistical estimate of the growth of machine production in the unknown North, it came as a staggering revelation to the ablest and

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most influential men of the day. The social change was already a settled and accomplished fact, before the country was ready to make the modifications in its constitutional form which corresponded to the shifting of economic power from the landed to the industrial masters of England.

It may be that our own generation is stumbling into the period of world-government with as little consciousness of its direction. Blind economic forces drive us into ever closer association. Governments feel constrained to concern themselves, now by blunt speech, and again by active intervention, with what happens on the territories of their neighbours. We attempt, in a constant succession of consultative conferences, to achieve, by negotiation and consent, what eventually will have to be imposed by legislation. We grope after methods of settling our disputes by arbitration, shutting our eyes all the while to the need for creating a central authority, which can dictate to the world a solution of the problems that give rise to these disputes. We know at every turn of our economic life, as the world's needs and the world's crops work out a world price for cotton or wheat, that frontiers have almost ceased to concern us. And yet the hard fact stands out, that a multitude of sovereign states, some effectively self-moving and independent, others mere satellites which must

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revolve in the orbit of the greater Powers, maintain their tradition of a defiant independence. They are the sole judges of their own conduct, and their assumption is, that it is their right to take their own estimate of their own interests as their ultimate guide. We seem, in the League of Nations, to have a political organisation modelled upon federal democracy. It follows parliamentary forms. And yet the essential foundation of every democracy is lacking. Its forms give no assurance that the will of the greatest number shall prevail. On the contrary, it is, speaking broadly, the rule alike of the Council and of the Assembly, that decisions must be taken by an unanimous vote. The council may, indeed, decide its own procedure by a majority vote, and the Assembly may make a recommendation in the same way, on the understanding that no government is bound to give effect to it. The general principle is, in short, that no government is required to bow to any decision to which it has not freely assented.

The meaning of all this is, that as yet there has been no real departure from the traditional methods by which States conducted business among themselves. They negotiated. They bargained. They made or suffered threats. In the last resort they demonstrated their sovereign independence

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by imposing the will of the stronger upon the weaker by a resort to arms. The Covenant, with its delays, and its provisions for conciliation by the Council of the League, has made a resort to arms more difficult and less normal than it was in the past. But around the table of the League's Council the old procedure continues. States negotiate. They barter. They even utter and suffer threats. If unanimity is to be secured for a decision of any importance, it is frequently necessary to address to the Opposition arguments which may have no relation whatever to the merits of the case. The British Empire will give way, in a European issue which does not directly affect its interests, in return, let us say, for a free hand in Turkey or China. It has even happened that a State (Sweden), which was making a stand for principle, has been plainly informed (by Spain) that if she persisted, she would lose a valuable contract for the manufacture of telephone apparatus. It rarely happens, if Britain and France can, by bargaining, reach an agreement, that other members of the Council venture to resist it by an abuse of the unanimity rule. But such cases have occurred, and there is nothing to prevent their repetition. Brazil, for example, was able by interposing her veto, to delay the entry of Germany into the League for six months. A Great Power,

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which is, by right, a permanent member of the Council, might have used its veto in such a case indefinitely. If we are seldom outraged by a public use of this veto, that is only because no government would risk making a bold proposal to the Council, unless it had first of all secured the assent of the Great Powers. If one assumes that the League is an organisation which aims at the good of the greatest number, one can conceive no arrangement less fitted to ensure it.

The League starts from an assumption at which all of us smile. It assumes the equality of all Sovereign States. In theory Salvador counts for as much as Great Britain, and Liberia is the equal of France. But just because everyone realises that no such equality does in fact exist, no one would dream of asking Great Britain or France to submit to a majority vote in which Salvador or Liberia might turn the scale against them. Common sense and the realities of life forbid us to carry the false assumption to its logical conclusion. Because its basis of voting is an absurdity, the League, for all practical purposes, refuses to recognise votes. There is no attempt to secure the rule of the majority, and in fact the Great Powers, by the weight of their wealth and their armaments, dominate the League. Each has its clients, which depend upon it for credit and protection, and even

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in Geneva the politics of Europe and its dependent continents continue to revolve round the Bank of England, the Bank of France, the French army and the British fleet.

Nor can it well be otherwise, so long as States continue to be the sole political unit on which the League is based. The State remains what it has always been in international relations, a concentration of power. Language rarely uncovers the thoughts of men so honestly as in the use which every European speech makes of this word "Power." In the last resort, when governments negotiate, their title to respect and recognition rests on their control of armies and fleets. The etiquette which they must observe towards each other is based on the code of military honour, and even in republics the symbolism and ceremony in which patriotism and nationality express themselves, centre around the flag and the uniform. If we attempt to analyse the obscure emotions which underlie the habitual dealings of States with each other, this sense that they are "Powers" is never absent from our minds. States cannot yield to each other, save as they may yield in negotiation for a *quid pro quo*, without the sense that they have suffered something like the humiliation of a military defeat. And that, I suppose, is ultimately the reason why they will not submit to an adverse

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vote at the hands of other States. We still feel that it is "France" or "Germany" and "Italy" which take their seats on the League Council, and these abstractions mean for us organisations which might one day set in motion their submarines, their aërial fleets, and their massed battalions of combatants. A nation at international gatherings is first of all a force which may act. It will act, when action is required, under discipline, as a solid unit. Behind these apparently solid units we cannot penetrate. A nation seems to face us, even when we discuss the common affairs of Europe, as a regiment which obeys the word of command and wheels like a drilled battalion. And yet we know, all the time, that on most if not all of the international issues which come up for discussion, opinion is divided in all nations very much as it is divided on national questions. Until the herd instinct is aroused by the alarming picture of another hostile herd across the frontier, opinion on most of these issues will follow the normal dividing lines of temperament and class interest. There are, throughout Europe, the makings of an international party which believes in *laissez-faire*, and of an opposing party which believes that a society can and should regulate its common affairs and invoke scientific planning for the general good: an employer's party might come together as

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naturally as the worker's party, which already has its Socialist International: there are tendencies no less inevitable which might form rival groups to advance closer organisation and greater uniformity, or to maintain decentralisation and a romantic diversity. Cross Europe in a train, and pick up the newspapers from the bookstalls, as you pass through Paris and Vienna and return through Warsaw and Berlin. You will discover all these tendencies frankly reflected: the articles will use the same turns of phrase and appeal to the same watchwords and ideals, whether they are written in German or in French. Common interests and a common civilisation have made a Great Society of which the natural reflection is not a gathering of "Powers." There is a wide range of international questions which have no necessary relation whatever to the national idea, or to considerations of strategy and power. Opinion on such questions will divide us into a *rentier* group, or an industrial group, into an employers' and a workers' group, or remind us of the diverse interests of country and town. Whether we say bluntly that the majority should decide, or that an equitable compromise should be worked out, is a gathering of the world's governments the aptest organisation for achieving either end?

If Power may not yield to Power; if military

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honour must think of a reverse at the ballot box, as it would think of a defeat in the field; if voting among Sovereign States is an absurdity, because they are at once equal and unequal, can we invoke democracy to help us out? If France, the leading military Power of Europe, cannot submit to the adverse vote of other armed Powers at Geneva, might not the French people learn to think of itself as forty among the many millions of the populations of Europe or the world, and bow to the general vote? It was once difficult for Brittany, and intolerable for Burgundy to bow to Paris: may not Paris in its turn learn subordination to Europe? Plainly, if ever the anarchic individualism of the Sovereign State and the national government is to be overcome, we must set up, to overrule it, something other than itself. We dare not ask Power to bow to Power: but may we not ask Power to bow to Opinion? In plain words, must we not work out, through whatever transitional stages and partial realisations, a federal democratic constitution for the world? The authority of this supreme Super-State would rest directly on the populations of the world, and the policy which this supreme government followed, would be no longer the outcome of bargains reached amid the intricacies of a game of barter

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and veto; it would reflect the will and opinion of the world's inhabitants.

The reader may ask for a precise working out of this suggestion. I doubt whether the time has yet come for the definition of detail. If I were invited to say, for example, how I should define the respective spheres of world-government and national governments, I should hesitate on the threshold. Broadly speaking, the world-government must be the supreme arbiter in everything that concerns the relations of States with each other,—their armaments to begin with, and their disputes. It must, I think, eventually have the last word also in the relations of Imperial Powers with their dependencies. It ought to regulate the relations which seem to lie at the root of Imperialism—trade and investment across frontiers. It would, I am sure, be a mistake to attempt at any stage a precise and formal enumeration of the matters which fall within its scope. The evolution of the Great Society must permit it to add one matter to another, as opinion ripens with our increasing interdependence. One might distinguish matters on which the League (if one may continue to use that name) may give a binding decision, from matters about which it may make a recommendation. One can imagine that the League might, for example, attempt by discussion and

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negotiation to break down tariff barriers, long before it dared to abolish them by an imperative decree. In the same cautious way, it might deal with emigration, first by advice and the mobilisation of opinion, and only after the lapse of many years by command. One might despair of any rapid advance towards a centralised world-authority, were it not that the beneficent work of the League in introducing economic order, in aiding poor and backward states, in organising sanitation and hygiene, and in protecting labour, must create a growing loyalty and gratitude towards it.

The reader may fairly ask whether I contemplate a periodic general election throughout the earth to choose the League's Assembly or its officers. That might never be desirable, and it certainly would not be the way to begin. The simplest expedient would be to lay it down, that each national delegation to the Assembly should be elected by each national Parliament, by proportional representation. In this way one would get a reflection of the main tendencies of national opinion. Oppositions would be represented, as well as the governing party or coalition. This is already the practise in several countries, though the delegations are constituted rather by nomination than by election. But it is essential to break down the system by which delegations within the

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Assembly cast a single national vote. So long as this practice prevails, we shall always get in the Assembly rather the clash or alliance of national interests, than any measure and reflection of the opinion and will of mankind. It is essential, if we are ever to constitute a world-democracy, that groups based on opinion should unite across frontiers. Once the system of individual voting is conceded, inevitably parties will form themselves in the Assembly. Socialists will find their comrades in other delegations, and sooner or later Liberals and Conservatives, industrialists and agrarians, centralisers and individualists will come together for mutual consultation and support. There will be scope for individual leadership, which may sometimes fall to the representatives of the smaller nations, and not always to the official spokesmen of the Great Powers.

It must follow, if the system of individual voting is adopted, that the fiction of equality of states must be abandoned. If the Assembly is to represent populations and not Powers, the votes cast must have some relation to the number of millions behind them. I will not attempt to suggest in any detail a plan for the allocation of votes. It might be a mistake to aim at a too accurate system. Possibly it would suffice to divide States, according to population, into three or four classes,

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and to assign to those in each class the same number of delegates, so that Great Britain and France would have a substantially larger number of delegates than Holland or Norway. It might be wise to tolerate some degree of over-representation for the small States and of under-representation for the largest.

It is obvious that, in our day at least, the constitution of the World-League could not ignore the states which compose it. Doubtless it must follow the usual practise of democratic federations: it must arrange for dual representation of States and of populations. There may be a case for creating a Second Chamber, a Senate whose members would be directly appointed by national governments. But nothing would have been gained unless this Senate took its decisions by a majority vote; and, for my own part, I should doubt whether, even in such a Senate, one could avoid assigning several votes to the greater Powers. One might stipulate that before any decision of the popular Assembly could bind every member of the League, it must be ratified by this Senate representing Governments, and one might even require that a two-thirds majority should assent. It is, I think, obvious that where action is required,—as for example when the League must put economic pressure on a defaulting or

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disloyal Power,—one must leave it to a body representing governments to decide the measures which governments must carry out. The present Council of the League may be open to much criticism, but it is, on the whole, well fitted to act as an executive authority.

One doubts, however, whether this Council is a suitable body for the work of conciliation in disputes which are referred to it, or for intervening on its own initiative when it perceives a danger to the world's peace. It is composed usually of Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors. Each of these men is trained in his daily work to think, first of all, and all the time, of national interests. Each of them might defend his habitually nationalist attitude on the ground that a nation had chosen him out to guard its interests, and not to scheme for the good of humanity. For these men to think impartially must be, of all mental gymnastics, the most difficult: to think internationally might seem a sort of treason. For this all important double work of conciliation, whether for mediation in actual disputes, or for making a vigilant survey of the world's dangers, it is rather a disadvantage than an advantage that the conciliator should hold an official position in his own country. The qualities of mind and character required for this work may not be those of the

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party leader and the popular parliamentary figure. It is, moreover, essential that a conciliator should enjoy the confidence, not merely of his own country, but of others also. For these reasons it might be well to consider a proposal which came from the Swiss Government, when the constitution of the League was first discussed. It was that a permanent Council of Conciliation should be created; that each Member-State should propose names for a panel of candidates; and that from this panel the Assembly should elect the Council. If I understood this Swiss proposal correctly, the members of this Council would be chosen for their individual eminence and their reputation, and not because they represented a certain country. The Assembly might indeed elect on this plan several standing committees—certainly a general Political Committee to watch over the world's peace, an Economic Committee, and a Mandates Committee which would take charge of all Imperial questions. These committees should not be regarded as subordinate to the Council, but rather as the permanent spokesmen of the popular House. One need not stress what is obvious: a development of this kind will have to face from the first the jealousy of governments. Power will not yield Opinion without a struggle, nor nationalism

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abandon its trenches without a strong rear-guard action.

I N THESE constructive chapters, an attempt has been made to work out, in the realm of speculation and theory, the lines on which an authoritative federal government might be created for the world. The guiding thought throughout them is, that in the modern economic world, nationalism is the enemy of civilisation; it has its legitimate work only as the guardian of inherited culture. The tradition of the sovereign national state has become an anachronism which thwarts our national progress, and incessantly threatens peace. The task of our time is to give to the Great Society of mankind a political form which fits the facts of our economic and cultural interdependence. To it, the sovereign national state must subordinate itself in all its dealings with other states, in trade across frontiers, and above all, in its contacts with undeveloped peoples. We shall disarm, only when we realise that we must arm coöperatively for mutual defense. The constitution of this Great Society must be built on the model of a democratic federation, and sovereignty must reside in an assembly which represents the world's populations.

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In these pages of unrestrained speculation, some proposals belong avowedly to the remote future; others, it seems to me, we must prepare ourselves to adopt within our own generation, if our civilisation is to escape the ruin of another world war. I will attempt to set down here what seem to me to be the conditions of a stable peace.

- (1) The first step, it seems to me, is that the Great Powers should bring themselves to sign unlimited Treaties of Arbitration. The smaller Powers will be only too willing to follow. These Treaties will abolish the right of private war, and confine the right of blockade to the League.
- (2) Imperialism, in all its forms, is thereafter the central problem. It seems essential (a) that the League's supervision of mandated areas should become more effective, and (b) that all non-self-governing colonies in Africa and the Pacific should come under this system, with its rule of the Open Door and the absence of all discrimination in trade.
- (3) The national State must cease to be the protector and promoter of the trade and investments of its citizens beyond its

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frontiers. The League's Courts must replace it in performing these functions.

- (4) The world must build up its international organisation to regulate the distribution, and, if possible, also to stabilise the prices of raw materials and staple foodstuffs.
- (5) The League should organise such financial aid and administrative guidance as weak and backward States may require.
- (6) The League should extend its protection to all national minorities in Europe, and draft a Charter which should define their rights.
- (7) If the problems of Imperialism and nationality have so far been solved, regional groupings or federations on a continental basis may become possible within the League.
- (8) As a result of all these steps, disarmament becomes a possible policy. It should take the form of the constitution, on a coöperative plan, of modest police forces, military and naval, to support the authority of the League against any possible aggressor.
- (9) Finally, to ensure that world problems may be solved before they give rise to

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dangerous disputes, the League must evolve an effective Legislature. There can be no peace without a provision for change. If, only at first, as a consultative chamber, there should be created a World Assembly, which represents Parliaments in some rough proportion to population, and works by a majority vote.

These, it may be said, are exacting demands. They presuppose the decay of national sovereignty. They require an international morality far beyond our present stage of evolution. They demand, in short, rather centuries than a generation for their gradual adoption. It may be so. But in that case our fate will overtake us while we are still admiring the slow progress of history. The world cannot count on geological ages for the development of its social sense. The Society which cannot adapt itself promptly to the rapid changes of its environment, is doomed to perish. Peace is no longer in the modern world a lofty ideal. It is the condition of our survival.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

A Return to Realism

“YOU have finished,” says a voice within me, “your astonishing extracts from the proceedings of the Laputan Academy of Projectors. Let us now return to the real world. I will concede, lest I should needlessly offend your faith, that these projects for the amendment of the world’s structure, are as desirable as they are bold. Let us agree, while we are alone together, that both of us are weary of the megalomania of Empires and the pride of nations. Gladly would we see them humbled and decayed. It would be an edifying sight, if we might live to witness a procession of potentates and princes, lit by your friendly star, on its way to the cradle in Geneva. Comrade Stalin would bring frankincense and Mr. Coolidge myrrh, and both should join Mr. Baldwin in doing homage to the improvements which you have so thoughtfully introduced in Mr. Wilson’s stable. May we both live to see Standard Oil and Royal Dutch stripping themselves of the protection of the two greatest navies of the Earth, that they may bend their necks to the yoke of the League’s courts. I should rejoice with you,

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if the British Empire, moved by your preaching, were to fling half Africa and sundry other trifles of a comparable magnitude, upon the bonfire of vanities which you shall kindle in the market-place of Geneva. The angels would carol with us, while Admiral Jellicoe directed the ruthless destruction of his most recent super-Dreadnaughts. My heart glows with yours as I picture Trotsky and M. Poincaré, and shall I add, Mussolini, crowning themselves in the Council of your regenerated League with olives of endless age. But candidly, can you discern even the first beginnings of these happy motions? Do your ears detect even the discordant prelude of the band, before the choir intones the *Hymn to Joy*?

“Frankly, you have forgotten, in your amazing license of construction, that history has its system of causation. Men do not embrace even the most elevated ideals, merely because the light of heavenly beauty has fallen on their eyes. If they seem, at odd moments, to obey reason, it is because hunger and need have driven them in that direction. It is in vain that you demonstrate that a positive peace of coöperation would favour the general interest of mankind. Since when did that objective decorate the flags of Empires, or adorn the prospectuses of monopolist Trusts? The very fact that your ideal does, indeed, seem to fit the

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general interest, is the very reason why it never will be adopted. Men do not struggle for the general interest. They fight, and always have fought for the tribe to which they belong, be that tribe the clan that inhabits their valley, or a world-wide class. It is struggle between partial interests that makes movement in the world. You must point to some class which has an interest in realising your proposals, and when you have detected your ally among the real forces of the world, you must then demonstrate that the trend of economic change appears to favour its cause and predict its victory. Arguments marshal no battalion on the world's battlefields, and if they appear to mass votes, it is only because some interest has paid for their diffusion.

"I hear you murmur an objection. You say that after all, the League exists. That is exactly the worst illustration that you could offer. For in the earlier chapters of your erratic book, you have been at pains to show that the League, amid the armed Empires, is a pathetic irrelevance. Mr. Wilson's eccentricity availed to interpolate this misprint in history. He was the bard which every wise army encourages. He made the myth which induced conscripts and taxpayers to bear their burdens to the bitter end. After demobilisation his utility diminished, and the real forces which

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all the while had directed his Republic, were the first to repudiate both myth-maker and myth. The aristocrats of the eighteenth century openly proclaimed the political uses of the salutary lie. We have gained in system what we have lost in frankness. We maintain the League at the cost of a million sterling. It is cheap at the price, for it in no way incommodes us. Tell me: has the League prevented any armed Empire from doing any single thing, or taking any single thing, which it would otherwise have done or taken? The League is useful, because it avails to dazzle the brains of the idealists and the liberals, and to divert them from the struggle which would alone avail to realise their purposes, though in a less amiable and innocent form. 'They carried their Protocol,' you say, 'at the first reading.' They will go on smudging the page of history with these misprints. Its press has a vigilant corrector."

My Inner Voice has set me an impossible task. If one were to begin to explore all his assumptions and to balance all his half-truths, one would end by writing a treatise on the nature of the universe. Is it true, to begin with, that any solution which promises the general good, is doomed in advance, because it can never find a partisan who will struggle for it, and impose it? History can,

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I think, show at least one conspicuous instance to the contrary—the triumph of toleration as the solution for the wars of religion, and the habit of persecution. On a short view (and it is with short views that this doctrine of the supremacy of partial interests deals) tolerance was in the interest of no party, since it made for the good of all. Catholics and Protestants had each an interest in achieving a degree of supremacy that would enable them to crush the rival creed. Each battled through a century or more to attain this end. No great party or Church, during the crucial and formative period, ever did inscribe toleration upon its banners. Even the pioneers like Milton and Locke, who did so, made baffling exceptions, and they, in their enlightenment, were never typical of the mass-opinion of their day. If one surveys the slow process by which toleration became the rule of every civilised society, one may hesitate in assigning a precise value to the various causes—the tension of nearly equal forces, the decay of dogmatic belief, the weariness which the devastating strife engendered. But one cannot say that any party of toleration imposed its solution—there was never such a party until the victory was won. And given the tension, the decay of dogma, and the weariness, one must say that the preachers of toleration, and the capacity of mankind for dis-

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interested reflection—in one word, reason—did play a part in ending persecution.

I am disposed, then, to accept one of the tests which my Inner Voice proposes, and to reject the other. I must certainly be able to show that there is a tendency in the world, a drift perceptible in its economic conditions, which makes for international unity on a coöperative plan. But I am not obliged to show that there is an adequate force which will battle for this solution and impose it. It is enough that accident should throw up statesmen or leaders, whose personal circumstances will incline them to this solution, as James II and Henri IV were manœuvred by destiny into tolerance. It is enough that temperament or experience should ordain preachers of this idea, as they ordained Milton and Voltaire. It is enough that experience and reflection, after the real forces have done their best and their worst, should demonstrate that any other solution is impossible. It will not disconcert me unduly, if, in the end, I must confess that the only force or party which has declared for Internationalism without reserves, is weak, divided, and subject to the usual infirmities of humanity. The European Labour Movement is vastly stronger, immensely more numerous, and above all, much better organised, than any body of men that one might have described, by a

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strained use of words, as a party of toleration in the seventeenth or eighteenth century.

I have to show then, (1) that there is a palpable drift among things towards internationalism, and (2) that any other solution is impossible. One might seek for evidence of this drift towards internationalism in the world of culture, in the improvements of communications which annihilate distance, and in the growing complexity of commerce. In the last resort one might say that the advance of machinery is itself a sufficient driving force towards internationalism. The almost unlimited potentialities of modern machinery, its costliness and the consequent pressure upon its owners to keep it working at its full capacity—these technical considerations drive industry to seek for ever widening markets. Mass-production may in its earlier stages foster imperialism, as the readiest means of ensuring a market as safe as it is wide. But as the pressure continues, even the greatest Empire becomes too narrow. The United States finds Canada a more valuable outlet than its own colonial possessions; as little can Great Britain neglect Europe or South America. An advanced modern industry must take the world for its market. In this sense, then, frontiers tend to lose their importance.

At the same time, the workings of finance are

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breaking down the barriers between national states and limiting their sovereignty. The process has already gone so far that one may say that the national sovereign state is undergoing a slow process of decay. I will give but two illustrations, for each of us will readily find many in his own observation of the world. Every English reader who even strays casually into the pages of financial journalism, has noted from time to time the speculations which attempt to predict whether the Bank of England will raise or lower the bank-rate. Some consideration is paid to purely national phenomena. Occasionally France, by a sudden and unexpected withdrawal of gold, exerts an influence. But habitually, these writers focus their eyes on the doings and the presumed intentions of the American Federal Reserve Board. What it may do, as all acknowledge, must influence, if it does not actually dictate the action of the Bank of England. So much is this the case, that it is even assumed, that a certain solidarity of interest may or should influence the American Board, that it should take account of the inevitable repercussion of its actions upon Europe in general and London in particular—in plain words, that it ought not to act on a narrow view of purely American interests. These speculations and appeals are deeply interesting, for they reveal the limits, in

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this field, of national sovereignty. One may doubt whether all that the British Parliament has done since 1920, in its continuous sittings, and its tomes of legislation, has had upon British industry and upon the lives of the millions who live by industry or upon it, an effect comparable to that which the changes in the bank-rate¹ have brought about. And these changes lay outside the scope of our national sovereignty. On this score alone, it is conceivable that the area of our daily lives governed by the interplay of international forces, is already wider than the area dominated by national sovereignty.

Again, one grew up in the belief that protectionist tariffs, which embody the claim of the national state to the fullest sovereignty over trade, are commonly effective for their purposes. In the past that may have been broadly true. It is still true of industries which preserve an archaic organisation. But when one studies the working of an industry which possesses an elaborate modern organisation, one begins to doubt whether, against such an organisation, the national state possesses any effective power whatever. One may take the electrical industry as a type of such a

¹ For the sake of simplicity I use the bank-rate as a symbol to cover all operations designed to alter the volume of credit, including the sale or purchase of securities by the Bank.

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modern organisation. Combination of the most intricate kind is universal, though in few countries, and those not the most advanced, has absolute monopoly been attained. But all these combinations have international ties and allegiances. Interlocking directorships link up the financial syndicate with the manufacturing company, and the power, or distributing companies. And this intimate relationship is repeated across frontiers. A French company will turn out on inspection to be the "subsidiary" of the American Trust. American capital is found to lie behind concerns which seem to be Japanese. One cosmopolitan alliance or another dominates electricity throughout Latin America or Turkey. All this means that national regulation has become obsolete. It is not tariffs which draw the boundaries of the markets of each industry. The Trust dictates them, not on national grounds, but on considerations of sound economy: each manufacturer shall serve the market at his door, and long-distance trade shall be governed by the rule that waste in transport must be avoided. Geography and not politics delimits markets. It may seem that a French firm, enjoying the patriot's monopoly of the French colonial market, is actually supplying Algiers and Madagascar. Not at all: that French firm is a mere satellite of the American Trust, and does

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not manufacture the equipment which it supplies. An independent firm may offer, to a power or distributive company, equipment which in spite of duties is in quality superior to the article which other manufacturers supply, and actually cheaper. It offers it in vain. The power company is in the grip of a financial syndicate; it must deal with the manufacturing firms which the same syndicate has financed. In these several ways tariffs become negligible. They can be circumvented, but even when they seem to operate, the profits of the protected industry flow across the guarded frontier to the coffers of the cosmopolitan Trust.¹

What is true of the electrical industry, which has not yet in Europe achieved, either nationally or internationally, a tight monopoly structure, would of course be even more obviously true of a triumphant international combine like the Steel Cartel. But the refinements of technique designed to destroy political and national regulation in industry are capable of being carried to a yet higher degree of perfection. The next step, which is already under discussion, would make tariffs finally negligible. The proposal is that every international cartel should form a central fund, to which

¹The curious reader should consult the revealing volume issued by the British Electrical Industry—*Combines and Trusts in the Electrical Industry* (1927).

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every member should contribute, and from this common fund, compensation, up to the amount of the duties paid, should be given to those members whose export trade is subject to tariffs. The burden would of course fall on the consumers all over the world, and with good organisation could be completely equalised. Tariffs, if this ingenious plan should be adopted, would cease to protect, and would become nothing but cumbersome sources of revenue. The advocates of this plan openly commend it as a method by which economic nationalism can be thwarted.¹ It would have this salutary result, but it would also add one more item to the evidence which proves that national sovereignty is moribund.

Finance and industry are then, so soon as they achieve their ideal in organisation, a solvent, which causes frontiers to crumble and national sovereignty to decay. But the result is certainly not to produce a simpler or less organic world. On the contrary, its relations have become more numerous and more complex than they were in the previous generation. What has happened is rather that its political form has ceased to correspond to the economic reality. The flags and frontiers,

¹ See the interesting memorandum prepared by Professor Grossmann of Zurich for the League's Economic Conference—"Methods of Economic Rapprochement."

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which proclaim that we live in a world of sovereign States, as numerous as they are distinct, have begun to lie. Numerous these States may be, but they are neither sovereign nor distinct. They are penetrated by an infinity of the most subtle ties and relationships, and coöperation replaces competition as the rule even of industry and trade. Among material things, among machines and shop counters, the drift is towards internationalism. The changes in our economic environment tell in favour of the Great Society. One might almost say, in the dying words of the younger Pitt, as one surveys the triumphant march of the Trusts across the frontiers—"Roll up the map of Europe: it will never be needed again."

Men's minds, unless we have exhausted our will to live, must adapt themselves to their changing environment. The process will move the faster when it is seen to be inevitable. To complete my argument I have to show, then, that no solution which differs very widely from the League idea, appears to be probable.

What, then, are the possible solutions which we must consider? (1) It may be said, of course, by conservative minds, that in spite of the alterations which appear to be going on in the economic structure of the world, no great changes are probable or necessary in its political form. The Empires

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will continue to overtop the minor national States, but without destroying or absorbing them, and the League will remain what it now is, a rather dull platform for discussion, and a useful centre for philanthropic activities. (2) Or it may be said that one of the Empires will dominate and unify the world; the minor States will become even more obviously provincial, and the League will dwindle to a rudimentary organ. (3) A third view may contend that finance, or industry, or both together, will emancipate themselves from politics, force State forms into the background, evolve their own constitution for the earth, and impose the dictatorship of capital. (4) Lastly, there is the possibility of world revolution and the triumph of Internationalism after the pattern, not of Geneva, but of Moscow—in a word, the dictatorship of labour.

Leaving to the end of our survey the first of these four possibilities, let us consider the chance that an Empire may unify the world, by concentrating mastery in its own hands. There is but one Power which might, by reason of its wealth and population, achieve this preëminence. Few would dispute the possibility that the United States might one day attain this place. But without wasting words, I will say bluntly that I cannot conceive her attaining it without war. Proud

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rivals do not submit to the domination of another without a struggle. But war would change all the elements of our problem. I predict no victory for the League's idea, if ruin should overtake us in this form.

The next suggestion—that finance, or industry, or both may divorce the State, drive political forms into the shadow, and endow the world with a constitution of their own contriving—is just thinkable, on one condition. It is that this constitution should accord an equal place to labour. Finance may contentedly dominate the world from the obscure background, but would it ever dare to step alone into the open? At present, however great its influence may be, it hides behind the State. It shoulders no responsibility. It dreads publicity. Watching banks and foreign offices, as they dole out loans to weak States and devise their “dollar diplomacy,” one is often at a loss to say which is hand and which is glove. This suggestion supposes first of all a complete change in the habit and temper of finance. In becoming cosmopolitan, we must imagine that it will lose its shyness. One can believe that it may lose its dependence on the national State. Behind which State can the Franco-German Steel Cartel shelter? What State could have played guardian to that curious invention of Mr. Lloyd George's brain,

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the international Consortium—"Europa Ltd.," as it was nicknamed—which had a brief and shadowy life at the time of the Genoa Conference? Drawing its capital from every country of the West, and investing it in every country of the East, to whom would it have owed allegiance? It is conceivable that cartels and syndicates of this type might come together to form an international Council which would, in effect, by its money power, dominate the world. Improbable such a development may be, but not impossible. But this, I think, one may certainly say: if cosmopolitan capital dared to come into the open and to wield its powers publicly, it would be forced to take international labour into partnership. If it did not do this spontaneously, events and public opinion would compel it. An able publicist, M. Francis Delaisi, has, indeed, worked out a plausible constitution on this basis, and he, it is interesting to note, builds up this industrial authority within the League. There is no invincible antagonism between the two ideas. A world unified on this plan would enjoy a representative constitution, but it would assign industrial affairs to chambers chosen by capital and labour, and political affairs to the League's Assembly. One may doubt the possibility of dividing these two fields, and few of us would be willing to leave to capital and labour the

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decision of economic questions without introducing the consumer, but these are constitutional details: this solution involves no absolute contradiction of the League idea.

One turns from the dictatorship of capital to the dictatorship of labour. Morally Moscow and Geneva may be at opposite poles. The one would achieve international unity by world-wide revolution: the other by gradual evolution. Geneva is, or claims to be a neutral in the struggles of capital and labour: Socialist and Capitalist States and Governments may both be loyal members of the League. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, defiantly proclaims in its official title that only Socialist Republics may join it. But in spite of this dual opposition, the triumph of Moscow, if one can conceive of it as possible, would mean the adoption of the idea of world government in its most extreme form. The Soviet Union is a conscious rival of the League, which proclaimed its intention to become a world-wide federation, when it deliberately dropped the word "Russian" from its title. It is, indeed, the most centralised federation in the world, and compared with its actual arrangements, the proposals in this book for the attribution of certain rights and powers to a central world-authority, are timid compromises. Its basis, moreover, is, in theory at least, representative,

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however little Moscow may like the word "democratic." But the adoption of the Muscovite pattern of international government is no more conceivable without war, than the unification of the world under the hegemony of a single Power. To discuss its prospects fully would involve too long a digression. The tactical errors of the Third International, which are not accidental, since they flow directly from its rigid theories, are constantly balanced by the zeal of its members and their capacity for self-sacrifice. Schooled to poverty and obedience, like a monastic order, they impose a limit on their own incomes, which to European and still more to American notions, seems incredibly low. No member to whom the command may come from his fellows to leave his work and his native town, to undertake a public task, may refuse the charge, even if it should mean the breaking up of his home, and the utmost peril to his life. And while the Russian Communist must be content with a lower salary than the non-communist, his offences alone are punished with merciless severity, for the penalty in his case, for any grave breach of trust, is death. I can never bring myself to say that success is impossible for a party which fosters such zeal and accepts such discipline. If the more moderate Socialist Parties could approach this noble fanaticism, they would lead the world.

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In Asia one can readily contemplate the triumph of Moscow. In America the imagination refuses to admit it. In Europe, it seems to me, it may happen, if ever again defeat in a great war should shatter the illusions and loyalties on which society is built.

There is still the possibility that the world may escape fundamental change, and remain stereotyped as it stands to-day. A possibility this may be, in the sense that one can think it without self-contradiction. But to my mind this is the only one of these four possible solutions of the world problem, which reality decisively rejects. The contemporary world is in unstable equilibrium: one can say nothing about it with certainty, save that it changes and must change. Can men, in the rush of trade, trample frontiers flat, and make no mark on kingdoms? In which of the Continents has the ice closed in, to freeze the current of life? When the chalking up of a figure in a New York bank can make or mar fortunes in Tokio and Stockholm, is it possible that men should retain their simple feudal loyalties, and their old sense of national divisions? If the national State is no longer sovereign, when men count their wealth and trade, can it for ever command them, when it would array its legions? But apart from these general conditions which make for change,

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where is the stable Continent? Not Asia, girding its loins for the struggle against Imperialism. Not Europe, littered with the botched work of Versailles. Not even America, while finance and strategy extend the empire of the North. The man who believes in a changeless world must point to a contented world. But where some are gorged, others must go hungry. Three great Powers proclaim aloud their dissatisfaction, Germany, Italy, and Russia, and after them come Turkey and Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary. Can the Soviet idea penetrate China and leave no trace? Can Fascism boast that it will darken the sky with its aëroplanes, and stand motionless for ever? Is there no explosive among the contentious raw materials, and have men quarrelled for the last time over iron and oil and coal? I refuse to reckon as a rational belief the opinion, that every one of these forces of upheaval must fail to bring about change. A reasonable man might justify it, only if he were prepared to argue that in all these cases the League will prevent change and stave off war. I should answer, firstly, that it cannot stave off war, if it tries to prevent change. But more decidedly still would I answer, that unless the League first strengthens its own constitution, and adds to its own powers, it will be helpless either to dictate change or to forbid war.

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Faced with all these forces that make for change, I will confess the weakness in my own argument. I have argued that the world may adopt internationalism as it adopted toleration. No party, as I conceive it, will first win worldwide power by violent struggle, and then impose this solution on mankind. Rather the intolerable tension of competing nationalisms, the weariness engendered by the fruitless strife, the decay of belief in the myths of nationality, will conspire with the trend of economic change, to open men's ears, when thinkers preach, and parties propose the international solution.

I do not suggest that this, or anything else that is fundamental, can be won without struggle. But the struggle between nationalism and internationalism is a phase of the struggle between the ruling class which dominates each modern State—the class of owners—and the workers who wield no effective power in any modern State. One need not suppose that this struggle must end in the acknowledged victory of the workers, if the international solution is to be adopted. It may happen that the ruling class, or a part of it, loses its conviction that it must defend the national State against every encroachment on its sovereignty. It loses this conviction, because its economic interests

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are no longer centred exclusively in the national State.

But there is, I admit, a deadly weakness in this forecast. It demands for its realisation a length of time on which we have no right to reckon. Even when one allows for the rapidity of the changes which are going on in our economic environment, and for the quickening of the pace of thought in these days of easy communication, one supposes that some years, perhaps many years, must elapse before the League could evolve from its present impotence, into an institution capable of exercising real authority. Before these years of preparation and growth have passed, the crisis may be upon us, which will reveal the impotence of the League, and overwhelm, in the disasters of a world-war, both League and civilisation. If we relapse into quietism, and rely on the silent workings of destiny to ripen and mature the League, our fate will overtake us in our sleep. Our only hope lies in this—that the penalty of inaction is so terrible, that it may work upon our minds, and stir us to great efforts. Only by healing our divisions and concentrating our wills, can the friends of constructive peace expect to hasten the great change within the space of years on which we may count. Not without labour and struggle,

Olives of Endless Age

shall we crown ourselves with olives of endless age.

Once, in the lifetime of our generation, civilisation has escaped its overthrow. It will not survive a second war. The bush and the desert may encroach on our fields and our cities, as they have covered the traces of earlier cultures. A scene haunts my memory, as I think of the shadowed future. A road which once had been white and dusty in the summer heat, stretched its length across the endless plains that merge Poland into Russia. The dust had settled down to nourish the roots of the grass that grew upon it, for months had passed since the rear-guard of the last army in retreat had left it to silence and to peace. Beyond it, on either side, stood the forest. It was infinitely older than the road. Its trees had stood in their unbroken ranks, when the first human pioneers, hot on the track of boar or stag, burst into its brushwood. It had seen them come, with dance and ritual, to propitiate the spirit of vegetation in its mighty veterans. It had watched, through the slow centuries, the widening of the woodman's path into a road which pack-animals could tread. It had submitted first to the invading ox-waggon, and then to carriage and car. It had felt the axe of the conqueror about the trunks of its trees, till year by year, the free space on

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either side of the roadway had widened into spreading acres. Fire had consumed the branches of its trees, and their ashes had enriched the soil. Only four years before, there stretched, on either side of the road, fields of yellow corn, and at each harvest, man celebrated his victory over the forest. And then came war. The plough lay rusting. Over the first field the fir-trees scattered their cones, and where corn was wont to spring, a young forest covered the soil. As I drove over the green road, the forest kept its ranks, like an army which stands erect, while the front file kneels. In the distance, tall and sombre, were the older trees. Midway was the fresh verdure of the saplings. By their feet at the road's edge, one could just discern the shoots of this year's growth. In ordered ranks and disciplined companies, the forest advanced. In four years, with war as its ally, it had obliterated the toil of ages.

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